African democracy and the majoritarian-consensus dichotomy: How to resuscitate Malawi politics from her neo-patrimonial-induced comatose

 

To form a new government requires infinite care and unbounded attention; for if the foundation is badly laid, the superstructure must be bad―George Washington.

 

Introduction

In most African countries, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 signalled great rebirth. According to Huntington (1991) as cited in Diamond (2015), this marked the “third wave of democratisation”. Although this wave had started (in the South European countries) way back in the 1970s, Sesay and Alou (1998) have described it as “new democratic dawn” (Ganahl, 2013). Ganahl also writes that Bourgi and Casteran (1991) had characterised it as “springtime for Africa” while Fukuyama (1992) simply called it “the end of history”. One could read some hype in these phrases, heaven coming to inhabit Africa. But, whatever we may say, the reality has pointed to this: while the ink of that much-touted change was still wet, the roof of our great house of democracy suddenly gave in. In Malawi, the high promises of the 1994 General Elections that followed the fall of the dictatorship at the 1993 Referendum soon took a nosedive. In no time, the new leadership indulged itself in one policy undoing after another. Presence, birth or rebirth of the civil society meant little, as the powerful executive undermined it at will. The country was eating itself from the inside. Standard was set. And, from then on, every new government came to assume that set pattern: first, some semblance of democracy and therefore some renewed optimism; then shortly after, a litany of very well planned programmes of plunder cleverly guarded by some spirited attempts to annihilate dissent and opposition. In this discussion, I wish to give this new Government some pieces of advice on how not to fall into this attractive trap. This is in the hope that it will listen, though it is the habit of governments never to listen or to listen only after the horses have bolted. I will therefore discuss a number of issues, most notably, how this Government should handle the opposition and dissent, and where it should concentrate its energy in order to lead with distinction. My desire is to see true change through pragmatic politics and robust but incremental public sector reforms. Underlying my discussion is a belief in the democratic value of consensus for true nation-building. It is as though I am pleading with those wielding power today to please understand that though we have this majoritarian setting through the June 23 Presidential Election, practice should promote the culture of consensus for the synergy of active participation and inclusiveness.

 

Preamble

Following the February 3 Judgement where the Constitutional Court ordered a fresh presidential election, we now have a new President―His Excellency the President Dr Lazarus Chakwera. We also have a ‘new’ Vice-President―The Right Honourable Dr Saulos Chilima. Heart-felt congratulations to them both, belated though.

 

One would perhaps wonder why I have woken up, touting, with great industry, this new government. Well, I espouse an understanding that no leadership comes upon us but from the LORD. So, whoever we are, and wherever we are, we must teach our hearts to respect those in authority. This entails that we must pray for them besides helping them achieve their vision which also happens to be our vision as a people.

 

In short, we are entreated to support Government of the day, in both action and spirit, and it is for some three reasons. First, and I’m repeating myself here, GOD HIMSELF requires of us to pray for our leaders and to help them better serve us and this Great Country. Second, they are leaders for us all, for Malawi. If they fail, Malawi will fail, our generation will fail, the future will fail; no right-thinking Malawian must be party to endeavours that promise to wreck their nation. However, this should not be interpreted to mean going in head first, as we are always called to give constructive criticism so as to help in building. Lastly, leadership is a great promise and a great opportunity to bring positive change. If our leaders fail, let them fail because they made a choice to indulge themselves in vices that worked to unking them. We must never be the source of that problem. Our conscience shall be clear, that we did what we could in our time to serve a land GOD gave us to, but that, our leaders, intoxicated with power, had chosen otherwise.

 

So far, Dr Chakwera and his Vice seem to inspire, demonstrating some novel way of leading. For example, Dr Chakwera has openly declared intent to reduce presidential powers although he has come short of stating where the trimmed powers will fall after the said trimming or dissipation is concluded. My hope is that such powers, when trimmed, won’t be shared within the executive, because doing so will contradict the great principle of integrity and honesty. If this move seeks to serve public interest better, for example, by giving more powers, autonomy and independence to our legislature and all supreme audit institutions (SAIs) then we have in Dr Chakwera a great change agent. But as I say, let us remain vigilant, our eyes wide open, for Africa rarely means what it professes. The exploits of Professor Peter Mutharika himself serves as an example here.

 

Professor Mutharika is on record for having advocated (in the mid-90s) one of the most admirable governance mechanisms for any nation blessed with heterogeneity. However, when an opportunity availed itself before him, all that came to suffer some premature death, the dream dying right in his textbooks.

 

In 1996, Professor Peter Mutharika had advocated (for our electoral system) an innovative proportional arrangement instead of the “winner-take-all” majoritarian organisation we follow today. At the time, he had argued at length against this system―“winner-take-all” or majoritarian arrangement―one he observed was not feasible for heterogeneous societies like Malawi, a nation blessed with a diversity of ethnic, regional or linguistic groups. For him, in such settings, the majoritarian system grinds at the detriment of minority groups. It is therefore, that was his reasoning, not good for Malawi’s democracy.

 

Shortly after this, GOD favoured Professor Peter Mutharika as he became advisor in his brother’s Government. This should have been time to make these brilliant ideas work, but lo, all this soon got to get lost in the miasma of power and forgetfulness. Later, when GOD gave him the ultimate opportunity to lead Malawi in 2014, not even one of those brilliant ideas managed to find its way onto our national policy priority list. Instead, his Government rejected an arrangement―the 50 + 1 Bill―that should have given our electoral system some semblance of the consensus or proportional arrangement. Besides, he never made efforts to advocate resuscitation of the Senate, an institution that had been proposed for this very purpose―proportional representation.

 

It is the nature of power that leaders hardly mean what they say. Dr Bakili Muluzi had committed at his inauguration to leave seat at the end of his constitutional tenure of two five-year terms. Come 1999, he paltered, seeking an extension. Lucky for Malawi, the move floundered that July 4, 2002. Before Dr Muluzi, in our neighbour Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, a born-again Christian, had made similar promises only to dishonor them soon after. In Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, the leader of the National Rainbow Coalition, an alliance of opposition parties which trounced Daniel arap Moi's hand-picked successor-candidate in Uhuru Kenyatta at the 2002 elections, had promised to rule for a single five-year term and then give it, power, to another. You know what happened. As I am writing this, the West African nation of Cote d’ivoire is going through some man-made turbulence, their President, 78-old Alasane Dramane Ouattara, is seeking a third term of office, insisting that their 2016 Constitution allows him that pleasure. It beggars belief that this great man would disregard the suffering his people had been through for so long just to feed his ego. I think, for the sake of the Ivorians, he will rethink this stand.

 

You would think it is only Africa that breeds leaders who change with time. It’s everywhere. Aung San Suu Kyi, once an icon that represented triumph of democracy over terror and fear in her nation, Myanmar, presents a perfect example, not on third term, of course. Recently, this once iconic figure, a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, appeared at the International Court of Justice over her country’s treatment of Rohingya Muslims. Here she was defending her country’s military against allegations of genocide over treatment of the Rohingya minority. In one book on leadership (the author of that book should have known better), she is cited as an example of leaders who have lived by example. In the book, this Nobel Peace Prize Laureate is quoted as warning leaders against tyranny, when she says: “It is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it.”

 

What is the lesson in all this? Well, always take what leaders say with a pinch of salt. By doing this, we protect them from this ill of forgetfulness. Besides, this is good insurance for nations as sacred assets.

 

Having congratulated the new leadership, and having entreated all Malawians to support and work for this Government as though the world will end after these five years, let me remind my fellow countrymen and women that we have every reason to thank GOD that we are finally out of the post-election stalemate. It is no exaggeration to say that our situation was reaching crisis levels. As we thank GOD for this opportunity, let us remember that we have left behind a lot of pain and suffering among innocent Malawians on both sides of the divide. If we mean true healing and reconciliation, there should be a way to buy them in, all of them.

 

At the same time, let whatever has happened stand as a lesson that we must, with diligence, resolve all electoral dilemmas through honest bottom-up reforms while we have time. We have paid dearly for postponing our problems under this false hope that difficult events do eventually address themselves.

 

As we prepare to address the various political and administrative ills that have dogged us for so long, let us also thank GOD for how change arrived after the June 23 Election. On this, I wish to thank Professor Peter Mutharika for conceding the Election. There is no doubt Professor Mutharika did that because, in 2014, Dr Joyce Banda had done likewise. She had set a very good example, and she must feel proud for this great example. These things are great for our democracy, for it means that no leader in future will ever make vain attempts or use empty excuses to cling on to power after the people have cried, “Enough is enough!”

 

As far as good governance is concerned, we are steadily setting the pace on the African Continent. We have joined such legends as Abdou Diof of Senegal who, in 2000, conceded gracefully to Abdoulaye Wade, a veteran opposition leader of twenty-six years. On March 19, 2000, Diof is said to have told his people: “I am full of vigour to continue, but if the people decide otherwise, I will thank the Senegalese people for having placed their faith in me for so many years and I will congratulate the winner” (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005, p. 5). For Diof, what was important was that “Senegal shows the world it is a democratic country, a country where the law is upheld and human rights are respected” (p. 5). Remember that Diouf had been at the helm of power for nineteen good years; he had every opportunity to manipulate the vote. He chose good over evil. Unfortunately, Wade was to disregard this, later making attempts to stand for a third term of office. That he failed could be attributed to the standard Diof had set in 2000.

 

Conceding elections is an important component of legitimacy in any democracy. For this reason, we must never shy away from expressing our appreciation whenever our leaders concede elections. This can become a great incentive, the only way to motivate other leaders elsewhere that there is life after conceding. Without such incentives African leaders will develop a feeling that one never leaves power unless through the door of the grave. When one considers what has happened elsewhere on the Continent as a result of some leader’s decision on election outcomes, one learns to thank GOD we can have leaders who can concede elections. The events surrounding the resumption of hostilities in Angola in the early 1990s present a saddening example.

 

According to Bridgland (2004), UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi took back Angola into war right at the time the Angolan people and the international community were yearning peace for the Angolans. Bridgland writes that this happened after Savimbi had refused to go for the run-off in the September 1992 General Elections.

 

According to Bridgland (2004), for a very long time, the West had cherished a belief that Savimbi was the man to bring plural politics to the Angolan people. However, things began to change following the fall of the Berlin Wall when the West began to flirt with Eduardo dos Santos of the ruling MPLA as well. In 1992, after 18 years of war, the Angolans headed for the general elections scheduled for September. By then, Savimbi, set for the race, had moved to the country’s capital Loanda.

