Why our institutional reforms must take into account Malawi’s unique context and political culture: A look at wicked problems, neo-patrimonialism, and the unintended consequences of the stroke of genius that nullified the May 2019 Malawi Presidential Vote

Introduction

February 3, 2020 is special in our history. For the first time following the return to multiparty democracy in 1993, a Court nullified a whole Presidential Vote; it is historic and unprecedented in the honest sense of the word. Following that judgement, however, events in the country have taken a strange twist and it seems like we are heading towards some constitutional crisis, if not constitutional chaos. What spurs me to write is what I perceive to be a wrong narrative many are advancing in their attempts to explain the origins of all this chaos. Almost everyone has now swallowed the explanation that the source of our trouble is the May 2019 Presidential Vote. Some have added to the version elements of regionalism and tribalism as exacerbating factors. My fear is that this wrong diagnosis is forcing us to embark on institutional reforms without taking into account Malawi’s political culture. I opine that such an approach to our problems is creating many an unintended policy consequence. My argument is that our problems are too complex (I borrow the term ‘wicked problems’ to define them), but each one of them can be traced to our political culture, the mother of neo-patrimonialism, a vice that is guiding our discourse and every way of life today. I argue further that it is the poison of neo-patrimonialism, and it is very much present in every party at the moment, that is stealthily robbing us of political integration and national identification, two important ingredients in nation-building. Thus, I demonstrate how that this malignance―neo-patrimonialism―has found a fertile ground in Malawi owing to a number of factors including (1) a culture that detests learning from policy failures or flaws (from within and without), something that makes us commit, with monotonous regularity, previous policy blunders; and (2) the nature of political audience that comprises our political support base, a political fabric that is largely superstitious with an inclination towards envy, a culture of orality and scapegoating. I conclude that, unless we understand that Malawi’s political troubles are a direct consequence of a political culture that supports neo-patrimonialism, we will be directing our policy arrows at the wrong animal, a futile experiment akin to looking for a needle in a haystack.

Is Malawi better off now after the judgement?

First of all, this judgement has been hailed by many as a statement of intent that elections ought not to be measured by quantity alone, but much more, by the quality through which that quantity or figures or outcome was derived. It was a bold statement underscoring the level of independence the judiciary enjoys in this country. At the same time, we must also never close our eyes to the fact that it takes a restrained executive as an incentive for such a system to excel or operate freely.

You would expect that, following such a historic judgement, the policy terrain would go quiet; that hasn’t been the case; it hasn’t been the case because, like it or not, every profound legal or policy score often sets into motion a chain reaction of complex problems, call them unintended consequences, if you want. In 1964, only a day after Malawi had attained self-rule, the country found itself teetering on the brink of chaos and damage following the “imposition of out patient’s fee in all government hospitals of three pence by Dr. Banda with effect from 7th July 1964 amidst Independence ecstasy” (Chinguwo, n.d., p. 1).

The events in Iraq following the invasion by the Coalition Forces offer another perfect example of how victory and a feeling of accomplishment often trigger a litany of complex vices. According to Allawi (2007), “the overthrow of the regime that ruled Iraq was achieved in record time … (however), the euphoria that accompanied this effortless victory quickly gave way to increasing bewilderment … as the occupier came face to face with the realities of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the mystery of this most complex of countries” (p. 1). Allawi says this because “nothing that had preceded the war … could have prepared the Coalition … for what they actually found” (p. 1).

Following the Constitutional Court Judgement, many positive developments have hit the policy road. For example, the quota system―an equity mechanism for selecting students to public universities in the country―is now history. The quota system has been a contentious issue between Malawians from the North of the country and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which has a huge support base in the South. North Malawians have for long blamed it for marginalising students from the Region. Similarly, it is now codified in our laws that Malawi should run on 50 + 1 system when electing a President. The latter development has led to realignment among political parties in readiness for a Presidential Vote to take place on May 19 this year. Thus, the incumbent, Professor Peter Mutharika of the DPP, has joined hands with Atupele Muluzi, of the former ruling party, the United Democratic Front (UDF). On the other hand, discussions are ongoing between the United Transformation Party (UTM) of the reinstated Vice-President, Dr Saulos Chilima, and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) of Dr Lazarus Chakwera, for a coalition to oust Professor Peter Mutharika at the May 19 Vote.

Language from both camps―the MCP-UTM yet-to-be coalition, and the DPP-UDF done-coalition―seems to suggest at attempt to break into power for interests that have little to do with serving public interest. In other words, careful reading of their positions betrays the fact that it is power that is of great interest in them all. You would say, well, they want power of course, power with which to set the wheels of policy running. You should read in this some unintended consequences, namely that though the Court had worked to make the road clear for our elections in terms of quality, our eyes are set on quantity, to secure power. Put simply, the emphasis has returned to numbers or figures―secure the best numbers and go home with that seat of power.

(Just a small word of correction here: I prefer not to call the DPP-UDF coalition ‘coalition’ for this one reason: these two parties are one in everything bar colours. They have the same history, have worked together before, name it. This is not a coalition; it is a reunion, pure and simple. This is why it has been very easy for them to share their political bed again. It is a different story with the MCP-UTM coalition. In fact, it is easier for UTM members to return to DPP―reunion―than it is for them to enter into a coalition with the MCP. You would think I am biased; read the 2009 elections well, there the leaders had agreed only for the followers to choose to act otherwise, refusing to obey the order. You can be there in name only; come voting day, you go for the ex. Forget the Esau-Jacob fear―'fighting' right from the womb, this is the major dilemma facing the UTM-MCP coalition.)

I digressed.

It seems we are repeating the mistakes of old where change or opportunities for change were scuppered through our obsession with trivia after such moments were seized by extremist demagogues and the fight for power. According to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), extremist demagogues or simply populist politicians are those sharp-tongued politicians who promise paradise on earth often at the expense of some other’s reputation. When campaigning for the Referendum in 1993, a wave of populism had pummeled the poor so hard, overnight democracy came to mean paradise on earth for poor Malawians. In the course, we lost an opportunity for real participation and transformation. My own sister, Ella, was amongst the earliest converts to this ‘religion’ of vanity.

At the time, Ella was working for the Forestry Department in my hometown of Zomba. Their job involved caring tender tree seedlings at the Department’s nurseries at Bottom Offices, the foot of Zomba Mountain. One day, Ella, enthusiasm personified, told me her prospects of a new Malawi.

“We will be going to work on a minibus, coaster,” Ella, her voice laced with honest conviction, had told me.

Apparently, one politician had preached to them that life would completely change for them after the Referendum, that they would now be travelling to work on a special staff minibus, like Arsenal or Manchester United.

I tried to persuade her that it didn’t make political and economic sense Government spending such money on ‘luxuries’ when our hospitals were reeling in great want. Ella could hear none of that. For her, democracy meant things changing overnight, and everyone, literally everyone, becoming a millionaire overnight.

Not long ago, I reminded her of this, and her response was a sharp snap: “Those liars, I can’t listen to them again!”

There is something else that promises to drown the February 3 victory, namely, our zeal to flick many an institutional reform button without taking due regard to our political culture and our history. Today, everyone thinks that our problems will cease the moment we remove the incumbent, Professor Peter Mutharika. Some, including Parliament, this independent organ of government, has called for the Malawi Electoral Commission Chairperson, Justice Dr Jane Ansah’s head for presiding over a Presidential vote that stinks with glaring irregularities. On the other hand, the incumbent is on the road, preaching the power of continuity through him, the man holding the key to development. I personally do not share in all these sentiments, as I consider Malawi’s problems as lying elsewhere. If I would say without contradiction, my position in all this is that, the problem in our democracy is not what most people are pointing at―individual leaders or office-bearers. I take a position that our problem is the underlying system you and I worship whether knowingly or not―neo-patrimonialism. It is neo-patrimonialism that defines how we approach issues politics. This vice―neo-patrimonialism―is a manifestation of our political culture.

By political culture we mean “the deep-seated ideas, beliefs, values, and behavioural orientations that people have, or carry around in their heads, towards the political system” (Wairda, 2014, p. 2). Wairda adds that no one is born with it, that it is not in our genes, but that we learn it through political socialisation. This socialisation starts soon after birth. In other words, our view of politics is shaped by what surrounds us―our parents, our relatives, our culture, peers, institutions, et cetera.

Political socialisation takes place throughout life. Have you ever wondered why fire-brand politicians quickly lose their sting once inducted into Parliament? Well, the answer lies in political socialisation.

According to Rush and Giddings (2011), every Parliamentarian undergoes some metamorphosis from ‘elected MP’ to ‘being MP’. This process is called legislative socialisation. Rush and Giddings write that there are three forms of legislative socialisation: functional socialisation, attitudinal socialisation, and behavioural socialisation.

Rush and Giddings explain that, in functional socialisation, the newly elected MP learns the rules and procedures of the legislature and how to undertake their job as a member of the legislature. They add that MPs can knowingly or unknowingly adapt their attitudes to legislative norms and their roles as a member. These two researchers refer to this as attitudinal socialisation. On behavioural socialisation, the two researchers say, consciously or unconsciously, the MP adapts his or her behaviour to legislative norms in performing his or her roles as a member. This entails that a Member of Parliament undergoes significant change both in behaviour and attitude so that his or her manner of perceiving issues changes.

There is thus a big difference between ‘elected MP’ and ‘being MP’. It is after induction that the elected MP becomes MP, not before. This induction is like baptism or initiation into a new world of learning and socialisation. Honourable Lucius Banda has something to elucidate this.

Through his songs, Hon. Lucius Banda had, on many a time, attacked MPs for greed. However, when he came face-to-face with the reality of life of a Parliamentarian, his perception quickly changed. He observes, almost confessing: “There came a time when I thought let me go there (to Parliament) and see what is it that stops people from maintaining the good that they were before they joined and all of a sudden they change . . . I sang a lot of songs about MPs. . . Somehow I understand they are doing this because of this” (emphasis mine) (Interview with Cruise 5 host, Frank Joab Chakhaza, Zodiak Broadcasting Station, YouTube, published March 7, 2018).

Honourable Banda, adds, saying, “We look at MPs as people who are always eating; they’ve forgotten about the people in the village, but when I joined, I realised that it’s possible to be an MP and also be a victim whereby everybody comes to you with all their problems, their personal problems so much so that you can fail to do the right thing” (Interview with Cruise 5 host, Frank Joab Chakhaza, Zodiak Broadcasting Station, YouTube, published March 7, 2018).

When MPs run away from their constituencies, they are not being dishonest; they are being truthful to themselves in the face of reality. In short, legislative socialisation has taught them the truth about how they should behave both inside and outside that House. It also teaches them never to just say anything, as there are rules guiding decorum in the House. If you were fond of words that demolish, you learn to go calm or else your unparliamentary language will always see you outside.

In us as citizens, political socialisation has shaped how we should perceive political leadership. The leaders themselves also have a perception, a culture in them, that defines how they relate to the citizenry. In our context, this perception presents the leader as the sole and ultimate decider of issues and the master distributor of resources to those loyal to him and his system. The people also consider him the man to feed them, the man who punishes every sheep that strays. For this, the people, everyone―from bureaucrats to the lowest village tinsmith and farmer―’worships’ him. I suggest that this problem is made worse by the complex nature of our problems, and for lack of a better term, I borrow the concept of ‘wicked problems’ to describe these complex problems. I believe that it’s only by understanding this root cause that we shall wake up and begin to address our problem with the soberness and reason due it. In this way, we can reduce blame-shifting and, perhaps, all exchanges of high emotions.

Nature of Malawi’s problems: Wicked problems

According to Brinkerhoff (2016), the term ‘wicked problems’ was first coined by Rittel and Webber to refer to those problems which elude definition or explanation. These problems can be human-induced, for example, corruption, or can be naturally occurring, that is, from some natural phenomenon, for example, the recent disease caused by coronavirus, COVID-19, and heavy storms.

The fact that wicked problems elude explanations or definitions means that answers to a particular problem will vary depending on one’s position and beliefs, something that can trigger bias, finger-pointing and labelling. Take the case of causes of poverty in African countries. On this, some literature will tell you poverty is nothing but a consequence of policy coercion by the West. Some will say it is a result of uncontrolled corruption, over-population, or a consequence of poor national leadership, or of Africans’ un-Chinese-like attitude towards work, i.e. laziness, lack of innovation, you name it. Even the US President Donald Trump has his own explanation for this persistent poverty in Africa. Thus, depending on the school of thought you espouse, each one of these constitutes the real answer or the real explanation. Unless you discard bias so as to take into account all the factors in this forest of answers, you are bound to espouse a narrative that is both inadequate and misleading. The danger with this partisan approach to our problem is that it will force our policy-making machinery to overlook the other faces of our problems, thereby leading to policy answers that fail to address the whole problem. This is the problem we are facing in Africa and Malawi currently―we have limited our diagnosis to a narrow lane that ends in some policy cul-de-sac.

The complex nature of wicked problems requires more problem solvers than mere critical scholars or opinion makers. Problem solvers work to find robust answers; critical scholars go about labelling situations, churning paper upon paper for vain publicity. Brinkerhoff (2016, p. 333), warns against such labelling, arguing it robs the policy terrain of cooperation and commitment. In other words, since wicked problems require commitment by both those labelling and those labelled, cooperation between the two parties is essential for robust policy answers and for smooth implementation. This entails that labelling others as failures or wicked, and others as ‘saints’ can rob policy making of consensus without which policy making risks what is referred to as policy revolt or policy sabotage (where other players deliberately frustrate implementation).

