Introduction
Recently, a member
of parliament who thought was doing the rest of his colleagues a favour found
himself in the firing line after the public got wind of his intention poised to
introduce a motion that would see Government spend more on ordinary MPs after
they have left office. The crux of the proposal is that Government should institute
a mechanism that should see MPs earn something at the end of every month after
the expiry of their tenure or after they have failed reelection. The amount proposed
is half what the MP was earning at the time he or she left office or was forced
to leave office. His prayer is that this will have to go on for the rest of that
MP’s life. People have expressed dismay at this, almost all arguments
lampooning the idea. Some civil society organisations have weighed in,
threatening vigil at Parliament should he persist. Some MPs have spoken on
this, supporting their colleague though quaking in their boots, as they have
requested newspapers never to attribute the sentiments to their names. Some
have buried their heads in the sand, altogether abstaining. As a citizen who values
Open Government principles, one who never shies away from commenting on matters
bound to have telling implications on Malawi’s broad public policy, I have decided
to spare time to put in my opinion. For me, threatening the MPs without sifting
their side of the story fails to reflect the spirit of debate this country
desperately yearns today. I feel we should not spurn a healthy debate on what
has been one of the most vexing questions on efforts to help exorcise the
spirit of dependency in the House. Using my experience as a former news
reporter and now a lapsed student of public administration, and also evidence
from literature and interaction with mostly former MPs, I will demonstrate why it
could be healthy and politically progressive to listen to them first. In the
end, I take a position that a moderate sum that should see them live a somehow
moderate life as people who had put in so much to drive public policy the
correct way should not be a bad idea. However, what I find rather misplaced is
the timing of the motion and the quantity of the proposed package. Albeit, it
could still be sensible to debate it, knowing that motions can also serve what
is described as “strategic-serving purposes”, that is, to water the land in
readiness for future robust debate. The structure of this paper sees the
rationale for the argument after this introduction. The third part enquires
into why people are often dismissive of matters involving MPs’ rewards and incentives.
A detailed discussion doling out reasons MPs should be considered in such a
manner will then follow, after which conclusion.
Disclaimer: I am writing this
article in my capacity as a student of public administration and as a firm
believer in citizen participation for evidence-based public policy.
Why I am
interested in the debate about MPs on matters economic incentives
Recently, I
conducted research on why Members of Parliament in Malawi (at times) support
bills that are patently anti-people, that is, bills that do not promote or
enhance public interest. Jurisprudence terms such pieces of legislation ‘bad’ laws,
that is, laws that do not respond to preferences or wishes of general good, the
people. The motivation for this research was a television interview the former
Speaker of Parliament, Right Honourable Louis Chimango, gave a Zodiak reporter
on “Cruise 5”. The carry-home was a point he made that suggested that there
could be some issues about MPs we only assume, perhaps that we should take a
lot of interest to understand the complex setting within which our MPs work. I
also took a lot of interest in matters parliamentary after I had read a few
works on the complex subject of separation of powers, after which it dawned on
me that though in principle the three branches of government are considered
equal and complementary, for some reasons, the legislature brings the rear,
that is, seems not to perch on the same elite rung as the other two, the
executive and the judiciary. Perhaps this is the reason Kameme (2015) has
described the Malawi National Assembly (MNA) as a legitimisation or
rubber-stamping institution. Kameme is a former MP, and the fact that a former
MP could arrive at such a conclusion should stir us to enquire or execute a
robust inquiry to better understand the MNA. (I feel incentives or welfare of
MPs one such pertinent area.) Honourable Kameme was investigating the extent to which the Malawi Parliament performs its
vertical and horizontal accountability roles in law-making, representation and
scrutiny. His conclusion was that, since the rebirth of multiparty democracy in
this country, the MNA has been suffering a high executive influence, rendering
it an institution with no policy-making powers.