 

Bridgland (2004) writes that only six months to the election, the US began to reassess their conviction on UNITA. Bridgland says this happened after the US had learnt that Savimbi had killed his deputy, Chingunji, and others, on allegations that they, with the help of the CIA and Bridgland (the author himself), had been plotting to assassinate him. Come Election, Savimbi narrowly lost, and a run-off was scheduled. Savimbi could hear none of that; he took UNITA back to a war that was to last ten more years. An opportunity lost.

 

The irony of it all is that it was General Geraldo Nunda, Savimbi’s own former commander, that killed him ten years later, on February 22, 2002. General Nunda had defected to the Angolan Government after Savimbi had refused to go for the run-off, when he made a decision to go back to war.

 

When you read things like these, you learn to thank GOD that some African leaders, ours inclusive, do know their limit and do allow their people to move on. It is something we must always thank GOD for. In Malawi, it started with Dr Hastings Banda, the first Head of State. Dr Banda had conceded both the Referendum in 1993 and the General Elections in 1994.

 

These things must also serve as a lesson for the winners to learn to respect the loser. In elections, like most competitions, “the consent of the losers is one of the central, if not the central, requirements of the democratic bargain” (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005, p. 2) (emphasis original). Therefore, citing Nadeau and Blais (1993), these five researchers remind us that it is the consent of the loser that determines continuation of democratic systems.

 

We are yet to see how this new Government―the Tonse Alliance Government―will treat Professor Peter Mutharika and the opposition in general. I hope it won’t repeat what Professor Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had done on Dr Joyce Banda after she had lost power in 2014. The DPP had made Dr Joyce Banda’s life unbearable; she had to spend a lengthy period outside the country, afraid to return to her own country. The DPP at the time had forgotten that when you bully a former Head of State, you set the standard for the type of respect your successor should accord you at the end of your tenure. Above all, harassing your successor creates a gap between you and your predecessor’s supporters. This robs you of the support you should have won from that section of membership. Remember, there is always some support for everyone.

 

At page 186 in The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and reality is a photo depicting wailing women in a village in northern Uganda. These women are mourning the death of Rask Lukwiya, a former Lord’s Resistance Army commander. According to Pletts, a few days after Lukwiya had been killed (he was killed on August 12, 2005) by the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), officials took the news (of his death) to his relatives on August 16. Pletts writes that, while the UPDF officials were around, the relatives pretended not to be concerned at all. In other words, “they fought to maintain their composure until government officials and UPDF officers had left [upon which] the women broke into inconsolable wails (weeping for this rebel)” (p. 186). There is a good lesson here.

 

Well, considering how brutal the LRA had been in northern Uganda, one would expect that no one would mourn Lukwiya, yet here were some, his relations, mourning him. It is a very strange dilemma of life.

 

Why did the DPP find pleasure in executing “revenge” or “vengeance” upon Dr Joyce Banda? Well, perhaps because her government had charged Professor Mutharika and others with treason. As it is in humans to revenge, perhaps when Professor Mutharika came to power, he felt justified to hit back. Perhaps he should have chosen a different path especially considering that she had conceded the elections.

 

I know your question would be why I am concentrating on past regimes and not on this recent Administration. Well, the new leadership is just a month in power. As we speak they are undergoing presidential socialisation, that great learning experience that eventually shapes leaders to espouse and play by the rules of pragmatic politics. Meanwhile, they are “clearing the rubble” whatever this administration seeks to mean by this euphemism.

 

By the way, I always go tetchy whenever governments use euphemisms, also called “evaluative-descriptive terms” or “terministic screens,” to frame debate on some obvious things. I have no doubt that those using these terms are doing so from a completely neutral position, but anyone who reads history well knows that use of evaluative-descriptive terms (Poole, 2006, calls them “unspeak phrases” or “doublespeak”) that fail to distinguish humans from their actions do at times trigger unintended consequences. Terms that carry emotions can spur action, negative or positive. In other words, sometimes, innocent words meant to put forward an idea or ideology do produce unintended consequences (Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). I often ask myself what this “rubble” is: does it refer to corruption per se, or those who indulge in it, or both? “Rubble” or “rabble” had once been used in Julius Caesar by Mark Anthony to evoke certain emotions; it did not end well there.

 

Fighting corruption is a noble cause; only those who do not wish their nation well will stand in the way. However, it would play to our advantage if we convince the people’s intellect rather than evoking their emotions on this virtue. This is important to avoid some mistaking it for propaganda or computational propaganda; the latter being misinformation and manipulation in digital form (Woolley & Howard, 2019).

 

In Kenya, President Mwai Kibaki of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance of opposition parties, came to power on the platform of fighting corruption. As a way to fulfill this campaign promise, he set up the Integrity and Anti-corruption Committee of the Judiciary in Kenya with the purpose to root out corruption within the judiciary. When summing up the work of this Committee, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kiraitu Murungi, used the phrase “radical surgery” but reality on the ground demonstrated that “Kibaki had wanted to replace the weeded out judges with those pliable and sympathetic to his regime and propagate the subservience of the judiciary to the executive” (Shilaho, 2018, p.117). Perhaps folk observation was correct, for soon the Government found itself at the centre of a corruption scandal of biblical proportions, one of which involving the Anglo Leasing.

 

Anglo Leasing was a shadowy company officials were using to fleece Kenya of billions of shillings through non-existent contracts―in Malawi “cashgate” was borrowed from this devilish innovation. It is said nearly 55 billion shillings went down the drain through this thieving machinery there in Kenya. It is said that in the first two years of NARC’s leadership in power, officials spent nearly $12 million on top-of-the-range vehicles, a sum which could have provided 147,000 HIV-positive Kenyans with antiretroviral treatment for 12 months (Wrong, 2009, p. 86, citing Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, and Transparency International). Where was empathy in those officials?

 

When John Githongo, Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics in the country tried to investigate, he came before a blank wall. It is said that “on 10 May (2004), Murungi (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs) warned him (Githongo) to make sure his inquiries did not ‘knock out key political people’” (Branch, 2011, p. 254). Githongo had to resign from his post in 2005, fleeing to the UK, fearing for his life. According to Branch, the President had become aware of the magnitude of the plunder but had chosen to look the other way. This is interesting considering the fact that Kibaki had told the Kenyans at his inauguration in December 2002 that corruption was now to cease as a way of life in Kenya. For him, “… those members of my government accustomed to corrupt practice [had] to know and clearly understand that there will be no sacred cows under my government” (Kiai, 2010). I find it interesting that Murungi had used euphemism only to be caught up in his own words. Murungi teaches me the power of coming in straight.

 

Well, I diverted.

 

Back to my subject: but why is leadership a problem in most African countries, Malawi inclusive? I think African leadership lacks one important ingredient: mentorship or interaction with heroes or heroines to develop a culture for robust leadership development. Most leaders had not been roundly prepared to carry out a national project of leading a people. In some cases, they got so unlucky, they “benefited” from the mentorship of worse crooks. Like father like son, they become thieves in three-piece suits. In worst cases, leaders have moved straight from the jungle (civil war) or military bases (coups) into state house. Such leaders have tended to lack empathy, that switch that triggers in us a supernatural feeling for others.

 

In my opinion, empathy is an important leadership feature without which leading turns into some tyranny of the majority. Empathy is that feeling that makes one say, “I can never do to them that which I wouldn’t want them or others do unto me.” It is this virtue―empathy―that makes people treat one another as neighbours rather than as mere friends. One difference between “neighbour” and “friend” is that one chooses a friend, but one can never choose a neighbour. A neighbour is given you by GOD.

 

As Malawians we are first neighbours. My wife is from Mzimba, a Northern Region district. I met her because she was my neighbour, that is, we lived in the same area. Not literally, of course, as she was in the valley, at a wonderful mission hospital―St Luke’s―and I was in the mountain, teaching at a great mission secondary school―Malosa. We are from where we are, and we are where we are because GOD had purposed that this should be so. In short, as Malawians we are first neighbours, great neighbours. Those who hype the language of regions, tribes, name it, are here by accident; they do not understand the purpose of our living.

 

And who are my neighbours? I like how Lord Atkin defined it way back in 1932―the neighbour principle: “persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected…” In other words, it doesn’t matter where he or she is, as long as my acts will affect him or her, that one is my neighbour. If I steal hospital drugs and affect someone in Mwanza, that one is my neighbour as I owe him or her some great duty of humanity. My understanding of all this is that, it is GOD who gives you a neighbour. It is up to you to handle them in a manner that will please GOD or not. Neo-patrimonialism―this feelings that everything must belong to us and the leader we protect and serve―is a strong manifest of lack of empathy or love for others, hence a fundamental failure on our part.

 

Like us all, our leaders have tended to lack genuine empathy. For me, one reason for this is that, our leadership, especially after 1994, has been deprived of the cauldron interaction needed to cook great leadership. In short, they have had no opportunity to learn leadership by living it. We have a very poor leadership nurturing culture in Malawi today.

 

In the late Nyasaland or early Malawi, most of our early leaders interacted with great cultures and heroes. From this, they acquired and appreciated values that enhanced practical politics, pragmatic politics, if you want. Take Masauko Chipembere, for example, where he attended his university education afforded him a great learning experience outside classroom knowledge.

 

Masauko Chipembere was at Fort Hare from 1952 at the age of 21. According to Nelson Mandela, who had been there from 1939, Fort Hare, opened in 1916, “was a beacon for African scholars from all over Southern Central and Eastern Africa … it was Oxford and Cambridge, Harvard and Yale, all rolled into one” (Mandela, 1995, p. 58). Among the great benefits those who attended Fort Hare derived from that great institution was its great culture, one that transcended all racial and tribal biases.

 

According to Meredith (2010), as a mission institution, on Sunday mornings Fort Hare saw to it that her students went out to nearby villages on foot to conduct services and Sunday Schools. Thus, interacting and identifying with the people, or speaking in public came to be part and parcel of a culture of Fort Hare. By these skills, you could therefore tell those who had been to Fort Hare.