In Malawi labelling has played a frustrating role against efforts to contain or curb various vices. In the fight against corruption, for example, every Government that assumes power always explains the mess as a curse they had inherited. Thus, one regime blames it on the previous, in that fashion. Dr Bakili Muluzi came to power in 1994, and his finger stuck squarely on his predecessor, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Professor Bingu wa Mutharika came, it was the problem of Dr Muluzi. Dr Joyce Banda came, it was her turn to point the finger at the DPP. When the DPP returned to power following the 2014 Elections, Professor Peter Mutharika used the theme-song of corruption against the person he described as ‘Abiti Cashigeti’ or simply, the ‘Cashgate Lady,’ cash-gate being a corruption scandal that had exposed unprecedented punitive plunder of public resources after public officers had connived with private businesses, taking advantage of loopholes in the national payment system, stealing nearly US$ 50 million in public funds (World Bank, 2018, p. 26). It happened in 2013 during the reign of Dr Joyce Banda though previous governments can never claim blamelessness at all.

Today, every Malawian, except I, perhaps, attributes the constitutional crisis rocking us now to the electoral mess at the May 2019 Presidential vote. In the course, we have successfully convinced the world that indeed the mess arises from the mismanagement of that Vote, that this volcano of chaos has erupted suddenly, without any warning signs at all.

Like it or not, our situation has now reached crisis levels. It befits everything crisis where crisis refers to “an undesirable and unexpected situation … that something bad is to befall a person, group, organization, culture, society, or, when we think really big, the world at large” (Boin, t’ Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005, p. 2).

Every crisis has three key elements―threat, uncertainty, and urgency. In every sense of the word, Malawi today is threatened by failures in this game of numbers called politics. In Malawi today, uncertainty hovers over our routine, uncertainty over what will befall us next if we keep refusing stressing those positive characters that bind us. In Malawi today, urgency dictates that we should each submit to principles that will help us better deal with the problems dogging us in order for us to return to our sweet ways of peace again, that Warm Heart of Africa that runs on the neo-liberal wheels of rule of law.

Basically, there are two or three ways through which nations deal with crises. According to Boin, McConnell and ‘t Hart (2008), “some crises are followed―quite naturally it seems―by investigations and promises of reform aimed at improving policies and institutions that have proven vulnerable under pressure … some crises are absorbed politically without major policy changes or reorganisations” (p. 5). In the case of Malawi following the 2019 Presidential Vote, our management of the crisis suggests use of the former mechanism, that is, by investigations and promises of reform aimed at improving policies and institutions that have proven vulnerable under pressure.

Personally, I haven’t been convinced by the manner in which we have approached our answers. My feeling is that our attempts at reorganising institutions such as the MEC have been lost in a mix of partisan interests and deliberate disregard of evidence. As a result, no one seems to remind us of the major culprit―neo-patrimonialism. I submit that, this proper diagnosis absent, the narrative has taken a sharp turn, attacking, not only the system itself but also one helpless soul under it, Justice Dr Jane Ansah, herself a victim of our neglect of problems of many years.

Elections in Malawi as a wicked problem

Guilty parties in our electoral mess: Political parties, Justice Ansah or Malawians?

Follow history of frailties of our elections and you will discover that the genesis lies right at the transition in 1993 or 1994 when we allowed ourselves to move on without transforming our systems. According to Gloppen et al. (2006, p. 7), the quality of the electoral process in the country had dwindled right from that time, that is, since the 1994 democratic elections.

A year later, in 1995, our MPs were to pass a Bill for the Repeal of the Recall Provision also called the Constitution (Amendment) Bill Number 6 of 1995. This was right in the first sitting of the first Parliament in the multiparty democracy (Kameme, 2015, p. 213). On the pretext of preventing the constituents and ‘big men’ from abusing the Recall Provision (Patel, 2008, p. 24), the MPs from the then ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), successfully stripped the Provisional Constitution of the provision which was contained in section 64. Eventually, “when the Constitution came into effect (May 1995) it did not have a recall provision” (Kachale, 2012, p. 193). The problem was growing, and we were all quiet.

Before 2001, the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi had provisions for the Senate in sections 68 to 72. The MPS, arguing that, without full implementation of the Decentralisation Policy (a document guiding the subnational level government), constituting the Senate would make no sense and so had to be postponed until well after May 1999. In 2000, a Bill (presented by the then ruling UDF) to abolish the Senate was defeated. Determined to see the Senate dead on arrival, the UDF Government tabled it again in 2001. The Malawi Human Rights Commission and the Malawi Human Rights Resource Centre sought the intervention of the High Court to prevent the Bill from being tabled. But while the Court was still deliberating the matter, ruling party (UDF) MPs plus a faction of MPs from the opposition MCP passed it with a two-thirds majority within a week of deliberation (Patel, 2008, p. 25). The AFORD MPs had walked out of Parliament as soon as that Bill had passed. The problem was growing still.

Even when we talk of the Open Term Bid (or later, Third Term Bill), all parties in this country are as guilty, for, though talk of extension of Dr Muluzi’s tenure beyond the Constitutional provision of two five-year terms started way back in 1999, by July of 2002, John Tembo of the Malawi Congress Party, and Chakufwa Chihana of the Alliance for Democracy, then two major opposition parties, had joined forces with most UDF supporters, openly supporting the proposal. According to Nowack (2018), their support was on a promise that they would be part of a government of national unity if the bid would succeed (p. 16). The Bill failed to pass in Parliament by only three votes on July 4, 2002. Our democracy kept taking the beating yet we kept taking a leisure approach to it all.

Over the years, the Electoral Commission always acknowledged flaws though none of us, from the top national leadership―both ruling and opposition―ever took serious interest to deal with the issue. In 2002, for example, the MEC had indicted itself on the 1999 elections, observing, “In 1999 the Commission did not perform very well in the management of elections, as transparency, accountability, trust and efficiency were under question” (MEC Review of Operational Plan of the Commission 2002 as cited in English, 2004, p. 29). Did we do anything on the perceived potential flaws in 1999?

Well, according to Mwalubunju (2007), “following the ineffectiveness of the MEC to ensure a free and fair electoral process, in 1999, NGOs, the Church and political parties in opposition mobilised themselves through the National Consultative Group (NCG) … and successfully forced the Government to remove the then Chairperson of the Commission and its Chief Elections Officer. A replacement was made immediately before the polls in May 1999 of a new Chairperson and Chief Elections Officer was appointed to finish the process” (p. 288).

2004 Elections came and found us grappling with the same problem. In the words of Mwalubunju: “Similarly, in 2004, after the polls, stakeholders including NGOs managed to pressurise Government to remove the Chairperson of the MEC for failure to run the polls in a professional manner and a new Chairperson was appointed” (p. 289). Did that change anything? I don’t think so.

In August 2007, the Malawi Law Commission (MLC) was to point out the problem again. That year the MLC recommended comprehensive electoral reforms in the country. One recommendation was that the President “shall be elected by a majority of more than fifty percent of valid votes …” (The Report of the Law Commission on the Review of the Constitution, p. 75). To demonstrate the chronic nature of this problem, the Report was to point out that a similar recommendation had been made previously, in 1998, by the Special Law Commission on the Technical Review of the Constitution (p. 75).

Successive regimes were to sit on that (MLC) recommendation until the chaotic nature of the 2014 electoral process moved the civil society to strongly demand a review of the country’s broad electoral legal framework. In fact, the incumbent at the time, Dr Joyce Banda, had wanted the elections nullified. Following this chaos, a coalition of CSOs formed the National Task Force of Electoral Reforms for the MLC to (re)start the reviewing of the electoral laws in April 2016 (EU Election Follow-up Mission, 2017, p. 13). It was only after this Commission had made its submissions in April 2017 that the government was finally dragged towards the electoral reform stream. For your information, it wasn’t Justice Dr Jane Ansah at the helm of the MEC in 2014.

Come December 2017 when the MPs were given the opportunity to change history, guess what they did:

Number	Voting status	Number of votes	Percentage (%)
1	Yes	59	30.57
2	No	100	51.81
3	Abstention	0	0
4	Absent	34	17.62
	Total	193	100

(Source: MNA Hansard, 15th December, 2017, p. 34.)

How everyone disregards all this history, and how we now suddenly force one person to shoulder all the blame is beyond me. Where in this equation of blame do the 100 MPs who spurned the 50 + 1 Bill appear? Where in it are the 34 who had decided to be absent when the Members were voting on a Bill so significant?

Well, truth be told, what the Constitutional Court did on February 3, should have been done soon after the 2014 Elections when Malawians elected to the seat Professor Peter Mutharika and his running-mate at the time, Dr Saulos Chilima. We let that problem slip through the net. Come the 2019 Elections, we see one human being in the name of Justice Dr Jane Ansah carry the blame of many years, the major opposition parties in the country together with the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) demanding her head as Chair of the Electoral Commission. Anyone who has followed our history of flawed elections knows the truth―it is a problem that has been with us since 1994. We have always looked away, treating the symptoms each time we were presented with an opportunity to change things.

In 2011, Chancellor College came to a standstill following what is described as the Academic Freedom saga. At the time, the lecturers refused to go back to class unless their freedom and safety in classrooms were assured. This followed what someone had done, reporting to Government officials that some lecturer had given an example of the Arab Spring in his class. When the lecturers demanded an apology from the Inspector General after the IG had questioned the lecturer in question, a stand-off began. On his part, the President, Professor Bingu wa Mutharika, went for the jugular, saying the IG could never apologise. It was the Court using the instrument of injunctions that always saved the lecturers. Incensed, the ruling party decided to frustrate the injunction route through fast-tracking a Bill it had developed in 2010―Civil Procedure (Suits by or Against the Government or Public Officers) (Amendment) Bill, also known as the Injunctions Bill. Evidence shows that, that Bill was hastily ‘passed’ in June 2011 for that effect. According to Chikaya-Banda (2012), “following a serious and protracted dispute in early 2011 between the presidency and lecturers at Chancellor College … an amendment to the Civil Procedure (Suits by or against the Government or Public Officers) Act was pushed through parliament” (p. 19).

According to Hon. Henry Phoya, Chairperson of the Legal Affairs Committee, the Malawi Law Commission itself was never consulted when this Bill was being drafted (Hansard, 16th June, 2011, p. 759). In this Hansard, Hon. Phoya also reveals that the Office of the Attorney General had changed overnight; Mr Maxon Mbendera (SC) had replaced Mrs Jane Ansah. It is important to note that it was Mrs Ansah who had recommended that the Bill be redrafted, a position that was against the wishes of the ruling DPP. Perhaps it was no mere coincidence that she was removed overnight. Thus, right on the first day of Late Mr Maxon Mbendera (SC) in office as Attorney General, the MPs approved the Bill.

Why am I saying all this? Well, when we judge people, let us learn to do so based on evidence and objectivity. After I had read this truth, I understood when this lady pats herself at the back. The problem with most Malawians is that history is the last thing we consult when judging others. Personally, I follow history so I should not judge people by what others say, but by evidence, the sort of evidence gathered through meticulous sifting.

Elections and the death of democracy in Malawi

As I have demonstrated, evidence of elections mismanagement has always been with us right from 1994. This means that the decline in quality of our democracy hasn’t been sudden. Put simply, the policy world can never blame the quality of our democracy based on the 2019 Elections alone. The Court can because that was the evidence it was presented with. This also means that, to address the problem of decline of quality of elections and democracy in this country, policy analysts must look through the years, right from 1994. In that way, they can produce a robust answer to this problem. We must never look away from the fact that attributing the frailties of our democracy to this single event can limit the nature of policy response to these problems since our prescription can be limited to a single event.

Some political scientists assert that there are basically two routes through which democracies die. Death can be sudden, through the man with a gun, or slow, through erosion of good governance structures or principles in society.

The history of our electoral mischiefs reveals that death or decline of democracy in Malawi has not been sudden, but through the layer-by-layer erosion of democratic principles. This entails that it was foreseeable that the May 21 2019 Elections would be marred by some mind-boggling problems.

According to Boin, McConnell and ‘t Hart (2008), when a crisis was unforeseeable and uncontrollable, citizens’ tend to sympathise with the officials. Thus, official explanation is very easily understood. The three authors add that when the opposite is true, that is, “when there is a widespread perception that the threat could have been foreseen and possibly avoided altogether, or that the official response after its occurrence was substandard, political leaders and officials may end up in troubled waters” (p. 4). So, the question I would pose to policy scholars seeking answers on this is: Was the electoral mess foreseeable? If yes, then why do the people demand so much from a system everybody had allowed to operate with such inefficiency for years? Besides, who should shoulder that blame then?

There are people who advance a narrative that the problem was at the 2019 Presidential Vote (and not Parliamentary and Local Government Vote), and not the 2014 Elections, not the 2009 Elections, not the 2004 Elections, not the 1999 Elections, and not even the 1994 Elections. I hold a different opinion for one simple reason: if we want robust answers, we have no choice but to let our public policy perspective prop on a diagnosis that should date to 1994, and not to the 2019 Presidential Vote alone.

Even after I have made this explanation, many people will choose to believe that the problem is Justice Dr Jane Ansah. I can explain their response in two ways. First, it is because the angle from which they approach the matter stresses one event―the May 2019 Presidential Vote. Second, it is because people always find explanation for something so as to assume a starting point, a false one though.