Why the people
have dismissed outright the MPs’ proposal on this question
In truth, the resounding
level of repudiation of Honourable Werani Chilenga’s proposed motion has been
unprecedented. In the Weekend Nation (dated Saturday, 12th August,
2023), for example, a journalist I respect, MacDonald Bamusi, described the
proposal as “quite interesting indeed” (see “Chilenga, others must tread
carefully on MPs’ pension motion”.) One can read Bamusi’s sentiments are driven
by a desire to defend public interest and no personal grudges whatsoever, as he
has first described Chilenga as “an active, intelligent, charismatic and
down-to-earth parliamentarian” and an “astute people’s representative”. Bamusi
has invoked economic rationale to justify why Chilenga’s introduction of such a
motion is “quite interesting indeed”. For him, that “Malawians across the
country are spending sleepless nights in fuel queues at filling stations where
the commodity is scarcely available” and that “people are failing to find food
as maize prices keep soaring every day” should pump sense in Chilenga and
company to revisit or set their priorities right. He goes on to say in 2025
Malawi will have 228 legislators (presently Malawi has 193 Parliamentarians but
the electoral laws have been revised under the supervision of the international
community serious about democracy, creating thirty-five new constituencies) and
should the motion pass, the country would be spending “not less than K228
million every month or K2.7 billion a year on legislators, some of whom said or
did nothing when Malawians needed them most”.
The same newspaper
carries another powerful article “Pension for MPs is self-serving, shameless” (p.
18) by a man and analyst to the manner born, Steven Nhlane. Nhlane minces no
words, describing it all as “evil campaign”. According to Nhlane, “the
legislators’ argument is that the President, the Vice-President, Speaker of
Parliament and their deputies who are elected just like them, are all on a
pension scheme [so] [T]hey think that the current arrangement which leaves them
out of such perks is discriminatory.” Nhlane then almost turns the
uncompromising John the Baptist, “We must stop this greed, this madness and
wanton abandon of decency and morals.”
Now, flip your
eyes across the spread where Kondwani Kamiyala, someone, hats off, revered as a
top-notch news analyst, opines on one thing on which MPs always agree, guess
what, their perks (see p. 19: “MPs agree, always, on one thing”). Thus, you can
clearly read in it the magnitude of folly Chilenga’s attempt to tread where
even angels fear to carries, something that has invited for him general blame,
and this has been ‘universal’ as Malawi News (Saturday, August 12 – 18,
2023) too has picked him out. One headline by another of Malawi’s first-rate
analysts, Stephen Dakalira, appears in the fashion of caution: “Hold it right there”.
In the same
newspaper at page 6, a celebrated arts enthusiast, Richard Chirombo, wonders
why matters arts have been relegated yet these “[L]awmakers … seem to become
animated only when issues concern them.” Chirombo unequivocally submits that
MPs do not pursue a career but are only there serving the people, and so should
never be compensated for life. You can decipher the level of frustration in
Chirombo merely by the title of his article: “2 disappointing weeks in
Parliament”.
And when the same
newspaper on its HAVE YOUR SAY page asks whether MPs should be entitled to a
lifetime package, a good 7 comments (out of the total of 10) fault it outright.
And here, sample them: “the proposal is not on”, “it is selfish”, “a waste of
public funds”, “must concentrate on developing their areas”, “our economy
cannot allow that”, “will strain our economy”, and “money they are requesting
could be channelled to other important projects”. Even among the three in
support of the proposal, only two endorse it outright, as one calls for further
debate on the matter.
Almost all the
items I have read on the matter on the social media have not spared Honourable
Chilenga, in some cases, presenting examples from the West where some MPs have been
seen to forgo so much just to serve their constituents. Perhaps I should remind
the people who have been eager to cite such evidence that, in public policy, it
is a sin almost unforgivable to grant equal measure and attention to two
completely different public policy contexts (as though were one). The
readership must also be reminded that some of the oft-cited evils haunting
parliaments in Africa are very much an issue in parliaments in the developed
world. In the UK, for example, one of the reasons cited for
the MPs’ inappropriate behaviour following the 2009 expenses scandal there was
that the MPs had felt entitled to over-claim allowances since they were earning
less than what those with similar qualifications outside parliament were
getting (Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, & Quinn, 2013). Following this, their
conditions were improved, perhaps an acknowledgement that the question of
economic incentives ought to be scrutinised thoroughly if parliamentarians are
to be weaned from a culture of dependency, dormancy and too much submission.