 

As for Dunduzu Chisiza, Power (1998), writes that,

 

[W]hile Chipembere was a popular figure in Nyasaland, Dunduzu Chisiza enjoyed a positive international profile. He had participated in constitutional and economic talks in London and made a favourable impression. He had been warmly received in the United States and West Germany. He corresponded with a host of development 'specialists' including W. W. Rostow of the US who called him 'a spirited leader in the cause of African development' (p. 382).

 

In the case of Kanyama Chiume, he attended his university education at the great Makerere University. Besides, he was so close to such heroes as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, and even Nasser of Egypt (no wonder Nasser, through his ambassador in Zomba, had supported the so-called rebel ministers during the Cabinet Crisis, see Metrowich, 2005, p. 155). Even Dr Banda himself was well-read, well-informed, well-connected. Dr Banda had been to South Africa, the US, Britain, Ghana. Throughout he interacted with great minds and a diversity of cultures, including serving as church elder. The fight for Independence was a convergence of a cream of leaders and experiences. No wonder, they loved debate. Dr Banda used to gather his people for debates in Zomba. It was a great culture.

 

Perhaps I should mention that what these giants did wherever they were defined more who they became. It is not necessarily the university you attended; it is more what you did and how you did it there. Was it something that presented you with an opportunity to understand the people better? Our Independence heroes and heroines wrote books, took part in various activities that sought to uplift human lives, name it. They were therefore prepared to be servants of the people, leaders called unto their roles to bring change for greater human wellbeing.

 

It was also a culture that taught them to identify with those in need. Debates helped them achieve this. Unfortunately, over the years in my country, debate or critical voice has been taken to signify attempts to sow seeds of confusion.

 

Why African leadership tends to be a failed project can also be explained by the fact that most African countries consider bullying of opposing voices part and parcel of politics. Malawi has lost a number of productive lives to this culture of violence and intimidation, which sometimes comes through use of legal channels―the Venezuela style.

 

I think Africa has had little or no opportunity to consider seriously whether a culture of bullying does work. The truth of the matter is that bullying always has a boomerang effect. First, how you treat others determine how they will treat you when you leave power. Second, bullying affects followers’ level of performance.

 

Writing on effects of abrasive or bullying leadership on performance in Australia, Salicru (2017) observes that 75 per cent of employees surveyed there in 2016 reported that the country’s workplaces needed better managers and leaders, that is, not the type that tended to be abrasive. According to Salicru, citing a 2012 federal parliamentary inquiry by the Productivity Commission, abrasive leaders also called “bullying bosses” cost the Australian economy between $6 billion and $36 billion a year.

 

But why do African leaders seem to enjoy so much bullying of opponents? The answer is: poor nurturing which breeds ruthlessness. This lack of empathy has benefited from a similar culture taught us by colonialism. Colonialism taught us that humiliation of an enemy or an opponent represents finality. At independence, Africa adopted it, perfected it, making it an instrument of neo-patrimonialism with which to serve greed and a sense of invincibility.

 

Aldrich (2018, p. 1) writes on how Le Monde illustré, a popular French newspaper, had celebrated “deposed and pensioned off kings” in 1912. The newspaper described this humiliation as a “political necessity” that had required the dethroning and banishment of indigenous rulers. Among such deposed and banished indigenous leaders were Vietnamese emperor Ham Nghi, the deposed sultan of Grande Comore, and two Africans, Dinah Salifou from Guinea and the son of Béhanzin, exiled ruler of Dahomey.

 

Aldrich (2018) also gives accounts of the denigrative view the colonialists had of the so-called natives and their chiefs. For example, Aldrich reports of the lowly terms Robert Baden-Powell, a military officer and later founder of the Scouts movement, had used to describe Prempeh, the chief of Kumase (Ghana) and paramount sovereign (Asantahene) of the Ashanti confederation. According to Aldrich, Baden-Powell described the Ashantis as a people with brains “non-receptive to progress”. Badan-Powell, at the time a British officer in a campaign against the Ashantis in the 1890s, is also said to have compared the intelligence of a black race to that of an ox. With this mentality, subdued kings and queens were subjected to worse humiliation, among which confinement and banishment.

 

When we gained independence we allowed ourselves to espouse a creed that sought to subdue and humiliate those who had not shared our ideologies. In Malawi, we punished people for their stand on religion, or chiefs for not supporting the fight for Independence. The culture of tolerance seemed to have failed this time. You would ask why the change here when earlier on I praised our Independence heroes as being better leaders. Well, when you compare those leaders with the crop we have had since 1994, the Independence fighters are by far saints.

 

For some two reasons, after the change to multiparty politics in 1993, Malawi, like most African countries, failed to embrace the culture of tolerance. The first reason can be explained by the effects of the carnival associated with the fall or dismantling of Communism at the fall of the Berlin Wall. The other could perhaps be the birth in the US formal political circles of a culture that viewed political opponents as enemies to be routed and embarrassed.

 

In Eastern Europe, breaking with the past carried with it some symbolism of violence against iconic structures associated with Communism. The people therefore vented their anger on mere structures associated with history of Communism. To many, the impression was that change without obliteration of symbols and figures did not represent a complete break with the past. Everything past had to go for change to mean change. In Africa, where we did not have our own wall, symbols of single party regimes had to be obliterated and regimes themselves pushed all the way to the edge of the grave. In most cases, the leaders surrendered the throne following violent protests, structures which carried their names were dismantled or reconfigured.

 

Within this period, something happened in America. According to Haidt (2012), in the early 1990s, Congress set out new rules in politics, rules that literally discouraged friendships and social contacts across party lines. For Haidt, “once the human connections were weakened, it became easier to treat members of the other party as the permanent enemy rather than as fellow members of an elite club” (p. 212). Thus, you would do a whole research simply to dig out somebody’s dirt to feed the media frenzy to thrust yourself into some favourable limelight. Now, more than ever before, as it was backed by official rule, politics had come to symbolise a game where to survive you had to destroy another. If the 2016 campaign in America is anything to go by this culture seems to be growing (in stature).

 

In Africa, a setting already beset by sharp ethnic frictions, these factors fuelled a tension that bordered on chaos. Even elections, this important measure of democratic quality, now mean “nothing other than an ethnic census [where] the leaders hailing from the majority ethnic groups have a higher chance of winning elections than those hailing from minority groups” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017, p. 8). Political campaigns thereof, therefore, resemble sessions for attacking personalities, nothing on ideologies and policies through which these nations can rise from these ashes.

 

Does Malawi have some opportunity to change herself? Well, a lot if I may say. However, the question is where we should start from. Well, apart from understanding where we are coming from, we must also take effort to appreciate where we stand today as a nation. My interest here is the latter.

 

The current state of Malawi is that of a country negotiating turbulence in the midst of wicked problems. This knowledge―sense-making―is crucial if we are to pick out the signals of dangers intent to rout us. Once we pick them out we should rest assured of decision making that is based on evidence.

 

Turbulence, wicked problems and the opportunity for public sector reforms

The Malawi political and policy ship is currently negotiating violent turbulence. Although turbulence might suggest negative forces, they offer nations an opportunity to turn things around, to start afresh. In political science and organisational theory, turbulence refers to “situations where governance organisations and institutions must cope with (and sometimes create) highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected, and/or unpredictable political and managerial demands (or simply precipitous, conflicting, and novel governance challenges” (Ansell, Trondal, & Øgård, 2017, p. v). In many aspects, therefore, turbulence resembles wicked problems, or problems that are so elusive that “at first sight, grappling with them might seem like taking up lost causes” (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 712,). In the words of Daviter (2017, p. 4):

 

Wicked problems lack a single root cause or clear point of origin. Both causes and symptoms of the problem are connected to a plethora of interdependent factors. They are interconnected problems constellations, rather than easily identifiable single issues. Problem boundaries are diffused, and problems are difficult to scope and delineate from neighbouring problems. The contours of the problem and the pattern of its constituent components change over time in ways that are poorly understood and with effects that are difficult or impossible to predict.

 

Wicked problems are a common theme in health and climate change. Consider the advent of COVID-19 and how complex the issue has become not only among poor developing nations but also among mature, developed and heavily industrialised nations.

 

The state of both turbulence and wicked problems presents a rare opportunity for change and innovation. Public sector reforms, also called administrative reforms, offer one avenue for that renewal. By public sector reforms, I mean “formal changes in political and administrative processes and structures in institutions of governance (with the objective of getting them to run better or to produce better results or outcomes, including equality)” (Breidahl, Gjelstrup, Foss Hansen, & Balle Hansen, 2016, p. 228). Good reforms for us should target both our politics (political reforms) and our public administration (public sector or administrative reforms).

 

Reforms are often controversial and difficult, but are necessary. Speaking of public sector reforms, Durevall (2003) citing Collier and Gunning (1999), writes that “although public sector reforms are difficult and complex, making a good record of performance hard to establish, they are important for the promotion of good governance in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 129). If we want to thrust ourselves forward, we must submit ourselves to this revolution.

 

Our present state of affairs means Malawi is ripe for reforms. Kikeri, Kenyon and Palmade (2006), writing for the World Bank, summarise this better when they observe that political change and crises offer nations some window of opportunity for reforms. Their argument is that “new governments or new political leaders tend to benefit from a “honeymoon” period in which opposition parties and interest groups are less likely to oppose reform, and reformers have enough time before new elections to win back the support of groups that might be alienated by reforms” (p. 20). Malawi enjoys this opportunity today.

 

As we embark on this, we should be conscious to a number of vices that can restrict progress. These include culture of neo-patrimonialism; demography and geography; and preference for majoritarian rather than consensus organisation.

 

Malawi and neo-patrimonialism

Neo-patrimonialism refers to a system of governance where leaders provide their followers or supporters with rents or benefits in exchange for support, loyalty or legitimacy. Already the Tonse Alliance (“Tonse” literally meaning “something that is for all of us”) has come under fire for breaching ethical trust through, for example, appointments into cabinet of people belonging to same families, among others. In some cases, this is not an entirely dangerous attempt, because one would need trusted lieutenants to help one carry out important functions, especially security. It is said that when President Ronald Reagan was about to enter the operation room following assassination attempt in 1981, he first sought assurance from the surgeons. “I hope all of you are Republicans,” Mr Reagan is said to have said.

 

He might have said this in jest, but the lesson is clear here: you have to be doubly sure of the people that surround you, those unto whose hands you trust your very life. However, leaders ought to draw some line beyond which it could become ethically unfeasible to justify some selection or choices.