A good example of an approach to a single event is what did the Constitutional Court on February 3. The Court was asked to deal with a single event, but public policy must go beyond that if we are to prescribe robust, long-lasting answers to this problem.

The decision of the Court must be understood because they approached the issue at the operational rather than strategic level (note the emphasis). The Court was asked to make its decision based on that single event―operational level.

Response to crises is said to be at the operational level when those responding engage the problem as it has occurred. Unlike response at the operational level, response at the strategic level goes deeper, scrutinising the system including its history and culture. In the words of Boin, McConnell and ‘t Hart (2008), at this level, “political and administrative officeholders (both inside and outside the ‘core executive’) … concentrate on the larger institutional, political and social ramifications of the crisis” (p. 8). The three authors add by saying crucial components at this level include “people and forums who are permanently engaged in critically scrutinising and influencing elite behaviour: parliamentarians, watchdog agencies, journalists and interest/lobby groups” (p. 8). In Malawi, we are preoccupying ourselves with the event as it happened rather than scrutinising the whole system and history. In other words, almost every comment I hear suggests preoccupation with the operational level rather than both the operational level and the strategic level.

Why do we insist on limiting ourselves to this single event rather than to scrutinising the system? One reason could be because we don’t want to assume responsibility over this.

Our electoral problems and the culture of scapegoat

When we refuse to take responsibility, we play the hypocrite like Newt Gingrich, a man who had made Bill Clinton run for his money on the Monica Lewinsky affair when he himself was running an extra-marital affair at the time. In that context, we also seek self-justification, finding wild reasons to justify our failures. In some cases, we find someone, a scapegoat, to carry the blame.

In the current Malawi, our ills are being blamed on the Electoral Commission, and the false belief in the people is that, once these Commissioners together with the MEC Chair leave that office, Malawi politics will turn green again. I am not sure this is the way we should approach this opportunity for change.

Tavris and Aronson (2007) write that “the idea that ‘it must be someone else’s fault’ is a principle of modern world (because) … to hold someone else accountable allows people to move on and avoid responsibility for the immediate past” (p. 22). This should surprise no one since “many times throughout history, problems that are directly the result of bad government, political miscalculation or even catastrophe of national disaster have been successfully blamed by those who were responsible for dealing with such matters onto specially selected groups of people” (Douglas, 1995, p. 38). In this way, the whole society’s sins are loaded on one helpless individual who is thrown into the desert so the people can start afresh.

The danger with scapegoating is that it makes a people fail to learn from their mistakes or take all factors into account to address the future. Above all, it dehumanises others, especially those without power. This is because a common characteristic of the process of scapegoating is that “the communities chosen (to bear the burden of the blame) are generally seen as weak and unable to retaliate” (Douglas, 1995, p. 38). During the savage years in the West, witches, considered messengers of the Devil, were blamed for various ills in society. Those condemned were often helpless old women.

Another characteristic of scapegoating is that ‘justice’ therefrom is often derived via some short-cut mode with some semblance of truth. Scott (2015) explains better when he observes that “an unpleasant aspect of scapegoat is the undue haste in which action is taken―the ‘quick fix’” (p. 24). In such an environment or setting, the voice of the scapegoat is drowned in the cacophony of the majority ‘right’. I have seen occasions when some people have tried to explain their side of the story before a grouping with a decision ready, and everything the scapegoats have said has meant nothing. Even where the scapegoats have cried out, reminding the world of the danger of attempts to stifle explanation, no one, not even a single soul among those entrusted with power to represent the poor, has taken heed.

Malawi’s political problems have not been sudden; they have been growing over the years under our watch. Strangely, all of a sudden, today we have the answer after we have cornered what everyone, except I, perhaps, thinks are the culprits. I am not surprised.

As I said in my introduction, all these issues do not answer the question about the frailties of our democracy or electoral management. For me the answer is neo-patrimonialism a manifestation of our political culture.

Neo-patrimonialism and wicked problems in Malawi

Why Malawi political parties are always delineable by regions is an interesting question among political scientists in Malawi. The answer is usually that such political parties are tribal-based. For me, this answer doesn’t go far enough. In my opinion, Malawi’s biggest problem isn’t tribalism or regionalism or whatever you may wish to call it; it is neo-patrimonialism, and this has its origins in the patrimonial system or culture, this conductor in the orchestra of traditions wherever we come from. Unless we understand this and work to address it, all efforts at addressing wicked problems dogging us are bound to lead to nothing. Put simply, it is neo-patrimonialism that is the missing piece in the jigsaw puzzle towards addressing our problems.

I know there could be some who wouldn’t agree with my position that our problem isn’t ethnicity or regionalism but neo-patrimonialism. I have friends from the North or here South who support the former dictator, Dr Hastings Banda, with religious zeal. In College, I had a friend from the North, he is now a prominent gentleman in society, who told me in the face there’s no way he can abandon Dr Banda’s Malawi Congress Party. For him, doing that was tantamount to betrayal. Currently, I have a friend from the same Northern Region who has always been MCP. All this despite the fact that Northerners suffered the most during the one-party era. Common among these people is the fact that Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda had done something remarkable in the lives of their parents or relations for which they always feel very grateful.

I like one story late Dr Chiku Malunga, perhaps Malawi’s best essayist on development and public policy, tells on how neo-patrimonialism disarms an individual of the sting of criticism. Malunga (2014) narrates that around 2009 he met a Zimbabwean in Johannesburg, and took advantage of his presence and education to ask him why, despite his education, he wasn’t a strong critic of Mr Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwean President at the time.

Malunga (2014, p. 95) says the man, originally from the Côte d’Ivoire, told him (Malunga) he wasn’t happy with what Mr Mugabe was doing but that, Mr Mugabe had done him some great favour for which he always felt grateful. According to Malunga it all started when this man went to Zimbabwe for a conference. He told Malunga that, on the last day of the conference, Mr Mugabe had appeared for the closing ceremony. As luck would have it, “afterwards he found himself in a room where Mr Mugabe was handing out scholarships to some Zimbabweans” (p. 95) who were in a queue. Malunga says when Mr Mugabe noticed that this man was siting all by himself when the rest were in a queue, he asked why he was not forming part of it. “I am not Zimbabwean, Sir,” was his reply, upon which Mr Mugabe is said to have advised it didn’t matter as long as he was African. Malunga says the President further said he was ready to give him any job once he was done with his studies. True to Mr Mugabe’s words, he gave him a job after his PhD. He returned to Côte d’Ivoire, took with him his family to Zimbabwe, now as Zimbabwean citizens. “For this reason, my friend,” he told Malunga, “I cannot say anything against Mr Mugabe” (p. 95). All this demonstrates that, if someone does you a great favour, there is always a limit to which you can criticise that ‘good’ person.

Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda had done some Malawians great things in this country. In other words, some people shot from rags to plenty through some ‘kindness’ of Dr Banda. How easy can it be for such people to bite the finger that fed them? Or, how many people have been lifted out of poverty by Dr Bakili Muluzi or Professor Bingu wa Mutharika in this country? How far would such people go in attacking these patrons?

Neo-patrimonialism effectively clips the wings of criticism. It makes one obey lest one should lose the benefits that come with it. Sometimes one obeys simply to demonstrate one's appreciation for an old great gesture. In this way, neo-patrimonialism silences you; you can’t speak out. In worse cases, it makes you condemn those who stand for justice because you want to please the patron for more benefits and rents. Once this patron figure loses power, all these followers disappear, realigning themselves with the one holding power now. In the new party, such hoppers never become change agents; they play the chameleon, hypocrites, always cherishing nostalgia of Egypt.

The other day I travelled with a friend, a staunch DPP supporter. Dr Joyce Banda was in power then. A phone came, the speakers on loud, I was able to pick a few things.

“Boy, who’s this guy you’re talking to?”

He mentioned the name.

“Isn’t he a top official in the ruling party?”

“He is, but this is politics.”

Apparently, there were some top government officials in Dr Joyce Banda’s government who were still serving the opposition DPP. I wasn’t surprised when Dr Joyce Banda lost it from her cap―she must have over-trusted a people who weren’t really for the good of Malawi, but for opportunities that come with being a ruling party official―neo-patrimonialism.

When old politicians hop to new parties, they are looking for a position to push them back onto the eating fold of neo-patrimonialism. Neo-patrimonialism goes beyond regions―no one cares where the patron comes from; what matters is whether you will be able to get something for yourself and your family, and you regard less for the rest. It is never out of a wish to see democracy flourish that politicians enter into alliances; they do so with the eye to form part of those to control the resources. In this way, it makes little sense blaming tribalism or regionalism for our ills; the problem is neo-patrimonialism. These other issues come in because neo-patrimonialism thrives on them―regionalism, tribalism, family lineage, faction-creation, physical force, et cetera―to ensure some groups control the resources.

When political parties fail to form alliances, it is not because someone is throwing some spanners in the works; it is because their calculations don’t assure them automatic lion’s share of control. This is why politicians go with the wind, the wind of neo-patrimonialism as controlled by the patron figure. Even if we change Government today, a new form of elites will emerge and begin to eat the same way the current eaters are doing. That’s the nature of politics, especially African politics.

Botswana is hailed as a model of democracy in Africa, although the situation seems to be changing now. Botswana has been this successful because its leaders have tended to play the neo-patrimonialism button less. According to Brown and Kaiser (2007), “unlike most other countries on the Continent, Botswana is endowed with valuable mineral deposits that have been well managed by a succession of democratically elected political leaders” (p. 3) (emphasis mine). Managing resources well means the proceeds from such resources go to the people. In other words, there has always been some measure of openness and accountability in the way the Botswana leadership has used or handled those natural resources. This shows that neo-patrimonialism can only be conquered by making sure public goods and services benefit all the people, and not only those connected to power. Neo-patrimonialism is by nature anti-democracy. Practise it less, get democracy more.

I argue that it is because scholars so obsess themselves with something else that they fail to understand why democracy isn’t at all working in Africa. They look for giant amber signs, in the course, they neglect the thin flicker of the equation.

Manifestations of neo-patrimonialism

According to Wolfe and Müller (2018), citing Erdmann and Engel (2007) and Webber (1997), this, neo-patrimonialism is “a system of governance where patrons (leaders) and clients (beneficiaries) exchange rents (support, favours, rewards) for loyalty, as in archetypal patrimonial (village father-figure leadership) society, but existing within the legal framework or rational-bureaucratic structure” (p. 101). Thus, at the village level, there is patrimonialism, that is the leadership arrangement where one figure-head (usually male) receives all the respect and loyalty in exchange for favours, for example, rewarding his or her subjects with land and other benefits. When this arrangement continues into the formal bureaucratic structures or into government, it goes by the name neo-patrimonialism.

Bratton and Van de Welle (1994), write that, in a formal setting in this system,

the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law … the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system, and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred (p. 458).

Thus, the leader awards loyal public servants and private sector business persons. And, “in return, for these material rewards, clients mobilise political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons” (Bratton & Van de Welle, 1994, p. 458). While and by awarding loyalists he ‘punishes’ all those anti-neo-patrimonialism. In Zambia, in early 2001, after President Frederick Chiluba had failed in his attempt to stand for another term after the expiry of his constitutional second term, he reacted by dealing with those who had frustrated the move. For example, he expelled the Vice-President Christon Tembo and 21 senior party members, and, “in a major cabinet reshuffle (to enable him to surround himself with loyalists who would not oppose his political ambitions), dropped seven other dissenters” (Venter, 2003, p. 12).

In Malawi, neo-patrimonialism is as old as Independence itself. In fact, at the heart of the ‘Cabinet Crisis’ is neo-patrimonialism. For example, the younger ministers and their supporters (mostly Northerners and Yaos from the South) wanted expedited Africanisation, that is, they wanted wealth to flow as quickly as possible to Africans. In that system, they would look smaller patrons, those who worked to distribute wealth to the majority Africans. The first government after Independence in Tanganyika faced a similar problem when factions arose pulling from opposite directions on the same question of Africanisation. Late Julius Nyerere bemoaned it in the early 1960s, when he said:

When hunting there is no problem, other than someone gets wounded with an arrow, but that is not a big problem. Problems start when the animal has died, that’s when fighting starts, because this one wants that piece and another cuts another piece, and that’s when people start to have their fingers cut … We have cried for independence without difficulty. Now that this animal called Independence has fallen, conflicts begin. People are fighting each other for meat (Bjerk, 2015, p. 62).

Any scenario you take will fit in these wise words on neo-patrimonialism. In Malawi, for example, the first Head of State, Dr Banda, practised it himself. Dr Bakili Muluzi took over from him in 1994 and extended it. After Dr Muluzi, Professor Bingu wa Mutharika entrenched it; today, Professor Peter Mutharika is very much accused of it. I bet even those who are preaching ‘democracy’ from outside power are very much for it. It could even be worse with them considering the fact that the majority of them are aristocrats who had been near the helm of power at various times in various regimes in this country.

As we speak, opposition UTM and MCP are failing to strike a deal for a coalition. This has nothing to do with tribes; the problem is their central question, that is, who shall control that machine after they have wrestled power from the DPP. Before the kill, that is before the Constitutional Court Judgement, they were fighting with high level camaraderie; today, none seems to trust the other―the animal has fallen, each wants a piece of the meat. That’s what neo-patrimonialism does. And just wait, it won’t be too long from now, you’ll soon to hear some are returning home, to base. That’s Malawian politics.