It should be
pointed out that the evidence on the people’s perception of MPs as analysed here
is very much what literature on legislative studies proffers. For example, Patel
(2008) writes that, following MPs’ perceived dereliction of their constitutional duty, the people have described the
Malawi National Assembly and the MPs therein as “childish”, “waste of time”,
and “drain of resources” (p. 34). They have also been described as unusually eager
to pass bills that promise material or monetary advantage to them as opposed to
bills geared towards uplifting the general welfare of Malawians. Think of this:
of the 26 bills passed in 2011, a good 22 were materialist―16 money bills, and
6 mostly on higher education and energy (Chikaya-Banda, 2012). Thus, only 4 had
dealt with socio-legal issues. The same had been the case in the first term after democratisation, i.e. May 18, 1994 to May 25, 1999 when a total of 156 bills, nearly half of which (74 bills) on money issues (Financial Bills) (see Chirwa, Patel & Kanyongolo, 2013, p. 78). Surely, a picture like this gives MPs no chance
to be listened to.
Further, even on
the question of corruption, examples are so rife it makes it difficult to side
with MPs on matters money as the general feeling is always that MPs generally fail
to live to the people’s expectation. Only a year into the second democratic
dispensation, for example, MPs from the United Democratic Front (UDF) and
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) benefited from the so-called “K50,000
Presidential handouts” in May 1995 (Lwanda, 2004, p. 54). This was not a
once-off affair as it was to be repeated in 2001 in what came to be described
as the “Brown Envelope Saga” when envelopes containing cash rewards were handed
out to MPs to induce them to vote in favour of extending the presidential
tenure through the Open Term Bill (later Third Term Bill) (Patel, 2008, p. 28).
According to Lwanda (2019), Khwauli Msiska, the AFORD MP who had introduced the
Bill in Parliament at the time, was allegedly paid MK3 million for the job (p.
51). In 2017, during the debate on the 50 + 1 Bill, Hon. Dzoole Mwale,
MCP, had alleged that some MPs had been given MK150,000 each to shoot down the
Bill (see Hansard, 15th December,
2017, p. 38).
On their part, the
MPs have been quick to defend themselves, arguing that, for some reasons, the
people choose to misunderstand them, blaming them as MPs for issues they, as
MPs, know nothing about. One former MP has even hit back, dubbing the criticism “irrational comments by self-acclaimed
commentators and analysts who do not know the job description of MPs” (Aipira,
2015, p. 482). These sentiments have slightly been reflected in opinions by one
former Speaker of Parliament, Right Honourable Louis Chimango, who told a “Cruise
5” reporter that MPs are truly honourable men and women who do their best in
the environment they are yet often misunderstood by the public.
Do people indeed
misunderstand MPs, or MPs are to blame for their insatiable appetite for accumulation?
Members of
Parliament perform three major functions, all crucial for a healthy democracy.
Thus, they represent the views of the constituents in Parliament (representation)
(Patel & Tostensen, 2006), oversee the executive and limit its exercise of
power in accordance with the Constitution (oversight or scrutiny) (Tostensen,
2017); and enact legislation, that is, statute law (law-making)
(Green-Pedersen, 2010). Of the three functions, the last is their primary
function. In Malawi, section 66(1)(a) to (e) of the Constitution of the
Republic of Malawi therefore provides for the function of the legislature thus:
receive, amend, accept or reject Government Bills and Private Bills, among
others. This is supported by section 48(1) which invests all legislative
functions in Parliament.