 

One danger with neo-patrimonialism is that it blinds leaders from initiating policies that should reach across the board. In other words, neo-patrimonialism does breed what political science calls pork-barrel, a tendency whereby “government programmes or policy interventions benefit a narrow group of citizens often in the leader’s home district” (Menocal, 2014, p. 12).

 

One way through which scholars distinguish public interventions conceives policies through the eyes of Lowi (1964) who puts them under four categories: distributive policies, redistributive policies, regulatory policies, and constituent policies. According to Knill and Tosun (2011), distributive policies are those interventions which see resources being distributed from the government to particular recipients. The two authors add that redistributive policies facilitate transfer of resources from one societal group to another, while regulatory policies specify conditions and constraints for individual or collective behaviour. On the last one, constituent policies, the two authors write that such policies seek to create or modify the states’ institutions. Neo-patrimonialism creates chaos in that same and same interventions are prioritised. For example, leaders might encourage distributive policies simply to benefit their regions or ethnic groups, even where redistributive interventions should have been the appropriate policy.

 

Sometimes leaders use neo-patrimonialism to create a leadership that will facilitate wishes of the regime better. In some cases, even the fight against corruption comes to represent a machinery through which to achieve this. In the words of Ganahl (2013), “accusations of corruption hurled by up-and-coming African politicians at the ancien regime often stem less from an abhorrence of corruption than from their own desire to ascend to power and take control of the means of dispensing patronage” (p. 56). I am doubly sure that our fight against graft is entirely not driven by motives to feed neo-patrimonialism.

 

The restricting vices of demography and geography

The second set of problems which can play against administrative reforms in this country pertains to demography and geography. In other words, this subject looks at problems that wild population increase and the fact that Malawi is landlocked can create in this country. On population increase, the following table should convince us to do something about our situation.

 

Population and Area (World Bank)

Country	Population in 2016	Area
Malawi	18,091,575 (3.3)	118,484 sq km (land: 94,080 sq km)
Zambia	16,591,390 (2.9)	752,618 sq km (land: 743,398)
Mozambique	28,829,476 (2.4)	799,380 sq km(land: 788,380 sq km)
Tanzania	55,572,201 (2.7)	947,300 sq km (land: 885,800 sq km)
Zimbabwe	16,150,362 (1.56)	390,757 sq km (land: 386,847 sq km)

 

The gravity of this issue here is that we are packing nearly 19 million people on a land that is only 94 000 sq km. We beat both Zambia and Zimbabwe who boast, respectively, 743 000 sq km and 390 000 sq km. The fact is that “an increase in real per capita income in a country, of say, 3% every year would be completely offset by an annual population increase of 3%” (Ghosh & Siddique, 2015, p. 4). Thus, at this rate of increase, any economic gain we can make is bound to be eaten out right away. Ghosh and Siddique therefore warn that it is not feasible for a country like Malawi to grow without some strict population control policy. I think they are right. Imagine our population has jumped by a staggering 35%, from 13,029,498 in 2008 to 17,563,749 in 2018 (National Statistical Office, 2018). The World Bank Group (2018) has since warned that, this increase, expected to double by 2038, poses great challenges for poverty reduction.

 

We are acting as though we never care at all. As shows the table Malawi annual increase is 3.3%, beating Zambia at 2.9% and Zimbabwe whose is a mere 1.56%. It must be strange courage doing this on a land so small.

 

In the case of the country’s geographical disadvantages, Malawi seems to resemble Egypt in the sense that her geography inherently decapacitates it. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), some researchers blame poverty in Egypt on geography. Such researchers cite the fact that Egypt is landlocked as an exasperating factor.

 

I personally find geographical position an issue in that it likely impacts on transportation costs, among other factors. In other words, high transportation costs are likely to contribute to problems of both importation and exportation. In Malawi the situation is compounded by the fact that Malawi has very few opportunities.

 

Currently, Malawi has almost no industries at all. Some of the reasons for this are beyond us, because we had listened for gospel truth what the West had preached to us on privatisation. During the early 1990s, the West had persuaded our Government to slough off industries, arguing that business and government didn’t go together. Unfortunately, most of the new companies quickly got what they wanted and quickly abandoned ship. Today, we import almost everything.

 

Majoritarian organisation versus consensus organisation

The last factor that will determine successful implementation of our political and administrative reforms is the extent to which the current leadership will value, tolerate, and promote consensus organisation. Consensus organisation encourages wide representation for robust but relevant consultation and engagement.

 

There are a number of ways democracies organise or run their governments. One such categorisation considers electoral systems in terms of whether they are majoritarian or are proportional. Proportional systems are sometimes called consensus arrangements.

 

Under majoritarian organisation, election for selection of a government constitutes a critical component (Thomassen, 2014). In other words, whichever party wins the ballot assumes that it has attained what it is that gives it the mandate to rule. A government formed therefrom assumes that it is accountable mostly to the electorates, those who voted it into power. The majoritarian arrangement therefore stresses the value of accountability, mostly to the principals―the electorates or constituents. The current Government which won by nearly 60% of the vote would therefore argue that its mandate arises from the fact that nearly 60% endorsed it at the poll.

 

It is different, however, under the consensus arrangement. According to Kriesi (2015), under consensus models of democracy, also known as proportional systems, the major function of elections is to elect Parliamentarians or representatives in a manner that should represent the diversity of the electorate as a whole. In other words, the criterion for the democratic quality of the system is how representative parliament or other bodies really are. It is said that whereas “majoritarianism refers to the rule of the majority without any consideration of the views or the rights of the minority, consensus democracy refers to the rule of as big a majority as possible” (Grigoriadis, 2018, p. 1) (emphasis mine). This means consensus type of democracy goes beyond majority vote by giving opportunities to even those who had not voted it into power.

 

A Government that is consensus-minded will therefore say that although it managed to get 60% of the vote, the 40% that did not vote for it also matter. Such a government thus, would make every effort to accommodate this 40%. The consensus model therefore stresses the value of inclusiveness in that it applies great effort to ensure even those who did not vote for that leader find democracy meaningful. It therefore creates some mechanism through which these others, for example, minorities and those in the opposition, are afforded as much room as possible for active participation in running of the affairs of their government.

 

Although such arrangements as federalism and the Senate are important institutions to achieve consensus, there are other subtle yet equally effective mechanisms through which a majoritarian arrangement can include others. One important route is the deliberate involvement in government affairs of special interest groups and minorities or even members of the opposition.

 

When one considers nation-building, majoritarian organisation resembles the concept of nation-state while consensus arrangement resembles what is described as multi-cultural model of nation-building. According to Dersso (2008), the nation-state model tends to ignore or disregard and even suppress or combat expressions of ethnic identity. This is because it stresses the power of national unity through surrendering of individual ethnic identities and feelings. Dersso writes that at the heart of the nation-state model is the idea that “there has to be coincidence between the nation as a culturally and linguistically homogenous entity and the state” (p. 7).

 

As for the multi-cultural model, Dersso (2008) writes that it does not attempt to create a homogenous national identity since “it recognises the reality of the various ethno-political communities constituting a state and institutionalises mechanisms to accommodate their interests” (p. 7). In other words, this model appreciates and applies effort to nurture a sense of allegiance of their individual members to the state. Therefore, the state puts in place deliberate policies and institutions that encourage and allow full participation of these various values and identities with the goal to achieve national identity. In the case of Malawi, one would expect deliberate policies to encourage and nurture the Lomwe Culture, the Tumbuka Culture, the Yao Culture, the Ngonde Culture, the Ngoni Culture, etc., without creating a situation where one tribe or culture seeks to reign over others, but where one tribe, etc., respects the others for common good.

 

All previous regimes in this country failed miserably to make use of consensus arrangement (or the multi-cultural model of nation-building) despite the fact that this organisation resembles democratic leadership style more. Remember that democratic leadership style as opposed to autocratic leadership style brings others into the decision-making fold and encourages sharing of ideas and opinion (Phillips, 2016). For the reason, Phillips argues that it results in ideas being more balanced, creative solutions being found, people getting more involved and therefore becoming their own masters, and more invested in future.

 

Another advantage of democratic leadership style is that it leads to consensus. Democracy “points towards both the idea of a collective act and the notion that such an act is often subjected to contestation” (Jones, et al. 2016, p. 425). Thus, “democracy in its widest application is a form of critique, a way of getting critical purchase on how we live as human beings and is itself a way of living with others” (Schostak, 2016, p. 4).

 

Consensus organisation is not without limitations, though. According to Phillips (2016), proportional arrangements or simply consensus organisation, can slow down or even delay processes. He adds that, in some cases, people without required knowledge can be given a say in things they know little about. In this way, the low literacy levels in the country, strict adherence to such consultation can backfire, for example, through waste in terms of time. Despite this, I find consensus arrangement in form of involvement in government of minorities or other members an arrangement befitting our economic, socio-cultural and political landscape. In other words, the Malawi terrain requires a balance of majoritarian organisation, one that relies on elections, and proportional or consensus arrangement, one that centres on the power of involving others in the running of the affairs of their country.

 

Consensus-minded arrangement ensures that both forms of accountability―vertical and horizontal―are made use of in governance. Genuine democracy requires that the people as principals are respected through provision of mechanisms through which they can check their governments even after elections. This is what is referred to as vertical accountability. At the same time, it requires that powerful voices of the third sector―civil society organisations and all those who did not elect a particular government―is afforded space to exercise unfettered horizontal checks and balances. Both forms of accountability are crucial, as governance in the twenty-first century is not a business of the few, but of all the people, including the CSOs. Anything to the contrary, leadership signally fails as democracy begins to operate in terms of power over others rather than power with others.

 

The concept of exercise of power over others entails subduing and humiliating the vanquished, those who lost it, or those without a voice. In contrast, the notion of exercise of power with others “occurs in mutually agreeable patterns of covenantal relationships in which patterns of social accountability are broadly shared among those constituting diverse patterns of association and communities of relationships” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 273). Every way, power with others stands for the virtue of inclusiveness or consensus.

 

Power over others is a preferred form of organisation among most African leaders. One reason such leaders find this organisation―majoritarian arrangement―attractive can be explained by their tendency to mistake elections for democracy. A government can win elections and therefore the initial trust or legitimacy, but democracy requires that this trust be sustained. It is the sustaining component that eludes our leaders, as they tend to take their ascending to power as meaning their attaining legitimacy and trust, wholesale. It takes more than elections to build a nation, as elections alone do not constitute democracy. In fact, elections alone can never define democratic quality. Mali is a good illustration.