One danger with neo-patrimonialism is that is creates a false sense of legitimacy. By legitimacy I mean that “psychological relationship between the governed and their governors, which engenders a belief that the state’s leaders and institutions have a right to exercise political authority over a society” (Thomson, 2010, p. 109). It involves a reciprocal or symbiotic relationship where the entrenched expectation is that “the ruler has the right to rule and the ruled the duty to obey” (Netelenbos, 2016, p. 33). By its nature, neo-patrimonialism alienates those not loyal to the figure-head. These therefore are denied the opportunity to directly benefit from the system. These people thus begin to obey their government less or obey it more and more unwillingly. The government then uses coercion or force to make them obey. The governor and the governed thus turn sworn enemies.

For me, two main reasons explain why neo-patrimonialism has persisted in almost all African countries, Malawi inclusive. First, the West has given us a doctrine that assumes that neo-liberal democracy is more powerful than neo-patrimonialism and that the former eventually overcomes the latter. Second, neo-patrimonialism has prevailed over neo-liberal democracy because our leaders―ruling and opposition―do not understand the meaning of leadership.

Neo-patrimonialism and neo-liberal democracy

Basically, political legitimacy or simply “the terms by which people recognise, defend, and accept political authority” (Bukovansky, 2002, p. 2) is derived from three sources or systems as described by Max Weber: patriarchy (monarchy or traditional); charismatic; and legal-rational.

According to Bukovansky (2002), monarchs, patriarchs or traditional rulers and their subjects live in a relationship that centres on reference to blood (lineage), traditions and divine sanctions. What matters most to this form of legitimacy is the internal political legitimacy. Thus, people in a monarchy follow, obey and support their leader because they share a belief that such a figure was put on the throne by GOD and that continuity of such a leadership is good for their progress. It is therefore based on history and culture or the traditional hereditary status.

As for charismatic legitimacy, Weber considered the leader’s personality and the ideals he imparts as the central features. Tribal factional leaders, warlords and religious leaders are a good example of this form of legitimacy.

For the final source of legitimacy―the legal-rational legitimacy―the relationship between the governor and the governed is forged through a social contract based on a Supreme Agreement or simply the Constitution, one standing on neo-liberal principles.

In short, the three can be distinguished as follows: “The ruler that claims legitimacy from charisma has to prove his divine ‘gift of grace’, the traditional ruler has to prove his claims in terms of tradition and traditional laws, while the legal ruler has to prove the validity of his claim upon the ‘rational’ rules of law” (Netelenbos, 2016, p. 35).

To understand how African leaders derive their legitimacy one has to understand the history of democracy of African countries. When the white man came to Africa, he found Africans mostly under chiefdoms―traditional legitimacy. He broke it, and instead, brought in authoritarianism through colonialism. At independence, the white man used charismatic leaders, for example, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda to bring the people their freedom. The white man made sure the end of his authoritarianism or colonialism was replaced by neo-liberal democracy. He therefore insisted that Independence come with constitutions carrying the bill of rights in most cases. Soon after independence, African countries reverted to authoritarianism with a mix of charismatic leadership and traditional leadership. They therefore abandoned the neo-liberal route altogether.

In Malawi, the independence Constitution carried the Bill of Rights, but two years later, in 1966, that Constitution was repudiated. Thus, although patrimonialism had been there even before Independence, it became official in 1966 with the 1966 Republican Constitution. That Constitution gave the Life President the free reign to “… act in his own discretion and shall not be obliged to follow advice tendered by any other person” (section 8(3)) and “shall hold the office for his lifetime” (section 9). Thus, no institution or authority would criticise or suggest anything he wasn’t ready to hear. Thus, in 1966, patrimonialism was entrenched in official circles hence neo-patrimonialism.

Neo-patrimonialism alongside authoritarianism or one-party system continued until 1993 (at the Referendum) when Malawians chose multiparty politics. The accident that happened at the time was that the framers thought that by sending authoritarianism packing and bringing the Bill of Rights back, they were restoring democracy. Neo-patrimonialism lay in wait, and once the opportunity availed itself, it slipped back, sitting side by side with democracy. Since by nature the two can never co-exist, neo-patrimonialism soon took the upper hand, leaving Malawians believing we still had democracy or the rule of law when the truth is that what we had created was a mermaid―part human, part fish. Thus, our democracy can be compared to a human creature clothed in democracy, but hiding neo-patrimonialism deep within it.

The problem is that the framers of the Constitution did not take their time (and time was not there, to say the truth) to check against neo-patrimonialism. Today, every institution of Government, including the judiciary, is affected. In the words of Ellet (2014), “The post-colonial Malawi judiciary has since struggled to institutionalize judicial independence and protect the separation of powers” (p. 16). However, the case is not hopeless as “there is evidence that the judiciary has sporadically asserted itself vis-a-vis the executive and that judicial power has waxed and waned over time” (p. 16).

The danger with our democracy today is that people are obsessed with the same old idea, the idea that had miserably failed us in 1994, namely that the removal of certain individuals from power or offices is the simplest way to rescue our democracy from total collapse. This narrative diverts from the real problem―neo-patrimonialism or all those systems that support it.

This narrative, like some meticulously prepared agitprop, has been carefully tossed before us, and we all have fallen for it, taking it home without question. I think it has had some intoxicating effect because the majority of us tend to take casual the power of reason and the need to learn from history when confronting our political, constitutional, and administrative issues. If we can’t learn from our past, we are bound to commit the same mistakes as our fathers in 1994, when, their eyes squarely fixed on authoritarianism in the person of Dr Banda, left neo-patrimonialism intact, albeit a little bruised.

Neo-patrimonialism and African leadership

As I said earlier on, the second main reason why neo-patrimonialism has persisted in Malawi is that African leaders―ruling and opposition―have tended to understand leadership as a window of opportunity to slough off poverty, a time to enjoy wealth at the expense of the poor. I like the analogy of true leadership that Simon Snek presents in his 2014 work on leadership, Leaders eat last: Why some teams pull together and others don’t. Snek uses the metaphor of the Unites States Army to discuss this concept. The foreword of this book is provided by George J. Flynn, Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps (Ret).

Flynn writes:

When you are with Marines gathering to eat, you will notice that the most junior are served first and the most senior are served last … Marine leaders are expected to eat last because the true price of leadership is the willingness to place the needs of others above your own. Great leaders truly care about those they are privileged to lead and understand that the cost of leadership privilege comes at the expense of self-interest (Preface in Snek, 2014, p. 9).

I can add by saying that the other reason leaders have to eat last is that they want to build trust and bond with their juniors. Who would never support (legitimacy) those who put your interests above theirs? It could also be because, by serving the juniors first, you allow them to go back to their duties happy and timely. The eating job done, they can now work with deep commitment.

Unfortunately, African leaders rarely learn these principles. When they attend the UN Assemblies they return with an idea to increase the number of vehicles for their motorcade. Mobutu Sese Seko did that when he visited England and witnessed the Queen on a horse-drawn carriage. He had to emulate that, introducing his own in his country, when Zairians were floundering in deep poverty.

African leaders eat first, always accumulating as much as possible so that they should control others―neo-patrimonialism. Often, this appetite for accumulation and control forces them to allow problems to deteriorate so they should be seen to offer solution for political gain. What Banik (2010) writes on this is right all through:

In many instances, it is actually in local elite interest to maintain the status quo or see to it that conditions deteriorate further since traders, moneylenders and large farmers often make their small fortunes based on exploitative practices. These groups stand to lose substantial benefits and profit incentives if deprivation is reduced drastically (p. 232).

Neo-patrimonialism thus harbours no mercy; it can sacrifice even trusted friends and people already facing excruciating poverty so long as the patron or leader maintains and sustains his figure-head position that enables him to control both affairs and resources. Chipembere, Chiume and others were given no mercy when they posed a threat to patrimonialism in September 1964. In early 2000, Mpinganjira and others had to be expelled for opposing neo-patrimonialism through their opposition to the Open Term bid. Dr Joyce Banda too had to be expelled from the DPP for advancing an “agenda not in the interest of the party”.

Once again, by African leaders I do not spare opposition leaders, for I believe that the whole reason they desperately fight for power is to control resources and have their own troops of ravenous eaters. Even within the opposition rank, the leadership hardly agrees when it comes to sharing spoils of war, each wants the lion’s share of the resources, leaders are chosen way before the convention.

You would say, well, but the members of the opposition are fighting for justice in all this. Anacyclosis should explain why they do this, and why this should not be mistaken for what they will always stand for.

According to Polybius, democracies go through some make-remake sequence. This process―anacyclosis―demonstrates to us that governments go through some distinctive sequence, namely monarchy (dictatorship) first, followed by aristocracy (junta or elites), followed by democracy, and then back around again to monarchy (dictatorship).

Greer (2014) summarises it, writing, within the inner circle of every dictatorship powerful officials emerge. He says that, since these officials are in close contact with the dictator, they read the weaknesses of their boss perfectly well. For the reason, they very easily take over power although sometimes they can wait upon nature to do the job for them―natural death. This group of the elites can be a military junta or merely former colleagues of the dictator. These elites or junta then share the spoils of their act amongst themselves to ensure each one of them is happy.

The story doesn’t end with the elites sharing the spoils. Soon these elites begin to show tendencies of dictatorship. Greer (2014) adds that within this group of elites, there emerges a wider circle of officials, officers, and influential people who begin to blame the leadership for advancing autocratic tendencies. He says that this group then deposes the junta or elites, and does something different, namely installing a democratic constitution to win popular support and outflank remaining allies of the deposed junta.

In Nyasaland (Malawi), we moved from colonial power in 1964. That oppressive government was equivalent of a dictatorship. The leaders at the time―Masauko Chipembere, Kanyama Chiume, Orton Chirwa, Dr Banda, et al―were a blue-blooded crop of Malawians―kind of aristocrats or elites. Soon they accused a fellow member of the elite, Dr Banda, of dictatorial tendencies. In this case, the opposite happened, Dr Banda strengthened his grip on power with a new crop of elites. Years later, however, those elites who had been with him for years, for example, Bakili Muluzi and others, ganged up and wrestled power from him, promising democracy. After a while, cracks emerged in UDF when some elites accused him of displaying dictatorial tendencies. His attempt to hold on to power saw Muluzi going for Bingu wa Mutharika (another elite). In the first days, Bingu promised a return to good governance and democracy, but soon began to display tendency of dictatorship. A group of elites, for example, Dr Joyce Banda, and others spoke against it, promising to bring back democracy.

When Joyce Banda came to power she started with cleaning up, restoring democracy. Soon, the ‘Cash-gate’ scandal was before us. Another group of elites, the second comers―DPP of Professor Peter Mutharika and Dr Saulos Chilima―came with promises of a clean government. Soon, accusations of mismanagement and dictatorship began to fly, and another group of aristocrats emerged from it, this time forming the UTM. If the UTM comes to power expect democracy in the first few months, then a fallout, then bitter recriminations. You would say, how about the DPP-UDF coalition? Well, expect the same trend, boy. This is a set pattern. It won’t be different; it is always the same. You can explain it even from afar.

Perhaps you can understand when I express fear for this country. Forget the lies they peddle, they will all behave the same way. After all, neo-patrimonialism sometimes does exist within a democracy, as Fukuyama (2015) argues:

Neopatrimonialism can coexist with democracy, producing widespread patronage and clientelism in which politicians share state resources with networks of political supporters. In such societies, individuals go into politics not to pursue a vision of public good, but rather to enrich themselves (p. 14).

One interesting question nobody seems to ask is why none of the new aristocrats is stressing the power of changing the system so as to do away with the underlying problem of our democracy―neo-patrimonialism. They can never fight it as they will soon need it to build their own empire of loyalty.

Once neo-patrimonialism gains roots, nothing else you do changes. In 2011, Professor Phillip Bayoyi of the University of Kinshasa said, many years after Mobutu Sese Seko was long gone, nothing changed. “The Mobutu regime is not dead, it’s still there under different management,” he said (see Daniel Howden’s “Can Congo ‘s new leopard change his spots?”)

Neo-patrimonialism has made us fail to deal with the real problem. Those of the South from where the President has always come (after 1994) see nothing wrong with whatever wrong a President from their Region does. Similarly, those from other Regions see no reason to demand that opposition Members detach themselves from neo-patrimonialism; they themselves benefit from that system. Interestingly, some funny decisions in our politics haven’t come from politicians from the South yet we all close our eyes to these truths.

It is neo-patrimonialism rather than regionalism or ethnicity that should blame. Was it tribalism that convinced the Ngonis to adopt ChiTumbuka as the language of prestige in the North? Was it regionalism that made the Ngonde-speakers attack ChiTumbuka and proclaim “We Bangonde would like our children to learn Nyanja in schools and not Tumbuka” (Vail & White, n.d., p. 165)? Malawi was divided into regions―North, Central, and South―in 1921. What does history tell us about the era before that? Anyone who understands history would appreciate that Malawians are one people divided by the unscrupulous politicians bent on using tribes and regions to accumulate themselves resources under neo-patrimonialism. And although history tells you Northerners were the best educated followed by the Yaos, truth of context reveals deliberate attempts by the white man to sideline other ethnic groups for various neo-patrimonialist goals, especially after 1915. Most Lomwe people were accused of supporting Reverend John Chilembwe during the rising against the colonial government in 1915.