Besides, section 8
of the Constitution provides a kind of guideline or device with which the MPs must
operate, namely to enact laws through deliberations that reflect public
interest, that is, the interest of all the people of Malawi with the purpose to
further the values expressed clearly or otherwise in the Constitution. This
framework is complemented by the provision in section 13 on national policy,
though these are merely programmatic or directory in nature, meaning, they are
not truly enforceable at law. To the best of my knowledge, nowhere in the
Constitution are the legislators invoked to provide for their constituents. But
our politics has been fashioned in such a manner that every MP inherits all the
problems of the constituency to address them personally. Besides, it has been
the general people’s expectation that MPs should reach the extent of actually
fighting to force their way on matters. Parliament is a house of honour, and it
subsists in debate and decorum that must be taken following particular rules
and procedures, hence standing orders.
I have ever
travelled with MPs to their constituencies when I worked as a reporter. I could
read helplessness on their faces as they tried to put portions for various
categories of constituents: from chiefs (the bigger lot) down to drummers. It
is no strange MPs pleading with reporters to ensure their story was aired so
some would know they are doing something about or for the constituency. The
same was the case at Parliament where MPs made friends all to see their stories
reach their constituents. It taught me one thing, this, that we over-expect on
these individuals, and in their attempt to impress, they adopt life of a fugitive,
choosing to reside in cities away from their constituencies.
And this general scarcity and dwindling economy, so much in constituencies will be laid at the feet of the MP, perhaps justifying the need for a special consideration.
For quite some
time, constituency fund has been an issue, MPs demanding a bigger say over it.
I think it has been out of the same pressure, namely that MPs should personally
meet almost every need in the constituency, that has forced MPs to demand this
chunk of say on the fund. In 2019, one MP, Honourable Kamlepo Kalua, even took
effort to clarify on the need for the MPs to control this (see “Kamlepo defends
MPs’ grip on CDF” by Joel Chirwa. The
Nation. Tuesday, April 22, 2019. Blantyre: Nation Publications Ltd).
Honourable Kalua stated that “Constituency Development Fund was created to deal
with development gaps left by Local Development Fund and District Development
Fund. So, in this case, the incumbent MPs are obliged to manage the fund and
ensure that the whole constituency benefits” (p. 8). He added: “Those alleging
that sitting MPs do this and that with the fund are speaking from the
perspective of ignorance” (p. 8).
Many
people hold the view that when a Member of Parliament holds the floor or speaks
in the House then he or she has done some job or that he or she has demonstrated
she has the welfare of the people at heart. The truth of the matter is that
power relations matter so much over who should be given the floor on an issue
in the House. It is no fault of the MP that he or she does not contribute. I
know a Member of Parliament who obstinately opposed the 2011 Injunctions Bill,
describing it as “infamous” and “incensing” yet had no choice but to vote in
its favour. Perhaps this explains why Right Honourable Davis Katsonga, former
Speaker himself, compared the life of a Parliamentarian in the House to a
robot, saying, “When the party says, as far as this vote is concerned, you do
not have the freedom to vote through your conscience by voting against it, you
must support that” (Interview with Times Exclusive host). As Patel and
Tostensen (2006) report, in caucuses, “MPs are simply told what to think and
how to vote or else they are liable to be considered disloyal and risk facing
the consequences” (p. 15). The same is the case elsewhere as Abercrombie and
Baptista-Navarro, (2019, p. 4173), citing Searing (1994) and Norton (1997) have
reported: “Voting (in Parliament) is to a large extent constrained by party
affiliations, with members often under pressure to follow the party whip
regardless of their personal opinion.”
What all this
means is that MPs face too much pressure to exercise their freewill, and
perhaps that, unless we devise a mechanism to make them truly independent, we
will continue to expect so much from them when it is common knowledge that
there is a limit to what they can actually do without facing consequences.