 

According to Van Eerd (2017), what happened on March 21, 2012 in Mali had come as a surprise to many, as, prior to that, the world had believed that democracy was on the right track in this West African nation. But things changed dramatically on that day―the country experienced its first military coup and breakdown of its electoral regime since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. No one had expected this because “Mali was considered to be one of the few fairly functioning democracies on the African continent that had held eight free, and mostly fair, parliamentary and presidential elections during its two decades of multiparty competition” (p. 1). Van Eerd writes that this had therefore defied conventional wisdom espoused by such critics and researchers as Huntington (1991), Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Moehler and Lindberg (2009), and Levitsky and Way (2010). According to Van Eerd, these critics had espoused a belief that “peaceful turnover through the ballot box and the termination of electoral one-party dominance are strong indicators of high quality of democracy and full democratisation” (p. 1). The problem with Mali, therefore, was that they had built their castle in majoritarian organisation which depends largely on the so-called free and fair elections.

 

In short, beating a party in power does not necessarily mean the new regime assumes legitimacy wholesale; the trust or the legitimacy ought to be sustained on a regular basis. The DPP had beaten a ruling party―the People’s Party of Dr Joyce Banda―yet the DPP was to fail big time to adhere to great principles of democracy in this country. In Senegal, the removal from power of a dominant party in 2000 did not prevent the new leader, Abdoulaye Wade, from seeking a third term of office.

 

Leaders should therefore be entreated to look beyond the ballot box when defining democracy in this country. Moisés (2016), citing Karl (2000), cautions against what they call “electoralist fallacy” or simply the tendency to “privilege electoral process and procedures over other important dimensions of democracy, failing to acknowledge how exclusionary practices can undermine democratic relationships in the interaction among citizens and between citizens and their elected leaders” (p. 239). Moisés attributes this problem to the tendency to present democracy from the eyes of Schumpeter (1942) who defines democratic political regime as the institutional arrangement designed to produce political decisions by actors chosen in competitive elections, that is to say, majoritarian organisation.

 

Moisés (2016) therefore seems to suggest that our definition of democracy must be as robust as possible lest our thinking and approach should mislead us. I find the definition the Economists Intelligence Unit (EIU) proffers absolutely intelligent. According to Moisés, the EIU defines democracy in terms of five criteria: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political culture, political participation, and civic liberties.

 

If we are to approach our democracy this voluminously, what Hawkesworth (2016), observes will begin to make sense and our democracy will be different and exemplary on the African Continent and beyond. Hawkesworth writes that,

 

as an ideal, democratic governance respects the dignity of human beings, affords rights and immunities to individuals, prevents abuse of power by government officials (or provides remedies for removal of abusive governments), fosters individual freedom, encourages collective action to achieve political benefits, provides opportunities for political innovation, and maintains mechanism through which citizens can hold government accountable (p. 215).

 

So, how can this new Government achieve this consensus organisation? Well, here are a number of suggestions or recommendations for that purpose.

 

Understand that processes matter as well as outcomes

There are basically two criteria to evaluate or measure political systems: the quantity and quality of the desired outcomes the system produces, and the process through which those outcomes are derived (Rose, 2014). When outcomes reflect the wishes and preferences of the people, including of the minority or the median voter, congruence is said to have been achieved. In this way, a government can be said to have been successful. However, how those decisions were made to arrive at these desired outcomes matters as well as outcomes themselves.

 

Regimes that emphasise outcomes are as good as dictatorships where a people can prosper because their government is able to meet their economic needs yet those people enjoy no freedom at all. Emphasis on accountability derived through majoritarian consensus usually leads to desired outcomes although often achieved without consensus or consultation. Thus, our Government should be encouraged to see to it that it is truly democratic by encouraging consultations through mechanisms which facilitate consensus organisation. Consultation is an important component of governance as it promotes policy ownership thereby enhancing support and performance. According to Salicru (2017), lack of engagement or consultation is to blame for leadership failure in organisations in Australia, costing the country’s economy some $54.8 billion a year in 2013 alone.

 

Learn from the success of others on consensus democratic organisation

Summarising why Botswana has remained relatively a star performer as far as good governance is concerned, Ganahl (2013) citing Acemoglu et al (2003), points to a culture of consensus as one of the main factors. According to Ganahl (2013), Botswana faces similar challenges as Malawi, for example, both are land-locked, yet how she organises her politics makes us look amateurs.

 

It is not that Botswana hadn’t faced strong opposition. In fact, Khama of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had faced with opposition from both traditional chiefs and white settlers. However, he considered it an opportunity, bringing them together with the less radical element of the new elite under the liberal democratic ideology of the BDP. In fact, Ganahl (2013) writes that when Khama’s party saw a threat in the opposition, “it never moved to eliminate the opposition, but undertook extensive investment in the country to show its constituents that the party was doing its job. This included widespread investment in rural areas, encompassing infrastructure, health and education” (p. 238).

 

According to Ganahl (2013), Khama was also innovative and successful in breaking the power of the chiefs, forbidding them from sitting in the public assembly, while still including them in the political process. Khama is also said to have done something novel in that, although he had all the opportunity to accumulate wealth as prodigious diamond mines were found in his home region, he ensured the mineral rights belonged to national government. Ganahl believes that this had helped significantly in staving off intertribal conflict over diamond revenues (p. 238). The lesson here is that good things should belong to the national pot, to benefit all Malawians rather than only a section of the population.

 

Make every effort to connect with the society

It is said that “widespread corruption is a symptom of a problem that runs deeper than the morality of the personnel in power and the solidity of institutions; it is a sign of lacking mutually advantageous dependence between the state and society” (Ganahl, 2013, p. 234). One way to address this lies in working to engage in a “much larger task of promoting socioeconomic development as a whole” (p. 234). In other words, work to fulfill policy congruence or opinion congruence.

 

Policy congruence also called issue congruence or ideological congruence refers to the degree to which policy preferences (and even wishes) of citizens as political equals are reflected in policies pursued or adopted by the government (Rosema, Denters, & Aarts, 2011, p. 12, citing Powell, 2000). According to della Porta (2013), citing Dahl (1971), policy congruence constitutes the fundamental characteristic of democracy itself. Perhaps this is the reason Rosema, Denters and Aarts equate policy preference with democratic quality itself. In some way, policy congruence resembles public trust, or “the expectation that policy will correspond to public wishes” (Prebble, 2012, p. 4).

 

According to De Vries (2002), policy congruence is one major way to measure delivery quality. This is because “the extent to which governmental organisations deliver quality (where quality means the ability to meet citizen’s expectations) depends on their relations between actual performance and citizens’ expectations” (p. 301). This means that the public sector has to (meticulously) read the sentiments of its citizens in order to determine what and how to deliver quality public goods and services.

 

It should be pointed out that, this can produce some unintended consequences. For example, attempts to involve too much participation does backfire through what is known as the Goldilocks conundrum, or simply the determination of how much and what kinds of participation is appropriate for a particular issue (Booth & Seligson, 2009, p. 144). In some cases, attempts to please the people through, say, increase of salaries, may rub the donors on the wrong side, something that can attract some condemnation and even penalties. At the same time, if such interventions are done haphazardly, they can trigger inflation and other societal ills. In some cases, they may spark dissatisfaction in that other sectors might begin to demand equal treatment, opening a flood gate of demands which government can fail to meet. There is thus a need to balance various interests while being pragmatic and strategic.

 

One way to contain expectations lies in instituting a robust co-governance and co-production arrangement through a healthy engagement with the third sector or the civil society organisations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Thus, governance should take a whole-of-governance view, that is, taking into account all the three governance sectors in society or public space―the public sector; the private sector; and the private non-profit sector or simply the third sector “which includes voluntary organisations, non-profit organisations, non-profit institutions (NPIs), non-governmental organisations, associations, civil society, social economy, solidarity organisations, cooperatives, mutuals, foundations and, more recently, social enterprises” (Enjolras, 2018, p. 2, citing Salamon et al, 2004).

 

Third sector or third sector organisations refers to those organisations between the state (public sector) and the market (the private sector) (Jenei & Kuti, 2008). In the whole of governance approach, the concept of co-production breaks the barrier between the regular producers of goods and services (the public sector), and the clients (citizens, interest groups, etc.) who demand, consume and evaluate them.

 

Another important reason for connecting with society is that we need them to understand that campaign and reality are two different scenarios. At campaign we speak to persuade in order to win. Thus, during campaign we hardly tame our tongues. This is now time to reason with them to please understand that the Schumpeterian ‘constructive destruction’ we promised does take time, and, in worst cases, might never happen at all. Schumpeterian constructive destruction refers to “a situation where old, inefficient forms of social activities are destroyed and replaced by more efficient and better systems” (Kangas & Palme, 2005, p. 1). Moreover, we must understand that even if we meet their demand today, that alone won’t at all quench their hunger for more. According to OECD (2005), “citizens’ expectations and demands of governments are growing, not diminishing: they expect openness, higher levels of service quality delivery, solutions to more complex problems, and the maintenance of existing social entitlements” (p. 13).

 

A word of caution ought to be had here, however, namely that such connect with the society should never harbour neo-patrimonial motives. These people ought to be considered equals or partners in nation-building.

 

Put in place robust Open Government instruments

This means passing and executing robust pieces of legislation and other tools that promote critical public participation and collaboration, openness, transparency, and accountability. For me, this is the only way that democracy will remain a conflictual process of inclusionary adaptation, that is, a system strong enough to oppose elitist democracy. Elitist democracy is that form of democracy which creates an unhealthy situation which allows only the powerful, well-connected, and intolerant to find a fertile ground on which to concentrate wealth and power among themselves, at the exclusion of the poor (Nylen, 2003, p. 4). Elitist democracy leads to civic disengagement, or a situation where voter turnout, trust in public institutions, and the people’s participation in civil society decline. Perhaps this explains why cases of vote spoiling are on the increase the world over. One extreme form of vote spoiling deserves my attention here―the one Serbia witnessed in 2012.