A number of factors exacerbate neo-patrimonialism in Malawi. I consider none to be connected to regions or ethnic variations.

Issues which exacerbate neo-patrimonialism in Malawi

(1)Nature of political audience in the Malawi society

Our number one problem―neo-patrimonialism―finds a fertile ground in the nature of political audience that makes the majority of political supporters or followers in Malawi. This political audience is scandalously inept, providing a culture in which neo-patrimonialism subsists.

When defining political audience, some scholars divide political scientists into cynics and sceptics. According to Sniderman and Highton (2011), a “cynic questions whether people will do the right thing even though they have the right reason to do it” (p. 1). As for sceptics, the two researchers write that they “doubt whether the audience know the right reason and in any case questions whether they have the competence to do the right thing when it comes to politics” (p. 1). In both cases, political audience should never be believed to make informed decision at all even where all the relevant information is laid before them. This is typical of the majority of followers in Malawi.

Apart from high levels of illiteracy, the political audience in Malawi is made more inept by a number of encumbering vices which include superstition; envy, the culture of orality; and the tendency to create or find scapegoat to explain complex issues.

The Malawi society and superstitions

No explanation of a historical event in Africa gives full meaning without a component of superstition. The following account about the civil war in Liberia (late 1989-July 1997) is a classic example:

During the modern Liberian civil conflict, there have been numerous documented accounts of human disembowelment and cannibalism, as well as references to the importance placed by fighters on consuming certain key organs of their victims, particularly the heart, as a means to neutralizing them spiritually and absorbing their power. These practices, while widespread during wartime, appear to fall more into the category of beliefs based on witchcraft and ‘juju’, or black magic … (Waugh, 2011, p. 43).

The same was the case in the Sierra-Leonean civil war which started on March 23, 1991 after Corporal Foday Sankoh attacked the country. Harris (2014) discusses this in detail, observing that the conflict in Sierra Leone was similar with that in Liberia in that combatants in both cases exploited a link between war and the spirit world. He writes that all forces in Sierra Leone “were concerned with charms and ‘witchcraft’ or juju—spiritual power associated with ‘traditional’ beliefs and used with both good and ill intentions—as a means of increasing combat readiness” (p. 98).

In Africa, this practice is common among many, including Presidents and people who have been to school. In 1987, two years after a Northern Ugandan Acholi woman, Alice Auma, had been possessed by an alien spirit of Lakwena (and thus became Alice Lakwena), she ordered her soldiers―Holy Spirit Mobile Forces―to attack Yoweri Museveni’s Government army, “to rid it of witchcraft” (Behrend, 2016, p. xi). It is said the Acholi people had suffered a lot under Idi Amin, Milton Obote, and Yoweri Museveni (p. x), and Alice Lakwena wanted to rid the area of this ‘evil’. It is said that her soldiers included a former cabinet minister and professor, Isaak Ojok. These people believed that if they took holy water and underwent some rituals, bullets would never work on them. On this, Behrend writes that, “in the course of his trial, Professor Ojok, a former member of the Holy Spirit Movement, also explained that his first encounter with Lakwena had confused him because he did not know whether Alice or the spirit was speaking. It was Alice who then told him that the spirit Lakwena had spoken and that it must not be contradicted” (p. 140).

The Holy Spirit Mobile Forces were finally defeated in November, 1987. Although Alice crossed the border to Kenya, her father went on with the war in Uganda. Later, Joseph Kony, also a Northern Ugandan, was to be possessed by a similar spirit. Kony rebel forces, the Lord’s Resistance Army, have been fighting Mr Museveni’s Government forces since the 90s (although currently the LRA has been reduced to less than 100 heads and no longer active in Northern Uganda but in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Although in Malawi we never reach these levels, the majority of our people here practise superstition with religious zeal. The following two events―the Chilobwe murders and the mchape affair―say it all.

The Chilobwe murders

On Tuesday, October 19, 1971, a trial began in the Southern Regional Traditional court in Blantyre. Walla Laini Kawisa was being accused of mysterious murders in Chilobwe Township of Blantyre. According to Brietzke (1974), Kawisa pleaded guilty to 3 counts involving 8 murders although at the delivery of the judgement, a few days later, on October 30, the Court convicted him for 31 murders and 15 attempted murders. Reading the Judgement, Chief Chikumbu said: “… the accused should be hanged and is not allowed to appeal.”

The facts are that, from September 1968 to March 1970, unexplained murders occurred in townships in Blantyre, the Southern Region commercial capital of Malawi. The Government of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the first President of Malawi (from 1966) and Prime Minister before that (1964-1966), failed dismally to arrest the culprits. If things had continued like that for many years, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s government would have been brought to its knees for failing to protect the population. In fact, one rumour went that the “Government was responsible for the murders, and was draining the victims’ blood and sending it to South Africa to repay a loan, since white men are believed to drink African blood and manufacture money from it” (p. 362).

Mchape of the mid-1990s

The Chilobwe Murders were by no means the first time issues superstition had gripped the country. In the 1930s, a practice known as mchape had taken hold of the country with the origins said to be Mulanje. Mchape was a “witchcraft-eradicating movement that swept through Malawi in 1933 … mass cleansing ceremonies were conducted in villages for the purpose of eradicating or purging the area of all evil. Those villagers declared to be witches were given a medicine (a poisonous concoction called mwavi) to cleanse them of their sins” (Crosby, 1993, p. 85). Even the Nyasaland Police Force, born in 1920, could not match the popularity of mchape, perhaps because even the police personnel themselves, most of them Yao, my tribe, the very one from which Kawisa came, believed in it, almost worshipping it.

In the mid-1990s, mchape returned in a different form and for a different purpose. This time it was a ‘healing’ concoction against HIV and AIDS. The degree to which most people believed it reveals how much the people in this country revere superstitions.

It all started when Billy Goodson Chisupe, a member of John Chilembwe’s Providence Industrial Mission Church, and an ordinary villager in Machinga, Southern Region, made a claim that the spirits of his parents―two men in black robes and black shoes―had shown him a tree that had the powers to cure people of AIDS. The people flocked to him in lorries to drink a cup from a huge drum at Chisupe’s village―Chikamana Village. According to Probst (1999),

From late February to mid-April 1995 up to 3,000 people per day had come to a small village near Liwonde to drink the medicine which was given out free by the cult’s leader, Billy Goodson Chisupe. Altogether, the number of people who went to see Chisupe from August 1994 to May 1995 was about 300,000, roughly 5 per cent of the whole population, encompassing all sectors of society, from ordinary villagers to wealthy businessmen, from civil servants, prostitutes and lorry drivers to clergymen and high-ranking politicians (p. 109).

Eventually, mchape was proved to be false gold, as the people continued to die in large numbers. Besides, although Chisupe had recommended taking only one cupful of the mchape, some thought taking more than one could lead to instant healing. For example, in March 1995, one person died after taking a record seven cups.

Superstition, culture of orality, and envy

Another danger with the culture of superstition is that it subsists in orality, that is, the culture of rumour mongering. In Malawi, one can create a story against another and the whole society, without effort to verify or substantiate it, springs into action. There have been cases in my country when lightning kills a person and the people blame it on some senior citizens in the village. End last year, villagers in Karonga (North Malawi), went about killing senior citizens on allegations that they were practising witchcraft. This barbarism is everywhere, even in the Southern Region where I come from. The cause for unexplained deaths in villages is often senior citizens.

The culture of orality is exacerbated by conditions of high level poverty in the country. For example, it is not uncommon for villagers to explain some villager’s wealth through some weird practices. A man who does well in agriculture is said to own familiar spirits―ndondocha―who do the digging for him at night or who go about other people’s fields, stealing crops there for their masters. A thriving maize mill means there is someone (a dead person) inside it (the machine) who does the milling. Businesspersons fight on mere allegations that they are sending each other snakes to swallow each other’s money to serve their respective masters.

It turns uglier when orality meets envy. According to Scott (2015), at times, “people have been blamed or vilified not necessarily in order to cover up someone else’s ineptitude but, often, through pure envy and jealousy” (p. 23). In Malawi, the National Anthem itself asks GOD to heal us of envy. The Chichewa (vernacular) version of the Anthem dilutes the seriousness of the concept because it gives ‘envy’ the same meaning as ‘jealousy’. In Malawi, the problem is not merely jealousy; it is something much more than that, that is; it is the envy our National Anthem talks against.

Envy, jealousy and greed epitomise the heart of ill will. Berke (2012) however, argues that “envy has long been considered the worst of these impulses” (p. 53). Berke proffers the reason, namely “because it is so painful to the mind, the envious person will go to almost any length to diminish, if not, destroy whatever or whomever may have aroused it” (p. 53). He adds, “the envious person feels inferior, rather than empty. He cannot stand to see others full of life and goodness, because he is preoccupied with his own limitations and defects. So he aims to debunk and debase what others have” (p. 59). In short, although jealousy is associated with not wishing others to have it, or greed with the urge to have more and more and more, envy wants to have everything and destroy those who have what you do not have. Envy refuses those targeted to have a say; it seals their mouths, at times, it seeks to obliterate them altogether. As a nation we must always ask ourselves whether we aren’t being driven by envy. I believe that one measure of whether one is being driven by envy is that he or she affords the scapegoat no time to defend themselves.

(2)Failure to learn from our mistakes and those of peers

Neo-patrimonialism also thrives in a culture in which no one seems interested to learn from past mistakes or from mistakes of peers. Malawi could have avoided many mistakes if we had a heart to learn from our mistakes and those of our peers.

In Tanzania, the bill of rights found its way into their Constitution in 1984 following pressure from the people. Sensing wisdom, the President at the time, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere voluntarily left office a year later, that is, 1985. What Nyerere had done, giving in to the incorporation of the bill of rights in 1984 had atoned for his earlier failures on the issue. According to Kijo-Bisimba and Peter (2010), “it was under Mwalimu that nationalists negotiating for the independence of Tanganyika in London and Dar es Salaam rejected the inclusion of a bill of rights in the independence constitution of 1961” (p. 151). The two writers add that Mwalimu had seen to it that the bill of rights was not considered for the Republican Constitution of 1962, the Interim Constitution of 1965, and the Permanent Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977. However, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere took advantage of the situation in 1984 to bring much-needed change and voluntarily left office. After leaving office, he went an extra mile, as “Mwalimu was the force behind the re-introduction of the multiparty political system in Tanzania in 1992…” (p. 156).

While Nyerere was working to undo past mistakes, Malawi was watching, waiting to be pushed to the edge of submission. Had Dr Banda read the events in Tanzania and acted voluntarily at the time, there would have been great respect for his legacy today, I tell you. As it were, Malawi kept oppressing her people well into the early 1990s.

Over the years, Zambia has always given us a premonition of things to come in our setting. Despite this, we have never, as a country, studied Zambia hard to prevent a repeat of their folly. Consider the fact that the dawn of multiparty politics in Zambia never moved us an inch to begin some preparations for change ourselves.

In Zambia, in 1990, the police had opened fire, killing 27 people, following demonstrations. These demonstrations had been sparked by price increase for maize meal. The same year, Kaunda realised it would pay no dividends fighting resolute demonstrators. Thus, he announced that Referendum would be held in the country in October the same year. Apart from this, “a ban on forming political organisations was lifted, an amnesty for political prisoners was declared, and a Commission for the Referendum was given a free hand to prepare for the event” (Erdmann & Simutanyi, 2003, p. 10).

Suppose Malawi (Dr Banda) had voluntarily taken steps, undoing the things that Zambia (Dr Kaunda) had been forced to do after sustained pressure, what form of respect could we be according Dr Banda’s Government today? Unfortunately, we never learned from the events in Zambia, our neighbour. As a result, in 1992, Dr Banda’s Government was to make a similar mistake as Dr Kaunda’s. What Muluzi, Juwayeyi, Makhambera and Phiri write about the events that followed the 1992 Pastoral Letter is informing:

The general public fully supported the Bishops. University students in Zomba and Blantyre demonstrated in their support. In May 1992, more demonstrations by university students and industrial workers in Blantyre, who were calling for higher wages and end to food shortages, led to rioting and at least 38 people were shot dead by the police (p. 140).

Many maintain that, had Dr Banda lifted a ban on forming political organisations way before he was pushed, or, had he declared an amnesty for all political prisoners way before local and international pressure had mounted against him, the 1994 results could have been different.

In October 1991, Zambia held elections, paving the way for a peaceful transition from one-party rule to democratic pluralism. The new President was the poster boy Frederick Chiluba, a former Zambian Congress of Trade Unions Chairperson. Barely two years before, in 1989, this man had openly challenged the then President, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, to return the country to multiparty democracy. As all this was happening, Malawi watched, unable to learn from the events.

Even after we had attained multiparty democracy, President Bakili Muluzi was not to learn from the mistakes of Frederick Chiluba. When barely two months in power, in December 1991, Chiluba unilaterally declared Zambia a Christian Nation, and received wide condemnation for acting without consultation, we watched. When Chiluba fell out with students, six months before, comrades in the demonstrations to oust the one-party regime of Kaunda, we watched. When Chiluba sent the police to crush the students, we watched, never learning anything from all that. All this should have taught us that if we were not to be careful, similar events were soon to rock our politics and compromise the gains so recently made.