MPs are also
restricted by time. Consider the following table on allotment of time as
provides the 2003 Malawi Parliament Standing Orders, p. 70.
|
Number |
Activity |
Period |
|
1 |
Second Reading |
15 minutes |
|
2 |
Standing
Committee Report |
10 minutes |
|
3 |
Other Members |
05 minutes per Member |
|
4 |
Minister in
reply |
05 minutes |
|
5 |
Speech to amendment |
05 minutes per Speech |
In all fairness,
the job of a Parliamentarian is never easy, some say it is complex. But how
complex?
The complexity of
the job of the legislator
Here is what the
World Bank (2006) testifies about it:
Unlike
chief executives, who represent entire nations, or bureaucrats and judges,
whose responsibility it is to carry out and interpret the law impartially
toward all citizens, legislators are responsible for representing the
differences in society, and for bringing those differences into the
policy-making arena. These differences may be rooted in geography, ethnicity,
religion, political identification, gender, or other characteristics, but MPs
are expected to present them at the national level (p. 1).
Nearly two decades
ago, the SADC Parliamentary Forum (2004) had made similar observations, namely
that “[p]arliamentary careers are among the most complex and challenging on
earth (because) [c]ompeting demands—from one’s party, from the House, from the
constituency and family—make the MP’s life a challenging balancing act” (p. 7).
At the international level, Akbar Khan, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth
Parliamentary Association, has compared the job of Parliamentarians to
“navigation in the complexities of parliamentary life” (The Parliamentarian, 2017, p. 284).
This juggling and complex job
description suggests that “parliaments are the most crucial institutions of
democratic representation and accountability” (Chên, 2017, p. 2), or in the
words of Mello and Peters (2018) “the pivotal democratic institution”
(p. 3), perhaps suggesting that democracy without a functioning parliament is
as good as dead. It also suggests the need for great art and balance if one is
to negotiate the terrain of the National Assembly.
While executing
this noble role, MPs from the opposition find themselves torn between serving the
people and their political party or even the man or woman at the apex of the
party. If they are from the ruling party, they will have to negotiate the
interests of, on one hand, the man or woman at the helm of power, the President
together with the (ruling) party, and on the other, of the constituents or the
people. It is easy to dismiss arguments that most MPs are reduced to occasional
participants because of power relations as determined by hierarchy and rules.
It is easy to pinpoint where MPs allegiance should lie, but because of power
relations in the House, things can never be as simple as one may try to reduce
or put them.
The power
relations in the House makes scrutiny, in the honest sense of this word and in
all its categories, a tall order. By scrutiny here, I mean “any activity that
involves examining (and being prepared to challenge) the expenditure,
administration and policies of the government of the day” (White, 2015, p. 3).
The three main categories of scrutiny mechanisms are debate, questions (oral
and written) and committees (White, p. 17).
Thus, it is more
of a ritual than serious business when MPs meet in plenary. Plenary session
refers to meeting in the National Assembly where all the members meet as one
group. It is also referred to as “a sitting of the legislature in quorum”, or “committee
of the whole”, the highest decision-making body of the legislature. If truth be
told, it is committees that matter most. This is because parliaments perform
most of their jobs through committees. UNESCO and Inter-Parliamentary Union
(2003) make this clear when they state that “parliaments perform their works
mainly through various types of committee (standing, select, specialised or ad
hoc) that are each entrusted with responsibility for a specific sector of state
business” (p. 6). These “committees are organised to decentralise the functions
of the legislature for the purpose of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness”
(Naymote Partners for Democratic Development & Legislative Information
Services, 2019, p. 7). Strøm (1998) citing Laundy (1989) notes that all parliaments
the world over work to a greater or lesser extent through committees (p. 21).
In fact, considering the crucial role committees play in parliaments, Strøm
(1998) concludes that “no understanding of the world parliamentarians can be
complete without an account of the committees in which they serve” (p. 22). And
this is universal, for even in the US, there is growing evidence that parties
as well as committees influence congressional decisions (Kim & Loewenberg,
2005, p. 1105).