 

According to Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik (2014), the outcome of the parliamentary elections in Serbia in 2012 had given victory to the conservative and one-time nationalist Tomislav Nikolić (and his Serbian Progressive Party, SNS), and Slobodan Milošević’s former Serbian Socialist Party (SPS). Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik write that a closer inspection of the results revealed a relatively low voter turnout (57.8 percent) and a relatively high percentage of invalidated ballots (4.37 percent). It seems the people had not wanted to vote in the SNS and the SPS, but by deliberately spoiling their ballots, they voted the SNS and SPS in. In some cases, some voters took the ballots home. They eventually posted them on social media websites, some bearing messages such as “You no longer represent anyone”.

 

One way to avoid such disillusionment with democracy lies in creating a truly open, transparent and accountable government that encourages active citizen participation. Open Government, thus, presents the answer. According to Meijer, Curtin, and Hillebrandt (2012), Open Government simply refers to “the extent to which citizens can monitor and influence government processes through access to government information and access to decision-making arenas” (p. 13).

 

One benefit of Open Government is that it creates ownership and therefore trust and collective responsibility among the citizenry. This is because “incorporating the views and preferences of members of the public directly into the policy process in ways that treat all citizens as reasonable equals not only helps to build confidence in a democratic system but also legitimizes final policy choices by imbibing in citizens a sense of ownership of policy outcomes” (Kpessa, 2011, p. 31, citing Cohen, 1989, & Cohen & Sabel, 1997). How can our new Government benefit from this?

 

Even in a home, when parents come to the open, for example, by revealing the salary and how much that salary can take the family, the members begin to appreciate the struggles. Transparency and other Open Government initiatives work the same way for governments; they help the citizenry appreciate the level of struggles and therefore nature of distribution of resources. They also help citizens feel duty-bound to help their governments, governments they trust, governments that serve them with integrity. Why governments run away from this benefit is beyond me.

 

One would say but we already have some of these instruments. Well, we do to some point. However, we should know that what we have is merely the minimum requirements. In other words, the instruments we have are not as robust as they should. In some cases, rather than facilitating access, they, in fact, hinder it.

 

In this regard, we can make our Declaration of Assets Law robust by ensuring that it adheres to the spirit of openness, namely that it should cover all public officers working in all “corruption-prone areas” while balancing it with the need to ensure it is in a form that is manageable so that it can be properly implemented and enforced (Martini, 2014, citing Wechsler 2013). This is important because in some cases, some might not be top officials but would exercise “significant authority,” influencing the ability to influence the outcome of a decision on behalf of an institution.

 

The same applies to access to information legislation. When the Malawi Congress Party (which now heads the Tonse Alliance Government) was in opposition, they advocated a robust access to information piece of legislation. The version of Bill that passed was so heavily watered down, it left the MCP reeling in anger. I had expected that their first job would have been strengthening this legislation, and then quickly operationalising it. Interestingly, they are not saying much on both issues. It is in governments to resort to weak instruments, those which will demand less of them as duty-bearers. Perhaps what Hansson, Belkacem, and Ekenberg (2015) write on this stands true everywhere, namely that most policies on transparency tend to make available only documents that already exist, not the ones that might be useful or that could be the most relevant (p. 549).

 

While in opposition, the Malawi Congress Party had also bemoaned lack of an independent entity or authority to look after issues of access to information in the country. This was important because, as argues Parasie and Dagiral (2012), independent information agencies are crucial for a robust Open Government regime. Now that the MCP heads the Tonse Alliance I felt they could seize the opportunity to institute some powerful and independent Information Authority. Personally, I am not happy that issues of access to information will be handled by the Malawi Human Rights Commission or any such bodies.

 

I am not saying that government should just allow out everything as, sometimes, too much openness does produce unintended consequences. According to Fasone and Fromage (2015), citing Lessig (2009), one disadvantage of full disclosure of government information is the inability of institutions to control the circulation and management of information by third parties (in between institutions and citizens) once the information has been disclosed. Besides, in the words of OECD, (2005, p. 187),

 

openness in itself does not necessarily improve governance, nor does it override all other public values. It should be balanced against other values of efficiency, equity, and responsibility. A significant challenge facing governments today is balancing the need to ensure greater national security with the need to preserve openness.

 

Despite this, robust Open Government instruments should be preferred. In fact, if I had been given an opportunity to advise this Government before it had assumed power, my first piece of advice would have been that it should set up a ministry to be called Ministry of Information and Open Government. This ministry would incorporate civic education, of which information is part, and other areas that deal with information. Operationalisation of Access to Information Act, issues of E-government, monitoring of declaration of assets, advocating for whistle-blower legislation, and civic education would all be under the umbrella of this Ministry. This Ministry would also work hand in hand with the Ministry of Economic Planning and Public Sector Reforms. This is because if there is an area where a lot of information is required public sector reforms is. The reason is that ownership of reforms is one of the most important ingredients for success of PS reforms.

 

Let us avoid the temptation that we can accomplish all huge feats all at once

It is said that the best way to do many things is to do one thing at a time. Evidence on public sector reforms seems to support this conventional wisdom. According to the World Bank (2008), adopting a long-term approach to policy reform taken in realistic incremental steps is one sure way to achieve public sector results. Why incremental reforms? Well, one reason is that “not all problems can be solved” (World Bank, 2012).

 

At the same time, let us sift carefully to understand key reform challenges. Identification of key reform challenges is necessary to avoid reform failures. The truth about reforms is that they will always fail where reform champions and leaders fail to pin-point key reform challenges. It is important to identify these challenges, as this is the first step towards addressing and anticipating corrective measures. The World Bank points the following as some of the key challenges to reforms:

 

How to identify the most important constraints, and how to sequence reforms? How to overcome opposition from interest groups and get reform onto the agenda? How to package reforms so that they are both credible and feasible? How to mobilize support for reform? How to create the incentives and capacity to implement reform? And how to create institutional mechanisms to drive, monitor, and sustain reform? (See Kikeri, Kenyon, & Palmade, 2006, p. 1.)

 

Understand that democracy entails a balance of contested interests

The greatest problem we have in our democracy today is that the opposition is fast drowning. Our President and even his Vice were both in the opposition against the regime of Professor Peter Mutharika. Together with 7 other opposition parties, they have now formed Government, the Tonse Alliance Government. The two lawyers who were in the defence team for the opposition leaders in the election case are now part of Government as, respectively, Minister of Justice, and Attorney General. One of the members of the defence team had declined a ministerial post, saying accepting that would have created the impression he was being rewarded as a member of the defence team for the petitioners. Why did this man do this?

 

Well, perhaps he knows that the people’s perception of their courts matters in justice. According to Cann and Yates (2016), in the US, I should suppose it should be the case in the UK too, courts have a duty to engage in public outreach efforts in order to bolster the people’s public confidence in the administration of justice. Why is this the case? Well, “a viable democracy depends upon citizen belief in the uprightness of government institutions. Nowhere is this more evident than in judicial institutions” (p. 5).

 

In my opinion, the balance of power is heavily skewed towards the Tonse Alliance Government. Above all this, the man who led the protests which many times went violent is now Minister of National Unity. This Minister, Honourable Timothy Mtambo, left the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) to start his own organisation as, to quote him, its Commander-in-Chief. The civil society organisation he was leading, that is the HRDC, is now under the tutelage of the person who was his second.

 

History on behaviour of the CSOs in Malawi sometimes produces some strange contradictions. Leaders of CSOs have switched sides, often abandoning their fierce and critical stance against a party in power to joining it eventually. Despite these small twists, the CSOs have always played a critical role in our country so much so that the history and consolidation of democracy in Malawi is hardly complete without the contributions of the third sector. What Ibrahim (2015) citing Putnam (2000), Diamond (1994), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Fukuyama (1995), writes on CSOs plays true in Malawi. According to Ibrahim, “empirical evidence shows that the chances of transitioning to democracy, of transitional democracies consolidating democratic gains, and established democracies staying the same depend on whether civil society that espouses a democratic culture emerges in these societies” (Ibrahim, 2015, p. 7).

 

Further evidence on the extent to which the scales have titled in favour of the Tonse Alliance Government can be deduced from the current configuration of the media terrain in the country. For example, the national radio, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, still unreformed, has now changed hands. It is now in the hands of the Tonse Alliance. A managing director of one radio and television station that has always represented neutrality in its strictest sense is now Minister of Information. Recently, this station floated a communiqué, explaining how that this will never at all affect its editorial policy. But in matters of governance perception matters.

 

Now how do you explain the media outlet under the Times brand, one heavily linked with the former Head of State, Dr Banda, and therefore with the MCP whose leader is the incumbent President? In fact, one popular journalist from the Times Television has just joined State House communication wing as Spokesperson for the new President. In the context of Africa, will it not be fair to say the Times Group now belongs to the ruling elites? For me, in every sense of the word, the formal media outlet in this country is now in the hands of the ruling elites.

 

Our hope should have lied in the legislature, to balance the power, but lo, we have a mono-cameral chamber of parliament whose members behave like errand boys of the executive. This is not out of choice but necessity; if you behave otherwise, you risk the boot from the feast table. History tells us that, at times, this does go savage, physically manhandling you. In fact, in Malawi, MPs, especially Independent legislators, always follow the ruling party. For example, following the 2014 Tripartite Elections, 52 candidates were voted into the Malawi National Assembly as Independent MPs yet within a month or two, 19 of them had already crossed the floor to join the ruling party at the time, the Democratic Progressive Party (Patel & Wahman, 2015, p. 88). In the same manner, between 1994 and 2007, a good 131 MPs had defected from the party that had sponsored them into Parliament, 72 of whom joining the ruling party (Young, 2009 as cited in Svåsand, 2013, p. 16). If you think I’m hallucinating, wait until Parliament opens this September early.

 

Perhaps I should remind you that the Speaker of our National Assembly is herself a top official of the Malawi Congress Party. During campaign, she was very much in the forefront fighting for the Tonse Alliance. 

 

To make things worse, the Tonse Alliance had been supported by the Church, including the quasi-religious institution, the Public Affairs Committee. In essence, anything that resembles dissent will be like tempting fate. In my opinion, currently we no longer have the opposition, as the scales have tilted too much.

 

Of course, we have the DPP and the UDF in opposition, but against a combined force of 9 political parties of the Tonse Alliance, I cannot see how the DPP-UDF bloc will present a formidable front. Besides, very soon MPs in the DPP-UDF camp should be flying en masse to the Tonse Alliance.

 

So should we be afraid?