The learning graph that Zambia presented to us was enough to force us shape our politics way before things would begin to go berserk. For example, according to Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003), “students demonstrations continued throughout the year (that is, 1992) and the police even shot at demonstrators … a number of ministers were apparently involved in corruption scandals without being dismissed, indicating no difference in style of governance to that of the predecessor regime” (p. 13). When, in July 1992, two ministers incensed by Chiluba’s failure to tackle corruption head-on, resigned (Erdmann & Simutanyi, 2003, p. 14), we refused to take home some lesson. When, in April 1993, those ministers known to cherish reform principles were left out of cabinet (p. 14), we went business as usual.

We knew it all that, following the Constitutional Amendment of 1996, the one that barred Kaunda from standing again, Chiluba had confirmed his support for term-limits (Cheeseman, 2019, p. 14). We know that in January 1998, Chiluba was quoted by the Sunday Mail (dated January 11, 1998), as saying “When my term of office [as President] comes to an end, do not even think of retaining me, because umuntu nga akota namano yalachepa (Bemba for ‘when a person gets old, he runs out of ideas’)” (Venter, 2003, p. 9). We know that, yet in 2000, after he had appointed new district administrators―loyalists who, together with party cadres, went full-throttle campaigning for the Third Term bid―the man changed tune. This time he confessed he had no option but to ‘bow down to the wishes of the Zambian people’. Thanks to “Oasis Forum”, a coalition of civil organisations from every sector of the country for stopping Parliament from passing this law.

Come home, 1999. The ruling UDF diehards began to go on a subtle campaign for Open Term bid, later to be christened Third Term bid.

Remember that in Malawi, the section against the Third Term had been included by the framers of the Constitution out of fear. The inclusion was a strategic ploy in case Dr Banda should win the 1994 Elections. In other words, it was meant as a constitutional instrument to stop him or his loyalists from standing for more than two terms. In this way, the MCP would not be in power (through the same person) perpetually. Now that the UDF had defeated Dr Banda at the polls, the UDF felt the provision no longer necessary, and that, the UDF as a party could, instead, use it to consolidate power for its own benefit.

The term-limit clause was by no means the only provision that had been put in the Constitution with the eye on Dr Banda or with the intention to check the MCP; the provision of the Senate was another such inclusion. Those fighting for pluralism feared Dr Banda’s party could form the first Government after the 1994 Elections. They therefore wanted to find other means through which they could confront Dr Banda, through this second Chamber. This is why MCP had been against it before the elections when those campaigning for pluralism were for it. When those campaigning for it got what they had been looking for, they saw no need to continue with it because it was bound to give the MCP more powers. All these things are there in our Hansards.

In July 2002, our MPs voted on the Open Term Bill. This was despite the fact that, our neighbour, Frederick Chiluba, had failed miserably to perpetuate power through the Third Term bid. Why we could never learn from the event in Zambia is beyond me. Interestingly, just as was the case in Zambia where one of the casualties, Michael Sata (National Secretary for MMD and Minister without Portfolio), a presidential aspirant himself, had been at the helm, almost a “‘hit man’ in elimination of other ‘contenders to the throne’” (Venter, 2003, p. 14), in Malawi, Brown Mpinganjira, a top founding member of the UDF and a presidential aspirant himself, was among the early prominent casualties for speaking against the Bill.

And when Dr Muluzi failed with his Third Term Bid, he handpicked Professor Bingu wa Mutharika, hoping that he would pay him immensely for the seat. When Muluzi was picking Mutharika, Chiluba was going through hell after his chosen successor, Levy Mwanawasa, had turned on him. Professor Bingu wa Mutharika was to act likewise, abandoning the UDF, starting his own party, the Democratic Progressive Party from 2005. That’s what neo-patrimonialism does― no two roosters can strut in the same compound of neo-patrimonialism.

Today, following the ruling by the Constitutional Court, parties are forging working relations―coalitions or alliances. I am not sure they are learning from what happened elsewhere on the Continent where such arrangements had been experimented. First, fate has paired the ruling DPP and the former ruling UDF. From my understanding, this alliance is simply to help the South maintain power, a pure act of neo-patrimonialism. I personally do not think it has the welfare of Malawians at heart as their leadership claims. Unfortunately, I read the same motives in the opposition camp, these fellas who are tossing before us a narrative that our biggest problem is the ruling DPP, that once we deal with this foe, our affairs will suddenly turn sweet again. It is interesting how this version has taken hold.

Based on this narrative, the people are talking of forming a grand coalition to topple the DPP once and for all, to create a new Malawi for Malawians. It is a grand idea, but, as Dr Saulos Chilima himself has warned, the motive must be clear. In other words, the motive must be to create public policy that serves public interest better. Coalitions formed for the short-term ‘goal’ of removing an incumbent is not what this country is looking for; Malawi is looking for men and women who carry a heart for the people, great men and women with tears for the poor who have been downtrodden for the majority of our years of Independence in this country.

Coalition for the sake of coalition is a project dead on arrival. We can borrow a leaf from the situation in the Gambia. In the Gambia, incensed by Yahya Jammeh, the man who had held on to power with a vice-like grip suddenly found himself on the losing end after a group of opposition politicians had ganged up against him. The coalition that toppled Jammeh was one made of people with contested interests who, for the sake of power, accepted to play the low profile, allowing Adama Barrow to lead it. True to their wish, they successfully removed Jammeh, and in January 2017, Barrow became President of the Gambia, ending Jammeh’s brutal 22-year reign. Unfortunately, their coalition, one built on shaky grounds, soon began to wobble.

The terms of the coalition were interesting, as it was all erected on a gentleman’s agreement―kind of Tower of Babel. They agreed that Barrow was going to step down after three years, as he was going to play the ‘transitional’ leader within this period, after which elections would be held where he would not stand. Interestingly, their Constitution provides for five years.

After tasting power and all its concomitant pleasures, Barrow has told the coalition that, where the Constitution provides for five years no one in their right frame of mind can step down after only three years at the helm of power. In fact, he has turned round, accusing coalition members of having given him lies that one can surrender leadership after only three years when the Constitution provides for a good five years. As we are talking, he has vowed to see through the five years and even stand again in 2021 for another five years.

The Gambians have been to the street to remind him three years is enough and that, reneging on one’s promise is a kind of self-indictment that one can never be trusted again. And what does that matter to him when, according to Cham (2018), “many of the original eight-member coalition parties represented in the cabinet have either been sacked or relegated to some insignificant advisory role”?

What mistake did Barrow or that coalition make? Well, they forgot to learn from events in their own history as well as from history from elsewhere. First, they did not take into account how Jammeh himself had come to power in 1994, and how he had quickly changed soon after tasting power. Jammeh had come to power through a bloodless coup, promising to give back leadership to a civilian administration. But soon he cast off the uniform for more of it, power.

The coalition in the Gambia had also overlooked what had happened elsewhere following similar coalitions.

(3)Lack of incentives and rewards for patriots pursuing truth and justice

Neo-patrimonialism has also persisted in Malawi because, as a nation, we lack that culture that rewards courage against injustice. Examples are rife in Malawi―whether during one-party regime or democratic Malawi―of people who, after they had followed great principles of democracy, found themselves getting rejected by the very people whose rights they were defending.

Following the ‘Cabinet Crisis’ when a number of prominent politicians fell out with Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, then Prime Minister of the first Government formed after Independence, those who had set their eyes on political posts, found it an opportunity to fill in the boots. Even today, very few remember let alone discuss these great men and women who had defied Regions, to identify themselves with the truth in search for justice for a newly born nation. They no longer matter in our affairs. Thus, we describe them as ‘rebels’.

After the sudden death of President Bingu wa Mutharika in April 2012, the Army Commander, General Henry Odillo, refused to heed to calls by the widowed governing party at the time, the DPP, to take over power. According to Dionne and Dulani (2012), one reason that had made General Odillo refuse to succumb to the temptation to take over power was his desire to immortalise himself as “a champion of the Constitution” (p. 119). Whether this assertion is true or not, the fact is that General Odillo had paid dearly after the DPP had returned to power hardly two years later. To make matters worse, General Odillo is currently answering corruption charges.

As I write, senior bureaucrats are silent, not sure towards which island the wind will blow them. Currently, they are in great uncertainty, wondering whether the DPP will be in power beyond 2020. This is what neo-patrimonialism does. It enslaves us all, making us always dance to those who pay the piper. Unfortunately, those who can speak out risk not being part of those to share the spoil. The dilemma today isn’t whether our democracy will thrive; it is who shall lead in this corporate banditry called neo-patrimonialism.

(4)Detest of a culture that shares knowledge on failures, mistakes, and errors

One problem with neo-patrimonialism is that it decapacitates, that is, it makes those eating from that pot not able to question things. In this club people don’t discuss weaknesses; they operate in a world where everything is fine, perfect. Listen to MCP supporters praising the Ngwazi (Dr Banda), you would think Malawi was London, and that Dr Banda was a saint. You can’t begin to discuss the frailties of Dr Banda before them, as Dr Banda was a man perfect. Listen to DPP diehards praising Professor Bingu wa Mutharika, you would think Malawi is all tarmac road and maize grows from every grass around. That Bingu had frailties is an affront in their world. That’s what neo-patrimonialism does; it closes our eyes to truth.

In 2015, Matthew Syed authored a book, Black box thinking: Why most people never learn from their mistakes―but some do. This is a powerful book that exposes the danger of a culture that shuns the mentality to confront our mistakes head on. He uses two safety-critical industries―aviation and medicine―to answer this wonderful question.

According to the World Health Organization (2019), more people die from errors in hospitals than from errors in aviation. The Organisation estimates that 1 in 3 million people risk death through aviation accident compared to 1 in 300 who risk death due to a preventable medical accident while receiving health care (p. 1). This is fascinating and perhaps reveals the gravity of the situation especially in African hospitals where almost everything is a problem―corruption, fake drugs, sub-standard facilities, misdiagnosis, wrong prescription, name it. Syed talks of a case in the U.S. where one woman had been forced to undergo cancer treatment yet she didn’t have cancer at all, that it was all as a result of a mix-up in some report. You and I have heard of cases where people were advised to start antiretroviral treatment when they didn’t have HIV at all. All this after some fella had messed up the diagnosis.

Syed explains why the aviation industry seems to fare better as far as safety is concerned. Syed says, first, it is a must that every aeroplane carries two black boxes, “one of which records instructions sent to all on-board electronic systems; the other (is) a cockpit voice recorder, enabling investigators to get into the minds of the pilots in the moments leading up to an accident” (p. 31). He adds that, “instead of concealing failure, or skirting around it, aviation has a system where failure is data rich” (p. 31).

Syed writes that, even in the event of an accident, the aviation industry frees itself from bias in order to get the most objective data. He writes that the industry does this by engaging “investigators, who are independent of the airlines, the pilots’ union, and the regulators, (and these investigators) are given full rein to explore the wreckage and to interrogate all other evidence” (p. 31). It doesn’t end with the investigation, for “in the aftermath of the investigation the report is made available to everyone (since) [A]irlines have a legal responsibility to implement the recommendations. Every pilot in the world has free access to the data. This practice enables everyone—rather than just a single crew, or a single airline, or a single nation—to learn from the mistake” (p. 31).

Syed argues that, by contrast, doctors tend to trivialise consequences of their mistakes, often taking it casual as one of those things that happen even after they have done their best (p. 14).

If African nations took the gravity of their problems with the same mind and approach as the aviation industry, the Continent could be sending astronauts to Mars today. Unfortunately, we still grapple with such simple issues as good governance, quality public goods and services, et cetera.

The lesson to governance is that we must take failures, no matter the stature, with the seriousness due them. We must trace where we went wrong and why. This will help us administer proper treatment rather than finger-pointing. This is why, my first recommendation on what we should do to return to our sweet Malawi, is on learning from our mistakes.

Way forward

Let us learn from our (past) mistakes and take responsibility for it all

There is no leadership style I admire as much as I do that practised in the military. In the military, people live one for the other―my brother’s keeper, and in the military everyone lives to win. In the words of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, each espouses one will, “the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed” (See “Duty, honor, Country”―Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s speech to the Corps of Cadets at the US Military Academy, at West Point, May 12, 1962).

Malawians must embrace a culture of sharing errors to ensure a similar problem should never occur again in future. The mixed bag of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s history does reveal some sparks of brilliance when it comes to owning decisions. One incident in which Dr Banda had demonstrated a heart to carry responsibility is that to do with plane hijacking at Chileka. Throughout his instruction to the Malawi Army, Dr Banda kept saying he would own up the responsibility for the action his Army would take.

In case you would need this history, the following case summarises what had happened:

Republic v. (Fouad) Kamil & (Ajaj Georges) Yaghi [1971-72] ALRM 358

Kamil and Yaghi hijacked a plane (South African Airways) flying from Salisbury to Johannesburg and caused it to land at Chileka Airport. The two demanded to meet some two people. When that failed they demanded a $5 million ransom. The hijack went wrong when all the passengers managed to escape. Shots were then fired at the aircraft, resulting in Yaghi being shot in the leg. The two then surrendered. They were charged with (1) demanding property with menace, with intent to steal (2) illegal possession of explosives, and (3) wrongful confinement.

Held:

Both were convicted and sentenced to 5 years on the charge of demanding money with menace; 5 years for the crime of wrongful confinement; and 1 year for being found in possession of explosives illegally. The sentences were to run consecutively (i.e. finish the first 5 years, then the second 5 years, then finally the 1 year).