Thus, unless a
particular MP carries a senior position in the party and belongs to some
influential committee, it is not on for us to expect him or her to influence so
much in the House. Besides, it is pointed out that sector knowledge is the most
important factor when selecting chairpersons for committees (Chiru, 2017, p.
1). Chiru mentions chair seniority and party credentials as additional factors.
Thus, even in these committees, a member could be slotted in just to fill the
numbers. What all this reminds us of is that we must tame our expectation of
what most MPs can do in the House even if they belong to some important committees.
In Malawi, before
Parliament was dissolved in March 2019, the Malawi Parliament had 20 committees
comprising MPs from different political parties. The works of these committees
were being undertaken by 172 members. The majority of these members were serving
on more than one committee, with broad mandates that stretch beyond the
portfolio of a single ministry. According to Lwanda (2019), decisions by these
committees are often ignored by the party in power (p. 68).
Sometimes the
world fails to appreciate the fact that MPs can also be said to have fulfilled
their jobs through other roles, not merely through passing of bills or checking
the executive or representing the people. Thus, MPs can also perform what is
described as non-legislative functions, that is to say, those “activities with
no direct material consequences for society, since no law is changed”
(Green-Pedersen, p. 348). Non-legislative activities include such issues as
merely presence of the member in the House or parliamentary debate or a
response by government to a question and interpellations, but have no further
direct consequences for society above the attention invited around an issue.
Green-Pedersen observes that at times, such attention may trigger some
politicisation of an issue, which could in turn lead to legislative changes
though such indirect material effects are entirely different from the direct
effects of changes in legislative activities (p. 349). In some cases, a
legislator may present a bill he or she clearly knows will never pass, but that
could be important to trigger future debate. Thus, “presenting bills that have
no chance of ever being passed may in reality have a similar function to that
of non-legislative activities” (p. 349). What all this means is that scholars have
to tread with caution when they describe MPs as people who go to Parliament to
do nothing and therefore not deserving of some better welfare.
Once again, as explained,
the context within which MPs operate matters, as whether or not the MP will
contribute is not merely determined by his or her wish or whims. Various forces
restrain them from participating. For example, rules described by Yadav (2012)
as “one of the most lucrative political assets parties and politicians can have
in office” (p. 1028) applied in the House have a larger say over how MPs will
behave in the House. Rules have the power to promote or restrain certain
behaviours, for example, rules that allow a party to take control of agenda
setting in the House, and rules that punish MPs who take a stand against their
own parties may end up breeding corruption (Yadav, 2012). The explanation is
that a party who controls the rules will snip attempts by MPs to check such
malpractices as corruption, thereby weakening legislative oversight role.
Most MPs, especially
those in the opposition, have little or no powers over rules in the House. In
this way, such MPs have little or no choice to influence debate or matters in
the House. Often, those in control of the rules, the ruling party or senior
members, that is, can exert control over who should speak or not. Thus, “the extent to, and speed by, which governments can
cut off debate have important implications for government control over the
legislative agenda” (Proksch & Slapin, 2015, p. 6., citing Doring, 1995; Tsebelis,
2002; Rasch & Tsebelis, 2011).
The power to
control who should speak or not is used as a sluice to control the MPs,
especially those perceived to be anti-establishment. Besides closing the opportunity
for them to express their opinions, such MPs can also be targeted for abuse or
punishment. During the Third Term Debate, a number of MPs faced the wrath of
those who desperately wanted it pass. On one occasion, an MP had been saved by
the presence of a British official when some boys openly accused him of
frustrating the Bill.
The other reason
most MPs are powerless is that they are often a product of a closed primary
election system, one which had been prearranged by the party leader. Research
shows that MPs who go to parliament through a prearranged primary election
system surrender their parliamentary voice to the man in charge. In one
important research on primary elections as a measure of degree of internal
democracy, Alvarez and Sinclair (2012) made an interesting conclusion, namely
that members who came through an open primary election system ended up taking a
more central or a more objective position on issues in Parliament than those
who came through the closed primary system.