 

Well, yes and no. Yes, because in 1994 we faced a similar dilemma when almost everything favoured the new Government. We paid dearly for that, as Parliament kept passing one bad bill after another, something which culminated in our MPs’ spirited attempts to amend section 83(3) of the Constitution, to allow the incumbent at the time, Dr Bakili Muluzi, to stand for another term of office.

 

In Kenya, the country returned to multiparty democracy in 1991. At both the first multiparty elections in 1992, and the second one in 1997, the opposition failed to remove Daniel arap Moi from power. The opposition had the best opportunity in 1997 because the ruling party―Kenya African National Union or KANU―had been weakened somehow by the 1997 constitutional reforms in the country. Thus, “while the 1992 contest had neither been free nor fair, the opposition now lost primarily because it had disintegrated into more than 20 parties and offered 14 presidential candidates” (Schmitz, 2006, p. 172).

 

When Moi failed in his third term bid, he chose Uhuru Kenyatta to represent KANU at the December 2002 elections. The announcement led to two reactions: 13 opposition parties created the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK); and internal dissent in KANU reached deafening levels. Thus, Vice President Saitoti and Raila Odinga openly opposed the choice and formed a breakaway faction within KANU, calling it ‘Rainbow’. When Moi resisted, Rainbow left KANU only two months to elections. Rainbow joined hands with NAK to form or NARC. Like our case here, the NARC torchbearer, Mwai Kibaki, won in the course winning 133 seats against KANU’s 67. The scales had titled too much.

 

Did that represent change in Kenya?

 

Well, according to Schmitz (2006), NARC started on a promising note. Schmitz citing Daily Nation writes that NARC first reduced the activities for the Office of President, from 48 to 25. However, from then on, the old pattern began to stamp itself on the new regime. First, political reforms stalled and neo-patrimonialism took over. Schmidt writes that as early as 2003, the new government found itself at the centre of a number of high-profile corruption scandals. According to Schmitz, this was despite the fact that Kibaki had included John Githongo―former head of the Kenyan chapter of Transparency International―in his first cabinet. Githongo was to resign in 2005 after noting that Kibaki’s government demonstrated it did not have commitment to the fight against corruption.

 

Within the year, that is, 2005, violent street protests rocked the country, leading to cracks within the NARC. The stage was set for more violence. So, although Mwai Kibaki was re-elected in December 2007, charges of vote-rigging from the Orange Democratic Movement candidate, Raila Odinga, saw the country plunged into post-election violence in which more than 1,000 people were to die (2017 Kenya General and Presidential Elections 2017 Final Report, the Carter Center, 2017, p. 12). It was to take Kofi Annan, Former U.N. Secretary-General, to mediate through the podium of the African Union for the two sides to come to a brokered power-sharing accord in February 2008. Thus, Odinga became the prime minister.

 

Why did the NARC fail to give the people what it had promised them? I think the leadership was not ready for true political reforms. If reforms simply aim at improving institutions but not the political culture itself, the result is always chaos. Besides, local NGOs, the international community, the opposition and name it, had created a setting where checks and balances were almost non-existent; there were very few to create some critique to make the government in power know the people were watching.

 

To my question once again: should we fear a similar situation in Malawi?

 

Well, I said: Yes and no. So far, I have discussed why it is necessary that we should fear. However, considering the promises the Tonse Alliance is giving us, I do not think there is a need for us to. If the Chakwera-led administration is bold determined on reducing presidential powers and on reaching out to the people so everyone feels this is their government, then there is no need for fear.

 

On our part, let us keep reminding our Government that by nature, democracy becomes healthier when it swims against the tide. Opposition, like competition, makes everyone better. In football, one team is always made sharper by the presence of another equally formidable one. Currently, Barcelona is undergoing some turbulence; their star, Messi has since requested a move away. You would expect Real Madrid, another giant in Spanish football to celebrate; after all, does not a weak Barcelona mean more trophies for them? But, according to former Real Madrid President, Ramon Calderon, a strong Barcelona makes Real Madrid better. Calderon therefore says he finds no pleasure in seeing a weak Barcelona. This is unlike what happens in politics.

 

Everywhere, politicians tend to find pleasure in a weak opposition. Those in the ruling therefore tend to find pleasure in creating an environment where opposition is muted or even obliterated altogether. In Malawi, it will be a sad day the day this happens, for, that day will crown the demise of our hard-won democracy. This is why we must guard against crushing of dissent or opposing views no matter the cost, and one way to do this is by reminding those in authority that “dissent” does not necessarily entail “disobedience” as one may dissent with an authority but may still obey (Levine, 2018, p. 16).

 

Meanwhile, the ball is in the court of the Tonse Alliance: do they want a terrain where those who oppose should be responded to with force or intimidation, or a landscape where engagement and civic participation will be highly encouraged right from the top towers of power? However, if engagement promises brimstone and fire, then we will do better joining the bandwagon of oily lipped social scientists now basking in the glory of victory.

 

As discussed, one way to ensure a balance in a democracy lies in putting in place deliberate mechanisms to strengthen consensus organisation. One advantage of this is that “consensus or power-sharing democracies are believed to generate stable, moderate and micro-economic policies, avoiding the ‘top-go’ abrupt policy reversals of majoritarian regimes” (Norris, 2012, p. 19, citing Knutsen (2011). Our Government has a beautiful choice to make.

 

As I alluded to already, leaders must never rely on elections alone. It is a fact that elections give leaders or representatives the foundation or bedrock on which to build more legitimacy. However, when these representatives begin the actual job of raising the wall, they must do it in a manner that sustains or even increase that bedrock-legitimacy or trust. The moment these representatives begin to do it their own way simply because they had been given it (legitimacy or trust) at elections, they lose their mandate or authority to rule. This is what section 12 of our Constitution means by “sustained trust” under “principles of our Constitution”.

 

But what mechanisms are there to ensure leaders do adhere to parameters of the authority they were granted at elections? Two ways: by law, that is, the liberal element of a liberal democracy; and by the permanent democratic requirement of continuous public accountability (Heazle, Kane, & Patapan, 2016, p. 3).

 

Law, for example, ensures that, although leaders are elected into office by the majority, they must be prevented from turning the legitimacy into a form of governance called the tyranny of the majority. Tyranny of the majority simply means use of majority mandate to suppress or victimise those that did not vote for them.

 

Running of government requires a balance of interests. These interests represent the various voices and mechanisms of accountability to ensure representation or mandate given the leaders is being exercised in accordance with a country’s supreme Agreement, the Constitution. Thus, after elections which are a source of vertical accountability, there must be democratic mechanisms to promote horizontal accountability. This can be through separation of powers, use of supreme audit institutions, the CSOs and even a balance of age and youth, old and new, those in the ruling, and those in the opposition, lawyers and true field experts, etc. Accountability also helps strike a balance between the three arms of government. In this way, accountability helps balance public administration as part of the executive, law-making, and interpretation of law.

 

There is a tendency in Malawi at the moment to tilt the scales in favour of the judiciary. Nothing wrong with this, but skew the scales too much, risk poor policy implementation. By definition, public administration is government in action or simply, “the continuously active, ‘business’ part of the government, concerned with carrying out the law, as made by legislative bodies and interpreted by courts, through the processes of organization and management” (Chakrabarty & Chand, 2012, p. 4). There is a very big difference between setting of rules and guidelines to run a government business or law, and, actually doing it, that is, public administration. In my opinion, law can never make sense if lawyers do not take time to understand public policy or public administration. Similarly, you can never make a perfect administrator if you are devoid of basic law or obvious basic principles of law.

 

Currently, there is an issue about the sale of a presidential jet in Malawi. Although there are cries that corruption might have taken place―you simply cannot rule that out in our Malawi today―the courts would never be best placed to referee on this. But I know that courts in Malawi say they handle everything―the principle of restraint hardly applies now.

 

Discussing the relations between political (civil) leadership and the military in a democracy, Houngnikpo (2010), writes that,

 

in a democracy, a well-crafted, well-understood, and carefully protected separation between political and military decisions should allow a civil supremacy over the military. Wise civilian leaders, in turn, understand that operational issues such as weapon procurement, manning levels, conditions of service in the armed forces, or strategic planning decisions, should be left to the military professionals (p. viii).

 

Unfortunately, in Africa, civilian leaders know everything, as their motive tends to centre around control of resources―manifestation of neo-patrimonialism. That running government in the 21st century requires co-governance and co-production means nothing to them. The result is always policy chaos.

 

In short, who would be best placed to give advice on military issues in a democracy? How then does it become an issue when the military gave the advice to purchase certain equipment for a certain job at a time the nation felt it was heading towards some country-country conflict? What I know is that issues of national interest ought to go beyond mere political talk. Unfortunately, Malawians, especially our lawyers know literally everything. No wonder, we keep making decisions only to reverse them a day later, like that.

 

There are matters that are best explained by experts and professionals in particular fields. This is why courts sometimes involve expert witnesses in trials; it is all because there are things lawyers would never explain as well as the experts. I have done some law and some public administration. My conclusion is that the dilemma Malawi is facing today is that the public service or the public sector is being asked to innovate, get more creative, more effective and more efficient yet our laws have not been made to accommodate these values. Worse still, the laws that run our public sector today reflect more the textbook theories (mostly from the West) rather than practice. It should therefore be a priority to review our laws to reflect practice. When doing this review, inputs of public administrators and policy makers ought to be taken into account.

 

Sometimes I ask myself whether our approach to law isn’t turning our nation into a territory under rule by law rather than rule of law, because the two are inherently different. According to Ma and Wang (2018), “rule by law refers to the combination of static laws and system, and leaves open the possibility of interference by human agents while the rule of law refers to the various aspects of the operation of the legal system, including its status, mode and process” (p. 2) (emphasis mine). Rule of law is never static; it is dynamic or innovative, anticipatory and contextual. This is why the two authors observe that it is the rule of law that offers more protection against dictatorship and the whims of any individual or group of individuals” (p. 2).

 

Demystify this leadership myth

If what I hear Dr Chakwera say about reducing presidential powers is anything to go by, we are on the right track as far demystifying the leadership myth in this country is concerned. It is a grand idea if this reducing doesn’t mean re-arranging the power within the executive.

 

Encouraging our leaders to demystify leadership should not be mistaken for disrespect. The people must respect their leaders or other professionals, but no one should fall prisoner to these issues. True demystifying will take place when our leaders fight to create opportunities for true competition in these political parties and in our public sector. Kill the founders syndrome in our parties, and so, turn party candidature selection or conventions into some serious exercise where everyone should have an equal opportunity to participate and win.