As I said, when Dr Banda was interviewed on this, he kept saying he had given the Army Commander orders to blow it up if the two insisted on their ridiculous demand. Throughout, Dr Banda said whatever would happen, he was going to take responsibility. That’s leadership.

As Malawians we each must take responsibility and accept that we all were either collaborators or principal actors in the failure of our democracy. If we can’t understand this, let us read history and see where exactly we had lost it.

Let us learn from how others handled similar events

Although politics often suggests that it favours the brave, those who act with diligence, sometimes, politics does use foolishness to thrust one unto greatness. Sometimes I wonder whether Dr Saulos Chilima should have played the Mwanawasa, investing in strategic withdrawal in order to buy clean social capital.

In Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa was Chiluba’s Vice at the October 1991 Elections. Mwanawasa resigned as the country’s Vice-President in 1994 “complaining of Chiluba’s bad record on human rights and corruption, and stating that there was ‘an emergence of the politics of one man’” (Venter, 2003, p. 17). In some way, Mr Mwanawasa’s stance resembles that of Dr Chilima who kept expressing dissatisfaction, in riddles and parables though, with high levels of corruption in the very government he was serving. Unlike Dr Chilima, Mr Mwanawasa resigned and went silent. Mr Mwanawasa had accepted to give up the Vice-Presidency itself and went years in hibernation. Sometimes I feel like Dr Chilima should have taken that strategic route. I am not suggesting that he is not a man of principles, but my opinion is that it could have bought me in had he resigned and went silent, strategising on new ways of doing politics.

According to Venter, what Mr Mwanawasa had done had served him well, as it “won him public sympathy and enhanced his stature as a man of integrity; it also afforded him several years free of any association with the baggage of corruption, graft, and bad management that dogged other members of Chiluba’s inner circle” (p. 17). When Mr Chiluba handpicked him, he did so because he wanted someone ‘clean’. I should add that, Mr Chiluba had also fallen for him because Mr Mwanawasa had refused to go confrontational, not that he would not, but that he was strategic, waiting for the right time for that.

I would say the same of the President, that he must continue with the approach of tolerating dissent. The ‘problem’ with democracy is that it usually assumes that those with less power are always victims, even where it is obvious they are causing problems. For the reason, it is important that those with a higher measure of power be seen to be even more tolerating. With time, people will begin to tell who between the two sides is a problem. Until then, it would be wisdom to exercise great restraint.

Let us go beyond peace and stability for political integration and national identification

Malawi has been going through a terrible phase with intermittent demonstrations against the Electoral Commission Chair, Justice Dr Jane Ansah. Many people were of the idea that such demonstrations were going to break the neck of Government, leading to its fall. If we were a different country, those demonstrations were going to be the turning point. Malawians have a limit to what they can do. In short, our mobilisation will never reach the critical mass as was the case in the early 1990s―the Referendum and Operation Bwenzani (an operation through which Malawi Army disarmed Dr Banda’s personal army―Malawi Young Pioneers).

According to Pion-Berlin (2016), “uprisings reach a critical mass when so many have joined that the movement seems irreversible and its political force unstoppable [at which point] they have the potential to bring down heads of state, governments, and regimes” (p. 8). The main reason demonstrations in Malawi can never reach the critical mass is that the decline of our democracy hasn’t been sudden; our democracy has been eroding over time. In that way, our frustration has been incremental, cooling itself along the way.

Despite the fact that these demonstrations failed to reach the critical mass, they have revealed an important element about our democracy, namely that we have all along assumed that peace and stability alone do constitute nation-building. The demonstrations showed us that we have been mistaking peace and stability for nation-building.

Nation-building is the ability of citizens to support the state politically and to develop a sense of loyalty towards the nation, that is, identifying with the nation, perceiving it as a community of lived solidarity and shared political destiny (Wimmer, p. 25). It is nation-building that leads to peace, which is a necessary ingredient for socio-cultural and economic development. For me, nation-building arises from the level of trust a people have in their government. It is thus, a feeling in an individual to be loyal to the state and all it represents.

But how do we achieve nation-building? First, let us realise that, at the core of nation building is political integration and national identification. According to Wimmer (2018), “to achieve both, it is critical to forge political ties between citizens and the state that reach across ethnic divides and integrate ethnic majorities and minorities into an inclusive power arrangement” (p. 25). This is important because “if citizens are connected to government through relationships of authority and support, an inclusive national community emerges and nation building can be said to have succeeded” (p. 25).

By inclusion it does not necessarily mean a government of national unity; it means a government that will make a people share a feeling that at least they do participate fairly in all facets of opportunities. At the political party level, this would mean getting conscious of the need to put in prominent positions others from minority groups. And it does no harm even including others from seemingly majority groups who are outside power.

At least, we now know that political integration and nation-building do not necessarily refer to political stability. Malawi is not necessarily looking for political stability or peace. Malawi has always enjoyed political stability, even in the times of Dr Hasting Kamuzu Banda. Thus, a people can ‘enjoy’ political stability though under oppression. What Malawi needs today is political integration and national identification for nation-building, and it should be nation-building that should lead to peace and stability.

What Dunduzu K. Chisiza said way before Malawi’s Independence on political integration makes a lot of sense today. Chisiza (1961) had argued over what was going to be the source of disagreement once African nations including Malawi attained independence, namely political problems, leadership problems, social problems, and economic problems.

On political problems, Chisiza prophetically presents what he thought were going to be the cause of bad blood between the governing parties and the opposition, namely, destructive criticism of opposition parties and intolerance of governing parties. However, Chisiza confesses that the problem lies elsewhere. Although he doesn’t attribute it to neo-patrimonialism as he doesn’t use that term, his explanation suggests neo-patrimonialism as the cause:

Before independence, foreign rulers occupy the topmost rungs of the social ladder. With the coming in of independence, however, they step down and leaders of parties which have triumphed at the polls step up to fill the vacant rungs, thereby becoming the recipient of gratitude and admiration from their fellow country-men for having liberated their countries. Leaders of opposition parties who may have fought for independence just as valiantly as anyone else find themselves the recipients of practically nothing. Herein lies the rub. It is only human for these people to feel that they have been given a raw deal (p. 2).

Chisiza says this leads to mudslinging, and eventually the governing parties use the force of the law to deal with it. He however warns that clamping down on opponents using the force of law doesn’t solve the problem. For Chisiza, the answer is to ensure “leaders of popular opposition parties share in the gratitude and admiration (through) national governments in the first ten years or so of Independence” (p. 3).

Practical politicians are rare; most politicians are mere populists who throw mud at others using unrealistic yardsticks. Chisiza, a social-democrat was not that type. He was the most practical of all Independence fighters in Nyasaland. No wonder Power (1998) describes him as “probably the most gifted of the MCP intelligentsia” (p. 370) and one “many believed was a likely successor to Dr H. Kamuzu Banda” (p. 371). That, after he had disagreed with Dr Banda had wanted to resign but waited till we received Independence, the Independence he was not to witness, tells it all. It is said Chisiza had wanted to resign but had waited till we attained Independence because he didn’t want the white man to use the ‘confusion’ as a sign we were not ready to rule ourselves. Chisiza died 32, following a car crash at Thondwe Bridge (25 km south of Zomba) on Monday, September 3, 1962. He was pronounced dead upon arrival at Zomba General Hospital.

I have many times laughed at Chakufwa Chihana for not being politically stable. Reading Chisiza proffers the answer. If you basked in the sunshine of glory as a President in-the-making, when you were once arrested, kicked, and suddenly you realise ethnic tunes make it impossible for you to get it, what would you do? You wouldn’t know whether to keep going with your principles or join your ‘enemy’ and enjoy the spoils somehow. When your ideals seem in conflict with those of the boss, you decide to come out, not exactly sure. One can appreciate Chakufwa’s political movements better using Chisiza’s analogy. This can also explain why the second Vice-Presidency was created, to appease a friend who had put as gallant a fight as had the rest, perhaps a form of acceptable neo-patrimonialism.

If today, we invited all these politicians aligning with others, and give them an opportunity to share in the gratitude and admiration, you would notice how quiet the world would go. That would tell you this fight is for control of the pot of resources―neo-patrimonialism―and not service to the poor unfortunate Malawian.

In short, there must be deliberate attempt by those in power to ensure others share in the prize. As far as I am concerned, this is the bone of contention. Forget claims of democracy, regionalism, et cetera; people are fighting for control, to be part of the ‘enjoyers’.

Any discussion on our politics must also ensure we have made the opposition relevant. If anything this is a brilliant idea, as it means that whoever falls shall be assured of some relevance. In the fashion of Chisiza, this will give them some feeling of control.

The Malawi Congress Party has been in opposition since 1994, continually receiving taunts for being people who always oppose. Give them their voice too. In fact, if I were asked who should be given more powers between Office of Vice-President and the opposition, I would favour the latter.

Let us disassociate ourselves with violence

Let us remember that violence by whatever measure can never be justified. When a nation begins to see violence as a norm, that nation is heading for a catastrophe. A week ago, some man was killed in Dowa. Although this alone had shocked me about the trajectory of violence in this country, something besides shook my belief as regards the future of this country. The photo depicting the incident shows a boy, about 4 or 5, looking with a face of pity a slain body of an alleged man suspected of being a cattle rustler. What future are we subjecting such young lives to?

Only in October last year, 4 people lost their lives and 21 houses were torched in Nkhata-Bay following disagreements over stolen property. Two villages, great neighbours turned on each other and shed blood like we were still in the 14th century AD. Today people can suspect someone of being a witch and subject him or her to worst humiliation and, eventually, brutal death. People with albinism live as though Malawi is not their home all because some misguided people harbour a very strange belief over body parts of people with albinism. Today a group of unruly youths can just descend on some woman, stripping her naked as a ‘punishment’ for wearing a skirt of her liking. Where in the name of GOD has humanity gone from us Malawians? Why has Malawi suddenly turned a violence worshipper?

Let us emphasise Regions less

In order to ensure that everything comes from and for you and those around you, neo-patrimonialism makes every effort to ensure the person heading your party should be from your Region or even district. The MCP believe that its headship must always come from the Central Region. For most MCP members, they better be in the opposition for centuries if going in government means playing the second fiddle. For them, President of the MCP from the Central Region is the creed. Nothing less, abandon ship. This is where the idea of a coalition with the UTM is becoming problematic. Followers might wish to see the idea of coalition work, but the truth is: never expect a leader from MCP to take the running-mate slot.

The same is the case with parties from the South and North. You can never be President of a party from the South if you come from the North or Centre. Similarly, you can never be a President of a party from the North if you come from the South or the Centre. This is not regionalism as many may claim; it is as a result of a feeling that anyone away from me will never give me the opportunities I need in life. This is why I insist that our problem isn’t regionalism as such, but neo-patrimonialism. It is neo-patrimonialism that uses the idea of regions to achieve its goals.

Let us stress the power of reasoning and talking more

Malawi has now become a land of demonstrations and confrontation. As I’m talking, the ruling DPP have been to the streets, claiming bias on the side of the Judges following their finding in favour of the opposition. Similarly, the opposition seem not relenting on their taunts on the ruling party. Not long ago, a top opposition official told a rally that the bona fide President for this country is Dr Lazarus Chakwera of the MCP.

I am not saying citizens must never express themselves, nor am I saying citizens must never ask judges questions where they question the mode of administration of justice. As citizens, we have every right to ask questions, and that’s a component of Open Government: participation; transparency; accountability; and openness. This is why Waldron (1990) argues that, we must each be “interested in law, not only in a passive capacity as people affected by it, but also in our active capacity―as citizens, voters, agitators, and politicians―because it represents what has been done or resolved in our name and in the name of our community. It is not merely a law for us; if we are a democracy, it is also supposed to be our law” (p. 1). However, we must ask in such a way as to strengthen our position.

I know that sometimes people are tempted to exert pressure so public opinion should sway in their favour. Although public opinion can affect decision since “in democracies public opinion matters” (Booth & Seligson, 2009, p. xv), that does not happen so often in a democratic society. This is why, after Justice Brennan had warned against the effect of public opinion upon judges, he quickly offered a caution. According to Justice Brennan, “Even High Court Judges are constrained in issuing rulings, … not just by precedent and texts they are interpreting, but also, on any attractive political jurisprudential theory, by a decent regard for public opinion” (as cited in Perry, 1994, p. 98). Thus, “public opinion may be, at least sometimes, a heavy burden on the constitutional court’s autonomy to decide. Empirical evidence in comparative politics largely supports this claim” (Mendes, 2013, p. 207). However, Justice Brennan is quick to warn that “in a democratic society they cannot do so often, or by very much” (p. 98).

As much as possible, let us speak as though we each have a cathedral in our mouths, words that edify in order to rebuild ourselves. This applies to all parties―governing and ruling. As far as I am concerned both sides have been so reckless with words, one wonders whether they are virtues at all in our politics.

In the same vein, let us remember that we run on wheels of rule of law. Use of threats has no room in Malawi. If we disagree with something, let the Courts be the arbiter. The Malawi society is currently charged, in fact, so charged it will be naïve to begin to engage in activities that will trigger violence or violent reactions.

Let us remember that political problems are not the only problems we are facing

As a nation, there are many forces we should strategically prepare ourselves against. Currently, the world is fighting COrona VIrus Disease-19 (COVID-19). Airlines are winding up, schools are closing, football matches, an important source of revenue in the West, are being postponed or played indoors; let us not allow politics to eat the precious time we would use productively in both preparation and prevention. This is time for us to get united as a country and begin to consider means to ensure this problem does not hit us at all. In short, let the majority of our time be directed towards issues that should prepare us against this disease and other more mind-boggling problems―wicked problems―facing Malawi.