Even those MPs
elected on independent ticket, one we would assume to represent some open
system, defect to the ruling party once they are voted into the House. Svåsand
(2013) offers some explanation, namely that in Malawi “political parties are
heavily dependent on the leadership” (p. 7). He adds that, apart from the
selective personal benefits the MP gets after defecting, the absence of clear
ideological differences also becomes an incentive for them to defect (p. 17).
Perhaps it is no surprise that between 1994 and 2007, a good 131 MPs had
defected from the party that had sponsored them into Parliament, 72 of whom
joining the ruling party (Young, 2009 as cited in Svåsand, 2013, p. 16).
The role of the MP
is constantly overshadowed by the role of the executive. According to Wiseman
(1999), “In July 1993, the institution of Life Presidency was abolished, and
section 4 of the existing (1966) Constitution, which had established the
monopoly position of the MCP, was repealed by Parliament” (p. 6). However, as
Tostensen (2017) points out, even in the new dispensation, the governance
system in Malawi is too kind to the president, as it gives the presidency
extensive powers (p. xi). In Malawi, this strong executive “plays a prominent
role in law-making process, thus performing a legislative role” (African
Institute of Corporate Citizenship, Malawi Economic Justice Network and
Transparency International in Malawi National Integrity System Assessment
Report 2013, p. 36). One reason for this is that “all the government bills are
initiated at the Cabinet meeting chaired by the President before passed by
Parliament, and the President also becomes the last person to assent and
promulgate the Bill which he or she initiated at the Cabinet meeting” (p. 36).
Over the years,
some MPs have tried to take a position against bad legislation even though
introduced by their own parties. Almost each one of them had ended up being
isolated and eventually losing his or her seat. Without empowering such people
economically, that is, through incentives or rewards that would go beyond their
time in the Malawi National Assembly, they will remain malleable, drifting with
the wind of the leader of their party or of the party in power.
Thus, unless a
mechanism is devised to make MPs truly independent, our MPs will keep propping
on the man in charge for support and survival. The country has been presented
with the opportunity to debate this question and find itself an opening through
which to rescue the MPs from the clutch of party leaders. Although greed cannot
be ruled out, my feeling is that this question can address some weakness in
intraparty politics.
I have often met
former MPs who almost live like they had murdered someone, people looking at
them with scorn for a sin not of their own making. Even when they are educated,
once they lose their seat, it becomes very difficult for them to secure another
job. This is often the case when they were in a different party and there has
been an alternation, that is, another party has taken over. If they would be
made truly independent economically, these honourable men and women would no
longer live in shame, resorting to tailoring or taxi-driving for a living. Remember,
the title ‘honourable’ is for life, although former MPs often look with scorn
at anyone who addresses them as such. I know the reason; they think one makes
it out of mockery. A human face to their plea can help address some weaknesses
of our intraparty democracy. No matter what eventually befell them, they once
represented our beautiful Nation in our National Assembly for which they
deserve some respect.
The fact that we
have lost trust in MPs should not be a reason for us to spurn a debate that
would help address weaknesses in our intraparty democracy. We are not alone in
this, as even “established democracies in recent decades have been confronted
with manifest political disengagement, decreased levels of citizen trust in
parliamentary representatives and increased public dissatisfaction with the
competence of parliaments” (Judge & Leston-Bandeira (2018, p. 154), citing
Dalton (2004) and Norris (2011). However, this pandemic has not spared the
other branches of government about which people do not speak much. Thus, writing
for the context of Finland, Snellman (2015), observe that this problem is
evident in all institutions of government.
Perhaps it is the
timing and the magnitude of the request that the people find fault with; well,
we can still debate it and in future consider how far we can help these great
men and women serving or who once served this Great Nation.