 

If we are in trouble today, it’s all thanks to poor intra-party democracy in the country. Dr Bakili Muluzi had wanted the UDF for himself and his family. Professor Bingu wa Mutharika had wanted the DPP for himself and his family and possibly, his ethnic tribe. The MCP is always Central Region. Even without going through the convention, the UTM already knows who will represent them.

 

I like the definition of democratisation Conteh-Morgan (1997), as cited in Ryan (2013, p. 2) presents: “a process of establishing a form of governance in which mechanisms are created to ensure participation at all levels of politics, responsible leadership, and civil liberties” (emphasis mine). Democracy must be at every level―intraparty, interparty, within leadership, outside it, everywhere. In Malawi, democratisation is conducting “free and fair” elections, nothing more. Let us encourage our leaders to go beyond that.

 

Political parties are key to democracy and good governance. They recruit candidates, provide the link between government and the CSOs, and form the legislature following elections. According to the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy as cited in Cross and Katz (2013), intraparty democracy or simply internal democracy ought to be one of those institutional guarantees political parties must fulfill for democracy to mean what it purports to (mean).

 

Political parties in Malawi are mostly cadre parties as opposed to truly mass parties. According to Duverger (1954) as cited in Carty (2013), cadre parties are merely arrangements of convenience for the conduct of elections, campaigns, and for maintaining contact with the candidates. For the reason, Duverger argues that such parties do not necessarily rely on central office or organised foot soldiers or followers on the ground. Carty observes that such a party “is composed of insiders―parliamentarians grouped together in their own electoral interest―and while devoted to managing their own supporters, they have no interest in linking them together in an effective wider extra-parliamentary structure” (p. 13). Carty writes further that financing of such parties is therefore through the personal resources that individual politicians command or access as well as through the patronage resources of the state that they can control. Intraparty democracy therefore receives little or no attention in such parties as they have no organised membership or truly formal structures.

 

As for mass integration or mass parties, Carty (2013) writes that their foundation lies on some distinct and substantive membership form which is also responsible for financing those parties. According to Carty, “this makes possible a party controlled by and responsive to a widespread membership, and it necessarily requires a more complex institutional design than those of the simple cadre parties” (p. 13). In such parties the membership on the ground have a say on how their party is run through well-set out mechanisms of accountability. Carty, however, cites Duverger as warning that indirect membership, for example, ethnic groups or some trade unions or SCOs supporting some political party, should not be mistaken for mass parties.

 

Strictly speaking, Malawi does not have truly mass parties. All the parties around are cadre parties which at times take some semblance of mass parties. This explains why certain “founding” families in this country obstinately refuse to free respective political parties even where such political parties are in the ICU. If democratisation is to be at every level, it should be our duty as citizens to encourage political parties in Malawi to turn themselves into mass organisations rather than cadre parties.

 

Encourage and nurture youth leadership for a healthy democracy

A number of subjects are crucial on this. I have in mind philosophy, sociology, psychology, international relations or history, English Literature that leans on criticism, public administration, law, and development studies. To the best of my knowledge, no university in Malawi teaches international relations as a truly stand-alone course although I know the Philosophy Department at Chancellor College offers MA in Ethics or something like that. This is very, very encouraging. Perhaps, what matters now is that students from those courses should be given the opportunity to apply the knowledge they acquire there. If we want true career diplomats, then let us consider this area seriously. The Department of Philosophy and the Department of History would be the right candidates for International Relations.

 

In the same vein, let us always encourage and prepare for leadership positions young people who demonstrate great promises. I see a lot of very promising young people, for example, former MP, Juliana Lunguzi. I find this lady exceptional in her approach to politics. Honestly, if I were a politician and I had Juliana as a member or a top official in my party, I would feel safe. If we would set up a mechanism through which to capture such talents and skills and nurture them for leadership positions, our politics would grow more civilised, sweeter.

 

Create some balance between public sector ownership and private sector enterprise

Most African countries are reeling in want all because in the early 1990s they had embraced wholesale the privatisation gospel. Total surrender into profit-oriented private sector, good as it is, does harm the economy in the long run somehow. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the obligation to serve the public largely falls in the hands of the state. For the reason, public entities, for example, universities, can engage in innovation and inventions to support the core activities of their universities. In this way, they can help finance some sectors, for example, research and innovation.

 

According to Kim (2010) and Chakrabarty and Chand (2012), this will remain a distant dream if organisational structures and strategies in the public sector are not adjusted to stimulate entrepreneurial activities and culture through opportunity-driven management. Perhaps this is the reason that the new mode of managing the public sector is demanding that such managers be given some greater elbowroom for managerial leadership by providing them with greater flexibility to help their institutions achieve high quality delivery of goods.

 

Encourage the building of the complete civil servant or public administrator

Currently, Malawi is implementing public sector reforms. One important question I feel we have failed to answer is whether we have the appropriate labour force or capability and capacity for that. By competent public administrator I mean those who have both the knowledge and the skills to accomplish their responsibilities.

 

Competent public administrators are better placed to achieve reform objectives, as they understand the delicate balance of public administration itself, governance, and law. Remember that public administrators work within a strict regime of laws and by-laws, something that makes it almost impossible for them to engage innovation and contemplation (Chakrabarty & Chand, 2012, p. 118). Often, balancing these interests creates a dilemma, one which cannot be solved by knowledge of constitutional law alone, or administrative law alone, or criminal law alone, or public administration alone, but by knowledge that links public law to public administration practices (Beckett, 2015). Unfortunately, literature that considers all these interests at the same time is never easy to come by.

 

Induction and in-service trainings could be one way to build complete public administrators. The Development Institute at Mpemba, our universities, for example, the University of Malawi, or the Malawi Institute of Management, could introduce courses specially couched to meet this important need.

 

Invest in strategic intelligence for the benefit of the people

Strategic intelligence which I use synonymously with strategic thinking or strategic leadership refers to “a wider process of problem solving that involves data gathering and analysis, interpretation, and speculative consideration of future developments, patterns, threats, risks, and opportunities” (McDowell, 2009). According to McDowell, strategic intelligence is a form of research which analyses issues at the level of breadth and detail necessary to tell apart threats, risks, and opportunities in a way that helps determine programmes and policies.

 

One area in which I feel we lack robust strategic intelligence as a country has to do with relations among the various faiths in this country. As I am writing this, Moslems have vowed to go to the street to demonstrate against what they are describing as perceived religious segregation. This follows the removal of a hoarding (billboard) by city council authorities after other religious persons had complained against the message it carried.

 

On the issue of security, our neighbour, Mozambique, is battling jihadists yet no one talks about it here in Malawi. In journalism, proximity is a component of newsworthiness yet none of this moves us to begin to discuss these issues seriously.

 

In the same vein, let us engage in some genuine debate on our population which is going out of hand. If we continue like this, we should never get surprised when some Malthusian disaster hits us one of these days.

 

Through strategic thinking or strategic intelligence, we will be able to foresee a lot of wicked problems and engage in proactive efforts to find answers before they strike us. Every year, we find ourselves at the mercy of floods, etc., perhaps we could do something to arrest such problems before they hit us. In this fashion, I could suggest creation of public forums through Ministry of Information or of National Unity, or Public Reforms where the people could contribute on various issues affecting them without retribution. Such issues could be analysed to establish whether they carry something that would help us run our Government better.

 

Prioritise intellectual property and integration in Job creation and employment

One way to encourage job creation is through use of intellectual property. Use relevant expertise in the area to devise mechanisms with which to help in job creation. Make deliberate efforts to make art visible in the country, to make small and medium enterprises tick in this country. Truly support the art by patronising art and sports of every nature. Let the arts policy roll, and let it receive the support it deserves.

 

Industrialisation will never happen outside laws which protect intellectual property, for example, patent and trademark. Commercialisation in sport will mean little if we do not operate it within the context of IP. Intellectual Property is at the heart of commercialisation in sport. Why is Rwanda taking part in putting their symbols on an Arsenal shirt? What do they gain from that? All these things are answered inside IP. So, take interest in this, and see why fellow countries such as Ethiopia have invested so much in this.

 

Intellectual property also holds the key to issues of local solutions, innovation and entrepreneurship in the public sector and in industries.

 

At the same time, invest in those about to retire. We can reduce retirement age through a formal attractive agreement so that those who feel they can retire at 50 or 55 with some hefty pay can do so. These can go out and open businesses that can employ more youths.

 

Lastly, start with those areas where it would be easy to attract funding. Apart from health, education and agriculture, I have in mind areas such as efforts to replenish our hills and forests, game, and the tourism sector in general. Forests can give our young people jobs while creating industry base as well as answers to problems of floods and climate change. Strategies that involve such integration align with the spirit of Sustainable Development Goals and could very easily attract attention and funding.

 

Lastly, lastly, let me express my pride that we have a State House that seems to understand the power of engagement. I have read a few “writings” by one Sean Kampondeni. I like that they are demonstrating a thorough understanding of the power of engagement and true readership. Please, keep this going.

 

Conclusion

Our politics has always been guided by neo-patrimonialism, but the current leadership has an opportunity to do away with that and bring this nation the much-needed change, genuine change. This is possible if we acquire as much knowledge as possible, if we learn to engage with others for robust answers. Let our leadership avoid growing a thick skin to criticism. At the same time, our leadership must never be afraid to ask, for knowledge is always a component of progress. Those who express a critical mind and a voice of dissent are not necessarily enemies; their wish might be to see us, together, move forward on this potential great wave of prosperity. Malawi has an opportunity to thrust herself forward, to graduate herself into a beacon of good politics, good governance, and economic prosperity on the Continent. If we all work together, this is possible, and these five years can be the most productive since Independence. We are set to give that support both in prayer and deed. However, if our leaders still stick to the old leadership style as though we are a hybrid regime―part democracy and party tyranny―these will be another five years of loss, and that will be unfortunate. Let us love our country and prepare to defend our roles when GOD finally calls us to account for this. Whether opposition or ruling, we have a great job before us, to contribute to the building and rebuilding of this wonderful place, this home, our home, Malawi. Let us pray for our leaders, knowing that their failure is our failure too, and their success, ours, as well as our children’s.

 

I love my country.

 

GOD bless you all.

 

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