Above all, as we take measures to build our nation, let us also keep praying that our GOD should keep giving us peace. Like it or not, we are entreated to pray for our leaders, whether from the ruling party or opposition parties. Let us do so to ensure we remain a peaceful society. In the same vein, let me remind those who had once invited us for prayers for peaceful acceptance of the outcome of the Constitutional Court Judgement that this is time to go back to GOD to acknowledge HE heard our prayers and HE granted us our wish. Let us not be the type of son or daughter who only knows how to ask but not how to say thank you.

Conclusion

If you don’t share with my analysis of the source of our trouble, let me cite Francis Fukuyama for you: “It is much harder to move from a patrimonial or neopatrimonial state to a modern, impersonal one than it is to move from an authoritarian regime …” (2015, p. 12). In other words, it was an easier task for us defeating authoritarianism than it is dismantling neo-patrimonialism. You and I are up to the neck in it; it can’t be easy to change our positions. Besides, since nothing matters more in democracy than what happens inside political parties (Cross & Katz, 2013, p.1), it is in political parties that neo-patrimonialism has erected its palace. When Hon. Frank Mwenefumbo says that “freedom and rights in parties do not work … anything to the contrary they call you a ‘rebel’” (Cruise 5 Interview with Frank Tumpale Mwenifumbo), he means neo-patrimonialism is the heart of our party politics. Similarly, when Hon. Davis Katsonga says, “in Malawi, the biggest employer is Government. Even private companies that you have, most of them can’t survive without [business] orders from Government” (Times Exclusive with Honourable Davis Katsonga), he means it is neo-patrimonialism that rules our politics. If our fight is directed elsewhere, we must never get surprised when our efforts turn themselves into some theatre of the absurd, kind of waiting for some policy Godot. Let us understand our political culture and history to pin-point where exactly we had lost it. In that way, we shall desire and achieve that robust change, one directed at both our political culture and our institutions. Institutional reforms without dealing with the issue of political culture is like giving an old house a new coat of exterior paint; there is not much that will change inside it when the DNA of failure remains untouched. I am sure this knowledge will also help us avoid blaming our failures of many years on a few helpless souls.

References

Allawi, A.A. (2007). The occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, losing the peace. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Banik, D. (2010). Poverty and elusive development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Behrend, H. (2016), Mitch Cohen (Trans.). Alice Lakwena and the holy spirits. Oxford: James Currey.

Berke, J.H. (2012). Why I hate you and you hate me: The interplay of envy, greed, jealousy, and narcissism in everyday life. London: Karnac Books Ltd.

Bjerk, P. (2015). Building a peaceful nation: Julius Nyerere and the establishment of sovereignty in Tanzania, 1960-1964. New York: University Press of Rochester Press.

Boin, A., McConnell, A., & ‘t Hart, P. (Eds.). (2008). Governing after crisis. Governing after crisis: The politics of investigation, accountability and learning (pp. 3-32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boin, A, t’ Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Booth, J.A., & Seligson, M.A. (2009). The legitimacy puzzle in Latin America: Political support and democracy in eight nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1994). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. World Politics, 46(4). 453-489. The John Hopkins University Press.

Brietzke, P. (1974). The Chilobwe murders trial. African Studies Review, 17(2). 361-379. African Studies Association. Retrieved January 30, 2015 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/523638

Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2016). Sate fragility and failure as wicked problems: beyond naming and taming. Third World Quarterly, 35(2). 333-344. Doi:10.1080/01436597.2014.878495

Brown, S., & Kaiser, P. (2007). Democratisation in Africa: Attempts, hindrances and prospects. Retrieved March 7, 2010 from www.academia.edu

Bukovansky, M. (2002). Legitimacy and power politics. New Jersey: Princeton University.

Cammack, D. (2011). Malawi political settlement in crisis, 2011. Background Paper, November 2011. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Cham, K. (2018). President’s Barrow’s Gambia: A dream betrayed. Posted Wednesday, November 28, 2018. Retrieved February 6, 2020 from www.theeastafrican.co.ke

Cheeseman, N. (2019). Should I stay or should I go? Term limits, elections, and political change in Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335303146

Chikaya-Banda, J. (2012). Duty of care: Constitutional and law reform in Malawi. 1-24. London: Africa Research Institute.

Chinguwo, P.G. (n.d.). 1964 Cabinet Crisis.

Chisiza, D.K. (1961). Africa: What lies ahead, 2nd ed. New Delhi: India Council for Africa.

Crosby, C.A. (1993). Historical dictionary of Malawi, 2nd ed. New Jersey: Scarecrow Press.

Cross, W.P., & Katz, R.S. (Eds.). (2013). The challenges of intra-party democracy. In: W.P. Cross, & R.S Katz (Eds.). The challenges of intra-party democracy (pp. 1-10). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

De Graaf, G., Huberts, L., & Smulders, M. (2016). Coping with public value conflicts. Administration and Society, 48(9), 1101-1127. Retrieved June 25, 2018 from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095399714532273

Dionne, K.Y., & Dulani, B. (2012). Constitutional provisions and executive succession: Malawi’s 2012 transition in comparative perspective. African Affairs, 112(446). 111-137. Oxford University Press for Royal African Society. Retrieved January 13, 2020 from https://doi:10.1093/afraf/ads067

Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007). The global diffusion of public policy: Social construction, coercion, competition, or learning? Annual Review of Sociology, 33. 449-472. Retrieved June 6, 2017 from www.annualreviews.org

Douglas, T. (1995). Scapegoats: Transferring blame. London: Routledge.

Ellet, R. (2014). Politics of judicial independence in Malawi. Freedom House.

English, K. (2004). The management of the 2004 Electoral process. In M. Ott; B. Immink; B. Mhango & C. Peters-Beries (Eds.), The power of the vote: Malawi’s 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections (pp. 29-48). Zomba: Kachere Series.

Erdmann, G., & Simutanyi, N. (2003). Transition in Zambia: The hybridisation of the Third Republic. Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Occasional Papers. Lilongwe: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

EU Election follow-up Mission Malawi 2017 Final Report. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. Retrieved February 23, 2020 from www.aceproject.org

Fukuyama, F. (2015). Why is democracy performing so poorly? In: L. Diamond & M.F. Plattner (Eds.). Democracy in decline? (pp. 11-24). Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

General Douglas MacArthur (1962). “Duty, honor, Country”―Speech to the Corps of Cadets at the US Military Academy, at West Point, May 12, 1962. Retrieved February 29, 2020 from https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places

Gloppen, S., Kanyongolo, E., Khembo, N., Patel, N., Rakner, L., Svåsand, L., Tostensen, A., & Bakken, M. (2006). The institutional context of the 2004 General Elections in Malawi. CMI Report 2006: 21. Retrieved June 11, 2019 from www.cmi.no/publications

Greer, J.M. (2014). Decline and fall: The end of Empire and the future of democracy in 21st century America. Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers.

Gyimesi, B. (2018). Trust in parliament. Blog article. Retrieved March 4, 2019 from www.oecdinsights.org

Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon Books.

Harris, D. (2014). Sierra Leone: A politickal history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Howden, D. (2011). Can Congo’s new leopard change his spots? https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.independent.co.uk

Kardasheva, R. (2008). The power to delay: Explaining the European Parliament’s influence in the consultation procedure. 1-29. Paper presented at Intra- and Inter-Institutional Relations in EU Decision-Making Workshop, the ECPR Joint Sessions, Rennes, France, 11-16 April, 2008. Retrieved April 23, 2019 from https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal

Kijo-Bisimba, H., & Peter, C.M. (2010). Mwalimu Nyerere and the challenge of human rights. In C. Chachage & A. Cassam (Eds.). Africa’s liberation: The legacy of Nyerere (pp. 149-159). Cape Town: Pambadzuka Press.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How democracies die. New York: Crown.

Kachale, C.J. (2012). Judicial (in)activism in Malawi?: A critical analysis of the impact of constitutional jurisprudence on constitutionalism and the rule of law. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London. Retrieved January 3, 2019 from http://eprints.soas.ac.uk

Kameme, W. (2015). The vertical and horizontal accountability in the Malawi Parliamentary Democracy. A PhD thesis submitted to the University of Hull, School of Politics, Philosophy and International Studies, United Kingdom, June 2015.

Katsonga, D.C. (2019). Times exclusive with Davis Katsonga. (Interview by Brian Banda).

Malawi National Assembly. (2017). Parliamentary debates (Hansard, Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 27 of 2017, 50 + 1) (pp. 13-38). 15th December, 2017. Lilongwe: Parliament Press.

Malunga, C. (2014). ‘Animal Farm’ prophecy fulfilled in Africa: A call to a values and systems revolution. Maryland: University Press of America.

Mead, L.M. (2013). Teaching public policy: Linking policy and politics. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 19(3). 389-403. Retrieved January 4, 2020 from https://doi:org/10.1080/15236803.2013.12001742

Mendes, C.H. (2013). Constitutional courts and deliberative democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mwalubunju, O. (2007). Civil society. In N. Patel, & L. Svåsand (Eds.), Government and Politics in Malawi (267-296). Zomba: Kachere Books.

Mwenifumbo, F. (2018). Cruise 5 with Frank Mwenifumbo. (Interview by Frank Chakhaza).

Netelenbos, B. (2016). Political legitimacy beyond Weber: An analytical framework. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nowack, D. (2018). Cultural values, attitudes, and democracy promotion in Malawi: How values mediate the effectiveness of donor support for the reform of presidential term limits and family law, 1-35. Discussion Paper. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH.

Obinger, H., Schmitt, C., & Starke, P. (2013). Policy diffusion and policy transfer in comparative welfare state research. Social Policy & Administration, 47(1). 111-129. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Doi: 10.1111/spol.12003

Patel, N. (2008). Representational challenge in Malawi. In Towards consolidation of Malawi’s democracy. Essays in honour of the work of Albert Gisy, German Ambassador in Malawi (Febuary 2005-June 2008). 21-37. Occasional Paper No 11, Malawi. Konrad-Edenauer-Stiftung. Retrieved January 3, 2019 from https://www.kas.de/get-file

Perry, M.J. (1994). The constitution in the courts: Law or politics? New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pion-Berlin, D. (2016). Military relations in comparative perspective. In H. Albrecht; A. Croissant; & F.H. Lawson (Eds.). Armies and insurgencies in Arab Spring (p. 7-33). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Power, J. (1998). Remembering Du: An episode in the development of Malawian political culture. African Affairs, 97, 369-396. Retrieved October 8, 2018 from https://www.jstor.org

Prebble, M. (2012). Which reform is most important?‒Some evidence from New Zealand. Working Paper No. 12/13, 1-21. Wellington: Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.

Probst, P. (1999). Mchape ’95, or, the sudden fame of Billy Goodson Chisupe: Healing, social memory and the enigma of the public sphere in post-Banda Malawi. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 69(1). 108-137. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved October 21, 2019 from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1161079

Rush, M., & Giddings, P. (2011). Parliamentary socialisation: Learning the ropes of determining behaviour? Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Scott, M. (2015). Scapegoats: Thirteen victims of military injustice. London: Skyhorse Publishing.

Shipan, C.R., & Volden, C. (2012). Policy diffusion: Seven lessons for scholars and practitioners. Public Administration Review, 72(6). 788-796. The American Society for Public Administration. Doi: 10.111/j.1540-6210.2012.02610x

Snek, S. (2014). Leaders eat last: Why some teams pull together and others don’t. New York: Penguin Group.

Sniderman, P.M., & Highton, B. (2011). Facing the challenge of democracy. In P.M. Sniderman & B. Highton (Eds.). Facing the challenge of democracy: Explorations in the analysis of public opinion and political participation. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Syed, M. (2015). Black box thinking: Why most people never learn from their mistakes―but some do. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.

Tavris, C., & Aronson, E. (2007). Mistakes were made (but not by me): Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful acts. Orlando: Harcourt.

Thomson, A. (2010). An introduction to African politics (3rd Ed.). Oxon: Routledge.

Vail, L., & White, L. (n.d.). Tribalism in the political history of Malawi. Available at https://publishing.cdlib.org

Venter, D. (2003). Democracy and multiparty politics in Africa: Recent elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho. EASSRR, XIX (1), 1-39.

Wairda, H.J. (2014). Political culture, political science, and identity politics: An uneasy alliance. Surrey: Ashagate Publishing Limited.

Waldron, J. (1990). The law. Routledge: London and New York.

Waugh, C.M. (2011). Charles Taylor and Liberia: Ambitions and atrocities in Africa’s lone star state. London: Zed Books.

Wimmer, A. (2018). Nation building: Why some countries come together while others fall apart. New Jersey: Princetown University Press.

Wolfe, S.D., & Müller, M. (2018). Crisis neopatrimonialism: Russia’s new political economy and the 2018 World Cup. Communism, 65(2). 101-114. Taylor and Francis. Doi: https://doi:org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1429934

World Bank. (2018). Systematic country diagnostic: Breaking the cycle of low growth and slow poverty reduction: Malawi. Report No. 132785. Malawi Country Team, Africa Region.

World Health Organization (2019). Patient safety fact file. Patient Safety and Risk Management Service Delivery and Safety, September 2019. https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/patient