Why we have often
misunderstood MPs
One reason we dismiss MPs before we have listened to
their stories is that we often look the world from our own perspective. This is
why parliamentary studies encourages use of interpretivism, a theory that
stresses the importance of context in meaning interpretation. As Geddes and
Rhodes (2018) report, we must “take seriously the way in which political actors
interpret the world around them” (p. 8). Thus, our meanings must be put side by
side with those the MPs construct for us to arrive at a robust interpretation.
The other reason we misunderstand MPs is that we
rarely take time to understand our MPs using approaches that would ensure we
put ourselves in their shoes. In the UK, the Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority had established in 2012 that 57 per cent of those who said
they thought they had a good idea of what MPs actually did thought they did a
good job (Cowley & Stuart, 2015), meaning unless people take time to study
the legislature, they are bound to cast it in bad light.
We also misunderstand MPs because we mistake them for
government. Beetham (2011) does not take kindly to this. According to Beetham,
it is not the mandate or role of parliamentarians to deliver national outcomes
yet when delivery of these outcomes fails, it is parliament, rather than
government, that takes the blame. Similarly, unless we understand the complex
setting in which our MPs work, our perception of them is bound to be jaundiced
(Thompson, 2016). Thompson therefore opines that MPs deserve a kinder billing
in the people’s assessment. Thompson was writing of the UK House of Commons.
Well, before I conclude, let me quote verbatim what a former
MP had told me a few hours after the passing on of Right Honourable Nelson
Khonje (who was the Speaker of the National Assembly during the era of the
Malawi Congress Party before the country had returned to multiparty democracy).
It was a Tuesday, November 26, 2019:
But look
at the position of the late Khonje that has just died. A speaker, twelve years
in the chair. He dies in the hands of, I think, his family, his daughter, very
brave and dedicated woman. We have yet to find out; I haven’t met her myself
but I understand she was looking after him. A whole Speaker? No benefit?
Because he served during that time (one-party era) maybe? What are we doing? … A
whole Speaker? A man who has put his neck on the chopping board, who has
protected the Head of State in that very volatile situation, who has served the
nation at the risk of his own welfare?
The MPs can never speak for themselves, and Honourable
Chilenga should be commended for this bold stance. He is in the opposition, but
this is an issue that concerns all MPs; who knew the Chilengas would be
speaking from the opposite benches today? At the same time, let me commend
Malawi’s vigilant media fraternity for keeping our Nation in check. In Malawi,
the media dishes us the best any civil society can, and when they put us to check,
we must always celebrate. They set the agenda for strategic and responsive
public policy, giving us an opportunity to debate issues before they are
finally considered for exit or adoption. What I am doing here is merely
complementing their great service to this Great Nation, merely adding a voice
or angle to their brilliant analyses.
Conclusion
Members of
Parliament in Malawi have not served the people as expected, but this has not
been of their own making; the context of the Malawi National Assembly (MNA) is
so complex one ought to take time to understand why good men and women suddenly
change once inducted and socialised in the House. It is not easy for a
Parliamentarian to withstand the political-economy forces he or she comes up against
in the MNA, because the nature of our politics, right from the early days of
the second dispensation, has found pleasure in vesting too much power in the
executive. Thus, Malawi’s political problems are often traced to intraparty
democracy where party leaders live like emperors, demi-gods. It must be in
public interest to make our MPs truly independent and autonomous so that they should
be able to take independent decisions without fear of what might befall them once
they have decided to listen to their conscience. I equate empowering MPs economically
with giving them the teeth with which to bite without looking over their
shoulders. And if this request was coming from the judiciary, were the people
going to question as much as they have? I don’t think so. And, you tell me, what
could be the justification under our law that only the Speaker and the Deputy
are on pension and all those like me have to think about what the world will be
like the day the glittering diamond chandeliers of the National Assembly
disappear forever?
The debate is on,
and debate is healthy.
I love my Country.
GOD bless.
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